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CHAPTER 1: 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
INTRODUCTION: 
Unique operation systems are the key for enduring competitive 
trends in international markets. Many international companies strive 
for it driven by economic hardships and fierce competition. However, 
they often realize it is easier to find new structures than to implement 
them. These companies have a lack of commitment for working with new 
organizational structures. They insist on continuing to operate with 
the same old system despite their search for a new one. They deny 
themselves the success of those that compromise, have a strong desire 
for change and are not afraid to dive into it. 
Some companies, like the Komatsu Corporation, have become more 
competitive in the international markets because they base their 
operations in a decentralized management structure. They follow 
guidelines along this structure, which allows their different branches 
to run their own business without any restriction from their 
headquarters. 
Their operations become very sensitive and effective to meet the 
challenges of an environment where the markets are constantly changing. 
Part of this effectiveness rests on following a decentralized management 
structure. Komatsu Corporation has attracted many new customers because 
of its approach to carve a customized organizational structure for 
itself. 
Several companies have not been as successful in their attempts to 
succeed though. Caterpillar Corporation's headquarters, for example, 
claim to have implemented a decentralized management structure to become 
a more customer oriented company. Yet their branches continue to 
operate according to a centralized structure. Such disparity has made 
Caterpillar Corporation pay a high price. The company has lost its 
customers in many markets. The old centralized system has brought upon 
unpopular practices in several countries like Turkey. These practices 
include higher prices, which have created conflicts with its customers 
and are driving them away. 
caterpillar's ambiguous management structure, flirting with both 
centralization and decentralization, has prevented it from improving its 
market share. Caterpillar also continues to lose its customers due to 
an identity crisis within its organization performance. The company must 
chose one organizational structure and stick to it to be more efficient. 
Furthermore, a company needs to have very effective controlling 
mechanism to check all of its operations around world. Only this will 
ensure that its operations proceed according to the guidelines and rules 
to protect its good public name. 
Toyota Corporation, for example, has an effective controlling 
mechanism to check all of its operations. All of its branches, like 
Kendall Toyota in Miami, operate under its headquarters1 rules and 
guidelines to meet Toyota Corporation's standards and requirements. 
Close supervision warrants it product quality and good service. Toyota 
Corporation owes its success and competitive traits to its reputation 
for having best quality products and services in the automobile 
industry. This has helped the company to increase its shares in the 
international markets. 
Ineffective controlling mechanisms on foreign operations, on the 
contrary, only help such operations to avoid complying with their 
headquarters' rules and guidelines. The branches don't feel compelled 
to change or comply with them because their company lacks the 
infrastructure to keep a close surveillance on them. Companies like 
Honda, Ford and General Motors have suffered because of some of their 
branches' unacceptable work performance, such as failing to improve the 
quality of products and services. These three companies cannot force 
their operations to comply with their companies' rules and guidelines, 
because they lack an effective controlling mechanism to supervise their 
operations. 
These companiest headquarters strive to become customer oriented 
by providing extensive information to whom is interested in learning 
about them. However, it is almost impossible to get any kind 
information from their operations in Miami. Because these neglected 
operations lead to a negative reputation and customer relations, many 
people buy products from other companies such as Toyota, which is more 
customer oriented. These three companies must improve their controlling 
mechanism to check their operations abroad, especially in Miami, and 
make sure they are strictly working under their companies' rules and 
guidelines. 
In order to become more competitive and customer oriented, the 
company must aim to stick to a single organizational structure. It 
should be able to control all of its operations to assure it is working 
according to the system dictated by its headquarters, particularly if it 
seeks to function within a decentralized structure. 
SPECIFIC PROBLEM STATEMENT: 
Many companies work very hard to become competitive in the 
international market by trying to find the best organizational structure 
and mechanism. Some companies become very successfull at implementing 
new organizational structures in their organizations. At the same time 
others have employed the wrong policies and have failed to implement 
similar organizational structures that successful companies use. 
Therefore, a company can be surprised by the realization that it 
has not accomplished its goals despite having followed some steps and 
practices of many successful companies. They immerse themselves in a 
search for the right methods and the road to success. They wonder what 
makes a company successful, but an answer to this is not easy to find. 
As a matter of fact, many companies do not have a real answer. They 
must endure a challenging struggle, and conduct an extensive search, in 
order to implement a new and effective organizational structure. Once 
the company has achieved this goal, it can become more competitive than 
others. 
CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REV1 E W 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
The drive to acquire a large slice of the industrial and 
construction machinery world market has triggered fierce competition 
between Komatsu, a Japanese company, and Caterpillar, its American 
counterpart. So far, both companies have kept increasing their profits 
and market share at a higher speed than their competitors. 
Komatsu is a multinational company. Its many divisions include 
construction equipment, engineering and construction, electronics and 
industry and machinery among others. As a whole they have turned this 
company into a highly lucrative one. In 1995 alone, Komatsu earned 
$10,562,184,000 in net sales. Its international status has not 
prevented it from making most of its sales in its home market, Japan. 
The domestic market is responsible for 66.2% of the earnings, which is 
an equivalent of $6,990,655,000. The international market takes credit 
for the remaining 33.8%. (Komatsu Annual Report 1995, pp 1). The whole 
continent of America, not just the United States, is the second place-- 
besides Japan--where Komatsu makes more money. In 1995, North, Central 
and South America have purchased products from the company for a total 
of $1,719,230,000 (Komatsu Annual Report 1995, ppl). The demand for 
construction equipment has also made Komatsu earn $7,443,759,000, an 
amount also included in the annual net sales (Komatsu Annual Report 
1995, pp 1). 
Even though Komatsu Corporation has increased its market share by 
increasing its sales and profits, it still holds the second place behind 
Caterpillar which is the world's largest manufacturer of heavy machinery 
and equipment both in US and international market. So far, Caterpillar, 
its US counterpart, still takes the lead in such endeav0rs.l Being the 
world's largest manufacturer of industrial and construction machinery 
and equipment allows it to have a $16 billion asset and a staff of 
54,000 employees all over the world (Caterpillar Fact Sheet, March 1995, 
P P ~ )  
Caterpillar has increased its revenues greatly since the early 
1990's. The company made $14.3 billion in 1994, breaking the record of 
sales and revenues made per year. This marked an increase of 23% in its 
sales and revenues from 1993 to 1994. Both the US local market and the 
international market provide Caterpillar with a sales profit of almost 
50% each. The company made $7.01 billions in sales in the United 
States, an equivalent of 51% of the profits made in 1994, which also 
meant a 23% increase in sales. The international market provided it 
with 49% of its annual profits, a total of $6.85 billions and a 24% 
increase in the sales in that area (Caterpillar: The Global Competitor, 
1994 Annual Report, Pp 5). 
KOMATSUtS WAY TO DO BUSINESS 
The cornerstone of Komatsu's strategy is having turned their 
centralized management into a decentralized one. The company's first 
step was granting power and authority to each and every operation, 
branch and subsidiary--at a local and international level--to run their 
business according to their customerst needs and the condition of the 
market in which they function. For example, Komatsu Dresser Company, 
Yates, Ronald E. Lessons of Past Fuel Cumins' Drive to Compete. 
Chicago Tribune, Chicagoland Final, Business Section. Chicago, February 
5, 1995. Pp 1. 
subsidiary of Komatsu, has become a profitable subsidiary serving the 
North American market under a decentralized management system, which 
encourages its foreign operations to have a localized management system. 
Komatsu Dresser Company has authority and power to run its own 
business such as setting up its own prices and rules. It does so 
according to the business environment in the North American market and 
in order to serve better and satify its customers needs, which might be 
different than those of other markets in different countries. Komatsu's 
headquarters believes that giving authority and independence to its 
foreign operations, like the Komatsu Dresser Company, can help the 
corporation to have a customer oriented organizational structure that 
will improve Komatsu's competitivenesses. (Komatsu Annual Report 1995, 
PP 6 ) .  
Komatsu Corporation has been able to appreciate the importance of 
having satisfied customers. This alone has increased its market shares 
in international market through the team work of its whole organization 
structure, from the headquarters to the small foreign operations in 
other countries. The company believes that the more it satisfies its 
customers, the more their profits will increase in the long run. 
Therefore, working hard to meet its customersf demands has become 
Komatsu's utmost goal. The company aims to provide every single one of 
its customers with the best possible products by having the most 
advanced technology and by catering with quality service. Its goal is 
to help its customers become successful in their own businesses (Komatsu 
Annual Report 1995, Pp 6). 
In order to have a better customer oriented service, the company 
seeks to improve its employeesf skills from its top management level to 
the lowest. Komatsu strives to establish a highly skilled, creative and 
resourceful atmosphere. The company has also taken steps toward 
improving its personnel, evaluation system, employee trainin program, 
and its communication and information systems in order to have better 
prepared employees. 
CATERPILLAR: UPDATING TO SURVIVE AND SUCCEED 
Caterpillar Company has also faced a new beginning. It started to 
restructure its whole organization and operations worldwide all over 
again to catch up with its own competitive advantage. Updating its own 
structure has become a must to keep a competitive edge over its 
competitors. 
The company used to run its whole organization around the world 
from its main headquarters in U.S. The headquarters did not give any 
kind of authority to its operations worldwide to run their own 
businesses according to their own customers needs and regional market 
demands. Therefore, the company distanced itself from its customers all 
over the world. Because they want to have better customer services as 
well as fulfill their customers' needs in the best way possible, the 
company has changed its management system from a function-oriented 
structure to a decentralized, customer oriented organization since 1990. 
Now each branch can make its own decisions such as establishing its own 
prices and rules to fit its customers' demands, which may differ from 
those in other countries. This approach will allow the corporation to 
become flexible enough to adapt to changing markets, (Caterpillar Annual 
Report 1994, Pp4). 
Caterpillar hopes to become more effective, as far as being 
customer oriented is concerned, by modifying its organizational 
structure. It believes that, in order to remain the world's main heavy 
duty machinery manufacturer, it needs to become familiar with changing 
economic conditions by seeking new avenues to serve its customers better 
and to increase its market shares in international markets. Caterpillar 
has started to modernize its facilities and production lines by trying 
to have a more advanced technology. 
The company focuses on improving its efficiency and quality as 
well. It strives to shorten the delivery time of its products by having 
new independent, customer and profit driven business units that can have 
total control (Caterpillar Annual Report 1994, Pp 12). 
S O M E  P R O B L E M S  IN COMMON: One company's disadvantage becomes somebody 
else's profit 
Being the world's largest construction and industrial machinery 
manufacturers has also created some problems for both Komatsu and 
Caterpillar. The source is located outside of their organizational 
structures but the shock waves have been strong enough to shake their 
entire corporations. 
The increase in the value of the Japanese Yen did not allow 
Komatsu to significantly increase its profits in 1995 and it has also 
damaged its competitive level. Every time the Japanese Yen increases in 
value it forces many customers to buy from Caterpillar because of the 
weaker value of the US dollar. Customers are being put in the situation 
of avoiding to pay expensive prices. Therefore,in order to eliminate 
this kind of dominance of the Yen over the dollar, Komatsu had to take 
drastic actions. First of all, the company has expanded its structure 
and operations by establishing joint ventures with US firms to have 
distribution and manufacturing facilities in the United States. This 
will enable it to increase its profits and competitive advantages 
against Caterpillar and the US dollar. Fortunately expanding its 
operations to other countries, like the U.S., has been very successful. 
Had it been otherwise, Komatsu would have had to pay the price with the 
loss of some of its market  share^.^ 
Komatsu organization believes that having operations in the United 
States represents a chance to reduce the negative effect of the strong 
Japanese Yen against the US dollar, its weaker counterpart. An example 
is the joint venture in which Komatsu engaged with the US Dresser 
Industries, a construction equipment manufacturer. Having manufacturing 
facilities in the United States eliminated some of the losses originated 
by the disparity between the American and Japanese c~rrencies.~ 
Moreover, the company's whole organizational structures struggle 
to find new solutions to reduce the negative effect of the rising value 
of the Japanese Yen. The payoff to this struggle is preventing 
Komatsu's products to be more expensive than its competitors, especially 
when Caterpillar can sell its own at cheaper prices due to the weaker 
value of US dollar. The opening of few manufacturing facilities in other 
countries, besides the United States, is also part of the strategy to 
defy the strength of the Japanese Yen. Komatsu has started to 
* Yengst, Charles R. Japanese are Still Players in North 
American Markets. Diesel Progress Engines & Drives. Volume 60, 
Number 8. August 1994. Pp 4. 
Flint, Jerry. The Enemy of mv Enemv. Forbes, Volume 142, 
Number 11. Pp 42. 
manufacture excavators  i n  Sao Paulo,  B r a z i l ,  t o  o f f e r  i t s  customers 
cheaper p r i c e s  i n  t h a t  reg ion  of South America (Komatsu Annual Report 
1995, Pp 4 ) .  So f a r ,  t h e  es tab l i shment  of new opera t ions  o u t s i d e  
Japanese boundaries has  helped Komatsu t o  lower i t s  p r i c e s .  
The company has t r i e d  t o  i nc r ea se  t h e  lower p r o f i t s  i n  
cons t ruc t i on  and i n d u s t r i a l  markets because of t h e  gap i n  t h e  exchange 
r a t e .  I t  i s  achieving t h e  de s i r ed  r e s u l t  by d i v e r s i f y i n g  i t s  
ope ra t i ons .  Such an approach w i l l  h e lp  t h e  company recover  some of t h e  
p r o f i t s  t h a t  may be l o s t  i n  t h e  cons t ruc t i on  and i n d u s t r i a l  machinery 
i n d u s t r i e s .  As a  r e s u l t ,  another  j o i n t  ven ture  was formed i n  1993 
between Komatsu and an  American company, Applied Mater ia l s  I n c . ,  t o  
ob t a in  f i n a n c i a l  ga in  i n  t h e  LCD market.  This s t r a t e g y  has allowed 
Komatsu cap ture  a  l a r g e r  share  i n  t h e  Japanese LCD market (Komatsu 
Annual Report 1995, Pp 4 ) .  
C a t e r p i l l a r  has enjoyed a  more p r i v i l e g e d  p o s i t i o n  than  Komatsu i n  
dea l i ng  wi th  t h e  i nc r ea se  i n  va lue  of i t s  currency. As a  mat te r  of 
f a c t ,  t h e  weakening of t h e  US d o l l a r  has helped C a t e r p i l l a r  t o  i nc r ea se  
i t s  p r o f i t s  and market sha re s  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  markets.  Weaker 
d o l l a r s  have b u i l t  up t h e  compet i t ive  advantage of C a t e r p i l l a r .  It 
a l lows it t o  expor t  i t s  products  a t  cheaper r a t e s  than  those  o f f e r ed  by 
t h e  Japanese Yen, t h e  same one t h a t  made Komatsu products  s o  expensive.4  
C a t e r p i l l a r  headquarters  had t o  s h u f f l e  around i t s  o rgan i za t i ona l  
s t r u c t u r e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i t s  product ion department,  t o  reduce t h e  nega t ive  
e f f e c t s  of l abo r  s t r i k e  a t  i t s  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s .  I ts  
ope ra t i ons  have been g r e a t l y  a f f e c t e d  by labor  fo r ce  s t r i k e s .  Since 
Report t o  s tockholder .  C a t e r p i l l a r  Inc .  F i r s t  Quarter  1995. 
Peor ia ,  I L .  Pp 2 .  
this conflict arose in June of 1994, it has forced Caterpillar to make 
some kind of adjustment in its structure, especially in its production 
lines. The company has put 6,000 white collar workers to fill the 
positions left vacant by blue collar employees in the production lines 
since the strike broke out. Caterpillar has also found in its retired 
employees another alternative and source of labor. It hired about 5,700 
temporary workers to avoid the production from stopping.5 
Moving some employees from their daily work and divisions to other 
divisions, which had been vacant because of the strike, and putting 
white collar workers into blue collar workerst production lines, helped 
Caterpillar to reduce the negative impact of labor strikes. According to 
the company's chief financial officer, Douglas Oberhelman, Caterpillar 
had the best three-month period in the second quarter of 1995 in terms 
of profits and sales. The company had a $323 million net income with an 
increase of a 35% at the time. The revenues also increased 17%, which 
meant a profit of $4.21 billion in 1995.~ 
Komatsu and Caterpillar headquarters made two different future 
forecasts due to the changing economic conditions. Whereas Komatsu has 
very optimistic prospects, Caterpillar finds itself in an opposite 
condition. According to Komatsuts 1995 annual report, the demand for 
Komatsu construction and industrial machinery will increase both in 
Japan and in the international market. The rebuilding process of the 
city of Kobe, in Japan, for example, has built up the demand for 
Franklin, Stephen . Caterpillar Renews Talks, Reports Record 
Earnings. Chicago Tribune , Business Section . Chicago , July 20, 
1995. Pp 1, 2. 
6 Franklin , Stephen . Caterpillar Renews Talks , Reports Record 
Earnings. Chicaho Tribune, Business Section . Chicago , July 20, 
1995. Pp 1. 
machinery. Therefore ,  Komatsu Company has focused on i ts  home market i n  
Japan by al lowing i t s  opera t ions  i n  t h e r e  t o  be more f l e x i b l e  toward t h e  
Japanese customers needs i n  t h e  f a s t e s t  way pos s ib l e .  The l o c a l  
branches were given t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  run t h e i r  bus inesses  i n  and around 
Kobe c i t y .  There w i l l  be a l s o  an i nc r ea se  i n  t h e  demand f o r  Komatsu 
products  i n  p l ace s  l i k e  Asia and North America. I n  o rder  t o  meet t h i s  
i nc r ea s ing  demand wi th  low p r i c e s  and good q u a l i t y  s e r v i c e ,  Komatsuls 
headquarters  has decided t o  r e l o c a t e  t h e  product ion l i n e s  o f f  sho re .  
This w i l l  a l low Komatsu t o  manufacture i t s  products  a t  a cheaper c o s t  
than i n  Japan, where it would be very  expensive.  The company can a l s o  
meet i t s  customers needs i n  a f a s t  way by having product ion l i n e s  i n  
o the r  c o u n t r i e s ,  which w i l l  enable  t h e  company t o  have enough inventory  
i n  t hose  reg ions .  
So f a r ,  C a t e r p i l l a r  f a c e s  t h e  f u t u r e  w i th  mixed b e l i e f s .  On t h e  
one hand, it p r e d i c t s  a decrease i n  t h e  c a p i t a l  goods i ndus t ry  i n  1996. 
On t h e  o t h e r  hand it a n t i c i p a t e s  a prosperous 1997. 7 
AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES, A DIFFERENT BALL GAME: 
THE JAPANESE BACKYARD 
The compet i t ion among Japanese companies, l i k e  Toyota and Honda, 
and U.S. companies, l i k e  Ford and General Motors, has become even more 
t ense .  Car companies need t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e i r  own o rgan i za t i on  s t r u c t u r e  
t o  compete a g a i n s t  each o t h e r .  
Toyota has increased  i t s  s a l e s  i n  t h e  1990 's  d e s p i t e  t h e  many 
problems t h a t  t h e  company has  faced.  Toyota made n e t  s a l e s  of 
Schneider , A . J . Yellow Keeps Maca l l i s t e r  i n  Black. 
I nd i anapo l i s  Business Journa l  . Indiana , June 26 , 1995. Pp 1. 
$91,246,916,000.00 in the first nine months of 1995 (Toyota Report 1995, 
Pp 36). It also sold 1,560,970 vehicles in Japan and 1,699,700 vehicles 
in the international market in first nine months of 1995. The 
corporation's sales include a variety of vehicles, not just one type of 
car. For example, it sold 2,581,546 passenger cars and 679,124 trucks 
and buses. The largest market for Toyota has been Japanese market 
itself, followed by North America and Europe (Toyota Annual Report 1995, 
Pp15). 
Another Japanese car company, Honda, was also been able to 
increase its sales and revenues in 1995. Honda makes automobiles, 
motorcycles and power products to sell both in Japan and the 
internationalmarket. The company has made net sales and revenues of 
$44,389,077,000.00 in 1995. Honda has sold total of 8,613,000 products 
of automobiles, motorcycles and power products in Japan and 
international markets. Even though Honda's largest market for its 
motorcycles has been Japan, the company has sold more cars in the North 
American market. Contrasts in its sales show that it sold 649,000 
motorcycles in Japan, while 860,000 were sold in the North American 
market alone in 1995 (Honda Annual Report 1995). Honda company has two 
different large markets for its two major products. 
THE AMERICAN BACKYARD 
Improving business conditions in the car market has also helped 
the U.S. car companies, Ford and General Motors, to increase their 
profits in recent years. Ford Company increased its total sales and 
revenues from $108,521,000,000.00 in 1993 to $128,439,000,000.00 in 
1994. The company makes its profits from its automobile and financial 
service divisions. Ford corporation made a total of $107,137,000,000.00 
in its automobile sales and gained the rest from its financial services. 
The biggest car market for Ford Company is its home market, the United 
States. The company sold total of 4,276,000 cars in the U.S. and sold 
another 2,383,000 in international market (Ford Motor Company Annual 
Report 1994, Pp 22). 
After having so many losses, General Motors finally started to 
obtain some profits in 1995. This company increased its revenues to 
$44.1 billion, a 9.3% increase for 1995 alone.* The company was also 
successful in increasing its income during the same year. It had a 
record $2.27 billion net income in second quarter of 1995 as well. 
Lowering material and manufacturing costs as well as improving 
productivity and quality has helped General Motors to turn the company's 
losses into profits in 1995.~ 
DECENTRALIZATION, AN EFFECTIVE STRUCTURE BOTH IN ASIA AND AMERICA 
Toyota: Decentralizing and customizing production and services 
The urge to become a decentralized corporation also hit the 
automobile industry, both in America and Asia. Toyota is one of the 
companies that made the move from centralized management to 
decentralized management. It reconstructed its organizational structure 
by allowing its managers, from all levels in their foreign operations, 
to join the decision making process of the company. Toyota headquarters 
also gives its foreign operations the authority to run its own divisions 
according to its local market needs. The company believes that having 
Bennet , James . G.M Rise Quarter's Auto Earnings Trends. The 
New York Times . July 21 , 1995 . Pp 1. 
Simison , Robert L. GM's Earnings Rose by 18% in Second 
Quarter . The Wall Street Journal . July 21, 1995 . 
high q u a l i t y  managers and employees can help t h e  Toyota Corporat ion 
become more succes s fu l  and compet i t ive  i n  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  market.  
Therefore ,  t h e  company has based i t s  t r a n s i t i o n  on s e v e r a l  types  of 
educat ion and t r a i n i n g  programs t o  improve i t s  employees' s k i l l s  and 
knowledge. Toyota encourages i t s  employees t o  have a p o s i t i v e  a t t i t u d e  
toward t h e  company and fe l low workers and t o  ga in  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
t h e i r  jobs i n  t h e  company i n  o rde r  t o  become more succes s fu l .  The 
company pu t s  i t s  employees from a l l  l e v e l s  through t h e s e  t r a i n i n g  and 
educa t iona l  programs no t  on ly  t o  improve t h e i r  s k i l l s ,  bu t  a l s o  t o  g ive  
them sense of belonging w i th in  t h e  Toyota organ iza t ion .  The company has 
been a b l e  t o  provide b e s t  q u a l i t y  of p roduc ts  and s e r v i c e s  along wi th  
very  high customer s a t i s f a c t i o n ,  which has enabled Toyota Corporation t o  
a t t r a c t  new customers and improve i t s  s a l e s  and revenues (Ou t l i ne  of 
Toyota As of May 1995, Pp 1 0 ) .  
Toyota i s  a l s o  t r y i n g  t o  lower i t s  o v e r a l l  c o s t s  by implementing 
i t s  own and unique product ion system. The company s t i c k s  t o  a 
product ion system capable  of lowering t h e  inventory  c o s t s  and e l im ina t e  
a l l  t h e  unnecessary waste (Ou t l i ne  of Toyota As of May 1995, Pp 4 ) .  
Moreover, Toyota Corporat ion encourages i t s  workers t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  
p roduc t ive  management and c r e a t e  t h e i r  own s u i t a b l e  work p l a c e .  The 
company has a l s o  lowered i t s  product ion c o s t s  even more and has improved 
i t s  white  c o l l a r  p r o d u c t i v i t y  by encouraging i t s  employees t o  j o i n  t h e  
product ion process .  Toyota Company g ives  every worker t h e  a u t h o r i t y  t o  
s t o p  t h e  product ion l i n e s  i f  he o r  she  sees a problem, o r  f a u l t ,  on any 
product  i n  t h e  kaizen measures system. The company be l i eves  t h a t  t h e  
only way t o  improve t h e  q u a l i t y  of i t s  products  i s  al lowing i t s  
employees t o  do t h e i r  job i n  t h e  b e s t  way, t h i s  i s  without  any 
restrictions or interruption. Toyota goes as far as giving them 
authority to stop and shut down whole production lines in the factory to 
fix the faulty products. The company thinks that the right way to fix 
any defective product is to let the employees, who manufacture it, fix 
it during the production time and right there in the production line. 
Toyota aims at giving its employees the right to work without any 
limitations in its kaizen system. lo 
Having satisfied customers and the best customer service in their 
market has become the key of success and competence for Toyota. This is 
why it has gone to great lengths to instruct its whole organization, 
from the headquarters to the smallest operations in other countries, 
about how maintaining a satisfied clientele is essential to endure the 
struggle with other competitors and improve its status in the market. 
The company meets its customers needs with high quality customer 
services. Toyota headquarters reminds its foreign operations about the 
significance of keeping the leadership in customer satisfaction to 
maintain the flow of loyal customers all the time. The company has 
customer satisfaction in its goal and mission statement to show its 
operations the importance of providing high quality customer services 
(TMC Guiding Principles and TMS Objectives). Toyota Corporation 
believes that the more loyal customers it has, the more competitive it 
will become in the international market. 
Honda: Catching on with the trend 
Honda Corporation has also employed decentralized management to 
grant its foreign operations full authority to run their own divisions 
lo Cullen , David . The Value of a Dollar . Fleet Owner . June 
1995 . Pp 100. 
and meet t h e i r  l o c a l  market needs.  Like Toyota motor corpora t ion ,  Honda 
company has i t s  own product ion system t o  reduce i t s  c o s t s  and i nc r ea se  
p roduc t iv i t y .  Honda Corporat ion uses  a  system t h a t  i s  c a l l e d  
v f l e x i f a c t o r y n  t o  lower c o s t s  by being a b l e  t o  change product ion 
volumes, models and t h e  na tu re  of t h e  products  . F l e x i f a c t o r i e s  are 
networks t h a t  func t ion  l i k e  a  b r idge  between t h e  m i c r o - f l e x i b i l i t y  of 
people ,  machines and o v e r a l l  product ions .  
Honda i s  t h e  most succes s fu l  company a t  implementing t h e  
f l e x i f a c t i o n  system. The company can a l s o  meet changing demand and 
cap ture  economies of s c a l e .  l1 
I n  order  t o  have such a  succes s fu l  lower c o s t  product ion process ,  
Honda i n v e s t s  a  l o t  i n  t r a i n i n g  i t s  employees i n  i t s  fo r e ign  ope ra t i ons .  
Honda t r i e s  t o  have f l e x i b l e  machinery t o  be capable  of changing any 
shape of product ion a t  any given time without  i nc r ea s ing  product ion 
c o s t s .  The company o f t e n  encourages i t s  employees t o  r o t a t e  jobs  and 
i j o i n  a s  many t r a i n i n g  programs a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  improve t h e i r  s k i l l s .  The 
company a l s o  focuses  on c r e a t i n g  a  f l e x i b l e  o rgan i za t i on  s t r u c t u r e  a t  
a l l  management l e v e l s ,  from headquarters  t o  fo r e ign  ope ra t i ons ,  t o  meet 
f a s t  changing economic condi t ions  and customer needs.12 
Decentralization: Advantages and drawbacks 
Because Ford corpora t ion  had p r o f i t  l o s se s  and decreas ing  market 
I 
sha re s ,  t h e  company needed t o  r e s t r u c t u r e  i ts  organiza t ion  t o  compete i n  
f a s t  changing economic cond i t i ons .  Such a  change was necessary t o  
l1 Mair , Andrew . Hondats Global F l e x i f a c t o r y  Network . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Journa l  of Operations & Production Management . Vol : 14 
Date : 1994 . Pp : 6-23. 
i 2  Anonymous . F a c i l i t i e s  . Yo1 : 13 , Date : 1995 . Pp : 19-20 . 
, 
improve its profits and regain its market shares by attracting more 
customers. The company is moving from a centralized management style to 
decentralized management by using less top management, less bureaucracy 
and more employee empowerment on making important decisions. Ford 
corporation also tries to push the authority and decision making process 
from top level management to lower level management and divisions (Ford 
Motor Company Annual Report 1994, Pp 2). 
Moreover, customer satisfaction and meeting a clientele's every 
need play very important role for Ford Company. Because automobile 
industries grow a lot in many international markets, Ford Corporation 
strives to move into new growing markets to capture the largest market 
share as possible (Ford Motor Company Annual Report 1994, Pp 2-3). 
General Motors corporation started to restructure its organization 
since the 1990's to solve many of its problems. The company is changing 
its decision making process from a very strict centralized management to 
decentralized management to encourage team work within the company. 
Until 1990 the only people who made the important decisions were those 
who were in the top management. People in the lower management lacked 
the authority to make any important changes. However, the company has 
decided to move toward a decentralized system to foster team work. The 
company looks forward to get everybody involved in the decision making 
process and, therefore, in running the General Motors corporation. 
Under the new management structure, it has created team management 
and empowerment within ranks by giving each management and divisions the 
right to join the decision making process. General Motors tries to make 
its employees feel part of the whole organization by encouraging team 
work to improve efficiencies and competitiveness.13 The company has been 
able to reduce its overall costs and become more efficient due to 
delegating authority to its divisions to run their own business. This 
approach invites them to work harder, to feel as a part of the company 
and, therefore, more important. 
Japanese companies Toyota and Honda both have similar problems. 
The appreciation of the Japanese Yen increases the price of both Toyota 
and Honda cars and makes them very expensive against U.S. made cars. 
Trade wars between Japanese and U.S. governments also increases the 
price of these two Japanese made cars. Toyota and Honda have opened 
production facilities in the U.S. to protect themselves against the 
appreciating Japanese Yen, or any trade restriction from the U.S. 
government on Japanese cars. Honda Corporation has also decided to 
increase its production capacity from 110,000 units to 720,000 units by 
1997, in the U.S., to protect itself from the same threats.14 
U.S. car companies are also facing similar problems. Ford and 
General Motors are running into difficulties to enter the Japanese 
market. Because Japanese government enforces though laws and 
restrictions to protect the local Japanese industries from foreign 
companies entering to Japanese market, there is a huge gap between the 
U.S. and Japan auto trade. The U.S. government has announced that it 
will impose tariffs on Japanese cars to force the Japanese government to 
widen its market to U.S. car companies.15 
l3 Smith , David C. Managing for Changing:How the Big Three Are 
Restructuring for the Future.Wardls Auto World.Augustl994.v30,Pp:32-33 . 
l4 Sato, Takeshi. Japan Times Weekly International Edition. Vol: 34, 
Date:August29-September4,1994.Pp :13 
The U.S. car companies also having problems doing business in 
Japan. Because of the different distribution system and business rules, 
many of them are facing difficulties to sell their products in Japan. It 
took two years for Ford Company to make a deal with Japanese Katsumata 
Company just to get Ford cars into their showroom.16 
Besides having conflicts in the international market, General 
Motors also faces difficulties at home in the U.S. The problems between 
General Motors and UAW workers union has created a strike that cause the 
company to lose a lot of profits and reduce the production. When General 
Motors' workers--also members of UAW union--went to strike in 1994, it 
cost General Motors $40 million in losses in third-quarter profits. The 
strike also closed fifteen General Motors assembly plants and reduced 
the production considerably, which was difficult for the company to 
recover. l7 Many U.S . companies, including Ford and General Motors, 
tried to solve their differences with workers' unions to prevent any 
strikes that affect production and cause significant losses. 
l5 Palmer, Jay. International Trader : Threatened Sactions May Add A 
Minor Headache For Japanese Auto Makers Already Racked By Migraine. 
Barren's. Vol:75, Date:May 15,1995. Pp:MW8-MW9. 
l6 Updike, Jay. Roadblocks. roadblocks everywhere. Business Week. 
Iss:3429, Date:June 19,1995. Pp:58. 
l7 Bohn, Joseph. Gm Strike: $4OMillion. Automotive News. August 29,1994 
Pp:39. 
CHAPTER 3: 
PRIMARY RESEARCH 
PRIMARY RESEARCH: 
Many companies try to redesign their organizational structure and 
worldwide operations according to the new developments, technologies and 
ideas to be more competitive in their fields. Some of them can adjust 
their organizations to improving changes better than their counterparts 
because of their will and ability to change their structure. 
Both Komatsu and Caterpillar's way of doing businesses in Turkey 
shows how these two companies have different customer responds and 
relations, even though they both believe in having a very good 
relationship with their customers and both engage in decentralized 
decision-making processes. 
Komatsu headquarters operates within a decentralized decision 
making structure by allowing its foreign operations set their own prices 
and run their own rules to create better customer relationships. The 
company believes that having satisfied customers will increase their 
profits because more people will buy Komatsu's products in Turkey and 
the rest of the world. 
Many customers, especially independent dealers who do not belong 
to any organization or company, are very satisfied to be doing business 
with Komatsu Company. Mr. Fuat Koc, president of Murat Ins. Dis. Tic. 
Ltd. Sti. in Turkey, says that his company like the other independent 
dealers prefer do business with Komatsu Company. He says Komatsu 
headquarters does not force its customers to buy from its main dealer in 
Turkey. They have the option of buying from independent dealers as 
well. Koc believes that Komatsu headquarters has the power to force its 
dealers not to sell to any independent dealers located in other 
countries. Nevertheless, the company allows its customers to buy from 
anyone they want to buy. He says that sometimes buying Komatsu spare 
parts from another dealer, in other countries, are much cheaper than 
when buying from a Komatsu dealer in Turkey. The reason, he thinks, is 
the diverse price strategies in different countries and regions. It is 
not unexpected then that many customers, especially the independent 
dealers, prefer to do business with Komatsu Company just because of the 
good relationship it is creating with its customers. 
Komatsu dealerships have created very advantageous customer 
relations with its customers. In the process they have showed how a 
decentralized decision making process can create a better atmosphere for 
Komatsu in Turkey. Because the dealerships are a part of the whole 
Komatsu Corporation, it must follow the Komatsu's criteria, guidelines 
and rules to make Komatsu company more successful as a whole 
organization. If one of this chain is missing, or doing bad business, 
the rest of the company can be affected negatively from this one bad 
operation in other countries. 
However, some companies have difficulties in molding their 
organization into a new pattern. Some insist on continuing to do 
business in the same old way like Caterpillar. This company claims that 
it has moved its organization structure from a centralized decision 
making process to a decentralized decision making one. It claims to 
have done so to be more competitive and customer oriented. However, 
Caterpillar Corporation still does business as if it still has a 
centralized power on any decision making situation. Caterpillar 
headquarters does not gives its foreign operations any authority to set 
up their own prices. Neither does it allow them to run their own 
businesses in their markets, an element which is essential in order to 
have a decentralized decision making process. 
Mr. Serdar Liman, president of Gunova San. Tic. Ltd. Sti. in 
Turkey, complains about doing business with Caterpillar Corporation. He 
says that Caterpillar headquarters has very strict rules about not 
selling any Caterpillar spare parts to any independent dealers located 
in other countries. Caterpillar Company forces everybody to buy 
Caterpillar spare parts from the main Caterpillar dealer located in 
their countries. When Mr. Serdar Liman tried to buy some Caterpillar 
spare parts from some dealers in other countries, those dealers told Mr. 
Serdar Liman that they could not sell any Caterpillar spare parts to him 
because his business was located in another country. They also told him 
that none of the Caterpillar dealers would sell him any Caterpillar 
parts for one reason: because they would be in danger of losing their 
rights to be Caterpillar dealers if they did, due to very strict rules 
enforced by the Caterpillar headquarters. Liman believes that 
Caterpillar parts cost more than they should. He says that buying from 
your Caterpillar dealer in your own country creates a monopoly on 
Caterpillar parts. He thinks that because of this monopoly, Caterpillar 
Corporation can and is charge of any price they want to put on their 
parts. He believes that out of the frustration of wanting to get 
Caterpillar parts at reasonable prices, and being unable to, many people 
are trying to switch their machinery to Komatsu, Hitachi or Isuzu. 
They are tired of fighting, waiting a long time to get much needed 
parts and paying high prices. Therefore, many customers prefer to buy 
machinery from other companies to avoid dealing with Caterpillar Company 
at all. By insisting on not allowing their foreign operations to run 
their businesses in their home markets, Caterpillar headquarters is 
creating customer dissatisfaction. This alone drives many of its 
customers away and makes the company lose market shares in Turkey. Its 
customers end up frustrated and are left no choice but to start doing 
business with other companies. 
Some companies try to implement their strategies, ethics, goals, 
rules and way of doing business through their operations in other 
countries. They believe that their operations in abroad have an 
important role in helping companies become successful in their 
businesses, they are partly responsible for it. No matter how much some 
companies try to do better, they are not as successful as their 
competitors. They lack effective controlling systems to check if their 
foreign operations follow the company's guidelines and rules, such as 
having good customer relationship and quality of products to protect the 
public image of the company. 
Toyota Corporation, by being a leader in the automobile industry, 
demonstrates the importance of being able to control and check every 
operation regardless of its size. It does it to force all of its 
branches to act according to Toyota headquarters' rules, guidelines, and 
strategies. Having very good customer relationships and providing the 
best quality of Toyota products has become a must, from top to bottom, 
in the whole corporation. 
Toyota Corporation has a strict control of its operations in other 
countries because it relies on offering quality products and having good 
relationships with its customers. The company demands its foreign 
operations to create a friendly relationship with its customers. 
According to the service director at Kendall Toyota, Melannie Brennan, 
Toyota Corporation strives to reach two goals: providing best services 
to customers and having best quality of products. Ms. Melannie Brennan 
says that because it is extremely important for Toyota Company to have 
very good relationship with its customer, Toyota headquarters sends 
representatives to check its operations all over the world. She says 
that a representative from Toyota headquarters is often checking Kendall 
Toyotats operations and relations with its customers. Representatives 
from Toyota headquarters talk to many customers and conduct a research 
on the services that Kendall Toyota provides. Ms. Melannie Brennan says 
that Toyota Corporation puts all employees, regardless of their 
position, through intensive training programs. Most of them that last 
one week and are useful to improve the employeest skills and knowledge 
about the market and customer relations. Ms. Brennan herself attended a 
one week training program in Jacksonville in December of 1995. 
Ms. Melannie Brennan claims that Toyota Company bases its good 
customer relationship in having excellent quality products. This is why 
the company sends representatives to its foreign Toyota dealers, to 
check the quality of the products that foreign Toyota dealers cater its 
customers with. Toyota Corporation is willing to provide any kind of 
information about its whole operations and organizations to its 
customers, or anybody interested in learning more about Toyota 
Corporation. The headquarters urge its foreign operations to be very 
cooperative to anybody who needs information, regardless of their age, 
wealth and status in society. 
However, even though other companies also urge its branches to be 
cooperative to anybody interested in learning more about their 
organizations, some of them do not make an effort to foster good 
relationships with people unless they are purchasing some product at the 
time . 
Honda, for example, headquarters tries to have good relationships 
with everybody by providing information about Honda Corporation to 
anybody, whether they are potential buyers or not. The company believes 
that having customer satisfaction will improve Honda's market shares and 
profits in the long run. However, even though Honda headquarters is very 
serious and sensitive about improving their customer relations, some of 
Honda's dealers in other countries do not try as hard as their 
headquarters to create a better public image for Honda Corporation. 
The Honda dealers, particularly those in Miami, are only 
interested in catering to potential buyers. They are not interested in 
assisting researchers or students. Providing information about the 
services they give is the last priority in their list, if it is a 
priority at all. They go as far as refusing release any data about 
their operations even in detriment of their public image. The Miami 
Honda dealers may go to the extent of being rude to anybody who is just 
requesting information about them and not purchasing Honda products. 
Investing time in anything that is not a sale means a waste of both 
money and time. If their exchange with a customer doesn't involve 
merchandise for money, they completely dismiss it and have been known to 
throw the customer out. For example, dealers like Brickell Honda and 
Braman Honda, do not care to spend time with students or researchers 
interested in learning about the Honda Corporation. Because of the 
powerlessness of Honda headquarters to control some of its foreign Honda 
dealerships, like the ones in Miami, the company has a very bad public 
image. No matter how hard Honda Corporation tries to improve its public 
relations, the whole company will eventually face negative consequences. 
The headquarters must put all of its operations, no matter how small 
they are in some countries, in strict discipline to improve its 
relations with its customers. They must achieve it by employing a much 
effective controlling system, if the company becomes more competitive in 
the automobile industry in the long run. 
The U.S. Ford Company also has bad public image because of its 
dealers1 bad attitude toward its customers, which has had a very bad 
effect on the whole Ford business within the automobile market. Ford 
headquarters is willing to provide any kind of information to anybody 
interested in the Ford Company. However, the corporation has not been 
very successful in reaching this objective because of Ford's dealerships 
rude behavior toward the public in some countries. Some Ford dealers, 
like Courtesy Ford Inc. and Dee1 Ford, completely refuses to devote its 
employees' time to provide information about their services. The only 
talking they do must involve the purchase of a car, nothing else. 
Because of the lack of control by the Ford headquarters, some dealers 
can treat their customers anyway they want because. They know they are 
completely unsupervised due to the lack of a controlling system. Ford 
headquarters will not be able to find out and punish them. 
General Motors1 dealerships has followed the trend of Honda and 
Ford dealers in terms of discouraging non buyers to approach them. 
Colonial Pontiac Dealer, in Miami, is a classic example. Their idea of 
dealing with non buyers is making a public display of bad manners. They 
go as far as denying to send printed information to callers requesting 
it. The dealerships show a total disregard for potential customers, who 
at the time may just be doing some research on the company. They limit 
themselves to take the name and address of the caller without bothering 
to reply. 
Komatsu Corporation has proven that having a decentralized 
decision making process allows its foreign operations to run their 
businesses according to their guidelines and market's needs. This, in 
turn, will create smooth operations that will help the company to have 
a very good customer relationship. When a company establishes its own 
unique structure in its organization, that company has to follow every 
step of that structure to let the new pattern become more effective and 
successfull. It must accomplish all this without insisting on following 
the old ways as Caterpillar Company has been doing. The side effects of 
failing to do this may be read in the company's failing business and its 
declining relationship with its customers. 
Toyota Corporation has showed that in order to become more 
competitive, companies must pay more attention to having a very good 
customer relationship. They must strive to satisfy their customers' 
needs, even if they are just about learning about the company's 
strategies and operations. Companies trying to be successful must not 
only focus on buyers and profits but also on anybody who approaches it 
with any concern. Toyota Company has proven that a company needs to have 
an effective control mechanism to group all of its operations under 
strict discipline. Only this will drive them to follow the company's 
rules, goals, ethics and strategies necessary to become competitive in 
the long run in the market. 
CHAPTER 4: 
METHODOLOGY 
METHODOLOGY: 
This research  was done by both primary and secondary research .  It 
inc ludes  va r i ed  informat ion about s i x  companies, t h e i r  opera t ions  and 
o rgan i za t i ons ,  which was taken from d i f f e r e n t  p r e s t i g i o u s  j ou rna l s  and 
magazines. The f i r s t  p a r t  was done according t o  t h e  r u l e s  of t h e  
l i t e r a t u r e  review system. This research  i s  based a l s o  on d a t a  found i n  
r e p o r t s  publ ished by t h e  companies themselves about t h e i r  ope ra t i ons ,  
goa l s  and management s t y l e s .  There i s  some informat ion from s e v e r a l  
f i n a n c i a l  newspapers and r e p o r t s  t h a t  have been done by t h e  expe r t s  i n  
t h e  bus iness  f i e l d .  
The primary research  was done by conducting in te rv iews  w i th  
s e v e r a l  managers wi th  exper ience and knowledge about t h e  companies and 
i n d u s t r i e s  they  a r e  working f o r .  Some companies were w i l l i n g  t o  provide 
a l l  t h e  he lp  needed. Others ,  however, re fused  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  
i n t e rv i ew  process ,  making it extremely d i f f i c u l t  t o  conduct a complete 
primary research  on them a s  on t h e  ones t h a t  cooperated.  
CHAPTER 5: 
DISCUSSIONS 
DISCUSSION: 
Finding an organizational structure able to turn a business into a 
more smooth and effective one has become the goal of many companies. 
They strive not only to grow into a competitive player but also to 
create a high customer demand for their products. Many of them have 
similar organizational structures. Nevertheless, only some reach their 
objective. 
Both Komatsu and Caterpillar Corporations, for example, have 
similar organizational structures and goals. Some of them include a 
decentralized decision making process and build a good relationship with 
the customer. However, the response and demand they both get from the 
Turkish market are quite different. 
Komatsu's key to success 
Komatsu's headquarters gives its foreign operations enough 
authority to run their own business according to the environment and 
local market in which they operate. They are free to set their own 
prices and buying rules in order to satisfy their local customers1 
demands. They decentralized some of its operations in order to provide 
a customer oriented service, which addressed their branches1 particular 
needs. 
Allowing decentralized operations in its affiliates, such as the 
one in Turkey, has made Komatsu more effective and customer oriented in 
the international market. As a result, the company enjoys a great demand 
from the Turkish market, in which its clients are eager to do business 
with it because their requirements are met in an expeditious manner. 
Komatsuts effectiveness in doing so is proven the soaring increase in 
their Turkish affiliatets profits. 
Caterpillar: The high price of centralization 
Caterpillar Corporation is a good example of a company that has an 
identity crisis in its organization. Even though Caterpillar claims it 
operates with a decentralized decision making structure, the companyts 
policies and actions have proven otherwise. Its headquarters does not 
give any authority and power to its affiliates in other countries, like 
Turkey, to run their businesses according to their own needs. They 
cannot establish their own rules and prices to respond faster to their 
customerst demands and the changing rules in their home market. 
The company keeps the habit of using centralized management to 
make decisions for their operations in other countries. However, because 
each market abroad has different characteristics and unique rules, the 
headquarters creates some problems such as setting higher prices and 
unacceptable paying rules. Lack of knowledge and information about some 
international markets makes the company consider these prices and rules 
to be acceptable. 
The Turkish Caterpillar operation has conflicts with its 
customers. It turns out that its headquarters has insisted on having 
higher prices and longer delivery times that are not suitable for the 
Turkish market. As a result, its Turkish branch has been unable to 
profit from its knowledge about its local market. It has been denied 
the benefits from running its own business, establishing its own prices, 
delivery times and rules to satisfy and meet cutomerst needs and demands 
in Turkey. Because Caterpillar has unpopular policies in Turkey, many 
Turkish customers have sought to do businesses with other companies, 
which has caused Caterpillar to lose its market share in Turkey. 
Controlling Power: 
Working hard to implement a very successfull organizational 
structure may not always work. Some of the operations in other 
countries might not want to work hard and spend too much efforts to make 
things perfect and create good company image. Headquarters need to check 
their operations to ensure that their operations follow their companies 
objectives, guidelines and behave according to their rules to create a 
better business environment and better customer services. 
Toyota Corporation is the best good example of having an effective 
controlling system to put its operations in discipline worldwide in the 
automobile industry. Toyota headquarters check its operations in other 
countries to make sure that they follow their guidelines and objectives. 
It keeps a close eye on their different branches to ensure they provide 
a satisfied customer service and the best quality of products in the 
automobile industry. 
Toyota headquarters sends inspectors to its operations in other 
countries, like Kendall Toyota in Miami, to check if it obeys the 
company's rules, objectives and ethics. Kendall Toyota often gets an 
unexpected visit from an inspector sent by the headquarters. The 
inspector checks the quality of the products manufactured by Kendall 
Toyota, as well as their progress in the sales department, financially 
speaking and in terms of good relations with the customer in the Miami 
area. The inspector goes as far as talking to customers about the 
quality of the Toyota products, its customer services and other services 
that Kendall Toyota provides. Because Toyota Corporation believes that 
having the best quality of products and customer services will attract 
more buyers for Toyota products, the headquarters keeps a tight 
surveillance on its operations to ensure the company keeps its good name 
worldwide. 
Failing of Policies: 
Many companies can not copy Toyota Corporation's success in 
creating such a good public image for its products. They fail to 
correct their ineffective controlling system to coordinate their 
operations through the company's lines and rules. Companies such as 
Honda, Ford and General Motors, try to increase their market share by 
working hard. However, their operations' irresponsible moves--such as 
ignoring their customers complaints and not meeting their companies' 
quality requirements--have driven people to buy products from other 
companies that provide better quality and services. 
It is difficult to gain access to any kind of information about 
products and companies such as Honda, Ford and General Motors, 
especially from their dealerships in Miami. Even though these three 
headquarters promote good quality of products and services to have a 
good relationship with its customers, their operations in Miami are not 
as sensitive as their headquarters about improving quality and customer 
services. Because these corporations have a lack of power to control 
their operations worldwide, some of their operations like the ones in 
Miami, do not work hard to improve their business performances. These 
companies get negative responses from customers because some of their 
operations display a damaging behavior that drives them away to other 
corporations. Companies must have a very effective controlling system 
to ensure their operations will follow their companies1 rules, 
objectives, ethics and policies to protect their companies' name and 
reputation, to make their products more desirable to people, to sell 
more and to increase their market shares in the international market. 
CHAPTER 6: 
CONCLUSIONS 
CONCLUSION: 
Many companies find out they have to be very sincere and work hard 
to make their organizational structure succeed and be competitive in the 
international market. Because some companies have the habit of doing 
their businesses in an old way, like the Caterpillar Corporation, they 
can't be as successful as others, like the Komatsu Corporation, although 
they have a similar organizational structure. 
Komatsu Corporation has proven the importance of having only one 
organizational structure, a decentralized management system, to help the 
company become more competitive. The company believes that having a 
decentralized organizational structure will help it become more 
efficient, which is something it will accomplish by giving all of its 
operations in other countries--like the one in Turkey--the freedom to 
set their own prices and rules to satisfy their customerst needs and 
demands in a better way. Being able to adopt only one organizational 
structure, like a decentralized management, and work with it is the most 
important key element for the Komatsu Corporation. It is what has made 
it competitive and has allowed it to capture more market shares in 
international markets such as the Turkish market. 
Double identity: 
The lack of commitment to work with one organizational structure 
has made many companies incapable of following new policies. Even though 
Caterpillar Corporation claims that it has adopted a decentralized 
management structure to become a more customer oriented company, it 
still does business from its headquarters by setting up prices and rules 
for its foreign operations. However, the main purpose of having a 
decentralized management structure is to allow foreign operations to set 
up their own prices, rules and objectives to meet and satisfy their 
customers and changing markets needs, demands and conditions. 
Because Caterpillar still insists on deciding about setting the 
prices for its foreign operations, the company has created a conflict 
nurtured by unsatisfied customersf demands. The high prices end up 
forcing many customers to do business with other companies that offer 
them better deals. 
It is not enough to decide certain organizational structure. The 
company must commit itself only to that structure to make sure the 
company does not have any identity crises in its organization. 
Controlling Power: 
Entire organizations, from headquarters to their operations in 
other countries, must cooperate between each other and work according to 
the company's rules, objectives, ethics and mentality to become more 
effective and competitive in the international markets. However, because 
some operations within some companies do not operate according to their 
companies guidelines, they produce negative effects on the company's 
performance and a damaging public image, which lowers its profits and 
market shares in the international market. 
Having an effective controlling mechanism has helped Toyota 
headquarters to gather all of its operations under very strict 
discipline. This ensures them that they all work according to Toyota 
Corporationfs guidelines and rules. This effective controlling system 
has helped the company upgrade its performance by improving its quality 
of products and services worldwide. Its operations must meet the 
company's standard and rules to be part of the Toyota organization. 
Toyota operations such as Kendall Toyota is compelled improve its 
quality of products and customer relations because of its headquarters 
effective controlling system. Tight surveillance is kept to find out 
how they operate in their market. Therefore, Toyota operations like 
Kendall Toyota have been under strict control to improve their 
operations in order to become more competitive in the automobile market. 
However, many companies try in vain to become customer oriented 
and competitive. They aren't as successfull Toyota Corporation because 
they lack an effective controlling system to check if their operations 
perform under their guidelines. Because companies like Honda, Ford and 
General Motors have an ineffective controlling mechanism, they do not 
know how their operations work in other countries. Therefore, no matter 
how hard their headquarters work, they won't be as competitive as they 
need to. Some of their operations, like the ones in Miami, do not 
follow their companies1 procedures and rules to become more customer 
oriented. 
The operations of these companies have created a negative 
reputation for them and strained customer relations, which invite many 
people to do business with other companies, especially with Toyota 
Corporation. They know they can get away with their mistakes because 
their headquarters lacks the controlling mechanism to conduct an 
accurate supervision. They have no incentives to improve their work 
performance. The headquarters is unable to force them into it. 
Therefore, a company must realize it takes a strong commitment to 
work with a single organizational structure to create its true identity. 
The example is being set by Komatsu and its decentralized management 
structure. Not only it must be able to check all of its operations to 
ensure they are under strict control, like Toyota Corporation does; it 
must also operate according to the company's guidelines and rules. Only 
this will guide the whole organization, as a unit, to a competitive path 
in the international market. 
CHAPTER 7: 
INTERVIEWS 
INTERVIEWS: 
MURAT INS. DIS. TIC. LTD. STI. 
Q1- )  What is your name? First Last 
A l - )  Fuat Koc 
Q 2 - )  How long have you been working for this company? 
A 2 - )  11 years 
Q 3 - )  What is your position at this company? 
A 3 - )  President and owner of the company 
Q 4 - )  What is your authority? Span of authority? 
A 4 - )  My main authority is making connections with the companies in 
another countries and also companies in Turkey; making business 
agreements with those companies. 
Q5- )  How long have you been in this position? 
A 5 - )  Since beginning of the company for 11 years 
9 6 - )  What kind of business does your company do? 
A 6 - )  We are export and import and distributor company. We export some 
kind of spare parts to abroad like radiators for automobiles and 
construction machineries. We also import spare parts for automobile and 
especially for construction machinery for Japanese and American 
excavators and loaders like Komatsu, Caterpillar, Hitachi, Kato, 
Kobelco. We then distribute these spare parts to our costumers in 
Turkey. 
Q 7 - )  What are the differences in being an independent dealer? 
A 7 - )  Since we are not dealer of specific company, we can go in business 
for different kind of brands. For example; if we were dealer of 
Hitachi, we wouldn't be able to import and sell spare parts for other 
brands, in that case we would have limited customers. 
08-1 How does being a independent dealer effect your operation and 
business? 
A8-) In some brands, sometimes we have problems with buying some kind of 
parts and we have problems for not getting competitive prices. For 
example; the dealer of Caterpillar in Turkey has changed to another 
company in Turkey. Since they are new company in this construction 
business, they asked Caterpillar to more competitive prices for parts 
and machinery and they got it for 5 years. Also in the past it was easy 
to buy parts for Caterpillar from other European countries and US. But 
then main dealers complained about and Caterpillar made decision that 
any of their dealers can't buy form other foreign Caterpillar. 
Therefore, we are not allow to buy parts for all kind of model and can't 
get good prices so it is difficult to compete with Caterpillar dealers 
in Turkey. But in other brands like Komatsu, Hitachi, Kobelco, we can 
import parts from not main dealers but also other dealers in other 
countries such as Japan, US and Europe. 
Q9-) Why don't you try to buy spare parts from other Caterpillar dealer 
in other countries? 
A9-) Last year I went to U.S. to make agreement to buy parts for spare 
parts for Caterpillar. But I was told that they were only allowed to 
sell parts to directly to customers in their region not companies from 
other countries like us. They told me that if Caterpillar headquarters 
finds out that they sell me any parts, they can lose their dealer 
contract. 
Q10-) How does this effect your competition? 
A10-) Some companies who were specialized in parts business for 
Caterpillar effect very much. As I told you before new dealer got very 
compet i t ive  p r i c e s .  I t ' s  almost  impossible  t o  import p a r t s  from o the r  
coun t r i e s  wi th  compet i t ive  p r i c e  t h a t  e f f e c t  them very much. I know 
some people have change t h e i r  bus iness  t o  another  f i e l d .  But f o r  me it 
d i d n ' t  e f f e c t  me t h a t  much because I import and s e l l  p a r t s  s p e c i a l l y  f o r  
Japanese excavators  and loaders  and I d o n ' t  have b ig  t r oub l e s  s o  f a r .  
Q 1 1 - )  Why do you want t o  buy C a t e r p i l l a r  spa re  p a r t s  i f  you c a n ' t  make 
any p r o f i t s ?  
A l l - )  Sometimes I need t o  buy C a t e r p i l l a r  p a r t s  because companies i n  
mining and cons t ruc t i on  i n d u s t r i e s  have excavators  and loaders  i n  
d i f f e r e n t  brands.  We s p e c i a l l y  sel l  a o r t s  f o r  t h e i r  machines, f o r  
Japanese machines, bu t  a l s o  some times we buy p a r t s  f o r  t h e i r  
C a t e r p i l l a r  machines and sell  them t o  s a t i s f y  t h e i r  needs.  We sometimes 
d o n ' t  make p r o f i t s  from C a t e r p i l l a r  p a r t s  bu t  we meet t h e i r  needs t o  
show them our  customers can g e t  every p a r t s  f o r  them. 
Q12-)  Would you desc r ibe  you have a  very  h o s t i l e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  with  
C a t e r p i l l a r  Company? 
A12-) Yes I can say t h a t  
Q13-) Would you say  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a h o s t i l e  environment between 
C a t e r p i l l a r  Company and independent d e a l e r s  i n  Turkey? 
A13-) Yes a s  I t o l d  you before  we a r e  no t  t h e  only company t h a t  has many 
problems wi th  C a t e r p i l l a r  Company. Some independent companies who a r e  i n  
C a t e r p i l l a r  bus iness  have changed t h e i r  bus iness  t o  another  f i l e d  and 
brands because they cou ldn ' t  compete w i th  C a t e r p i l l a r  main d e a l e r  i n  
Turkey. 
Q14-) Do you have any problems wi th  Komatsu Company? 
A14-) I d o n ' t  have any problems wi th  Komatsu Corporation. I c a n ' t  buy 
spa re  p a r t s  from Komatsu headquarters  bu t  I can buy p a r t s  from o t h e r  
dealers in other countries. For example; our best line in spare parts 
business is Komatsu parts and I import parts for Komatsu excavators from 
dealers in U.S. 
Q15-) What would you say about Caterpillar and Komatsu companies? 
A15-) Caterpillar used to best brand in Turkey. There are still many 
Caterpillar machines in Turkey but since they changed their rules that 
Caterpillar made their dealers sell the parts to companies in their 
markets and not sell parts to independent dealers now they are having 
problems to meet their customers needs in all over Turkey.Their price 
have become very expensive against other brands. There are Japanese 
companies and some Korean companies entered to Turkish market with very 
competitive prices and good services. They do business with independent 
dealers to meet customers needs every time and every place in Turkey. 
Therefore, Komatsu, Isuzu, Hitachi and other new brands sell a lot 
excavators and spare parts than Caterpillar in Turkey. 
Q16-) What would you say more about Caterpillar, Komatsu and industry in 
Turkey? 
A16-) Komatsu has just had a factory in Turkey to provide some brands of 
excavators and spare parts. They have good communication with customers 
and independent dealers. They let us sell their parts to meet their 
customers needs in any place in Turkey. But Caterpillar has very strict 
rules that not sell their products to independent dealer in other 
countries. I believe they need to change this rule if they want to stay 
in business in Turkish market. 
GUNOVA SAN. and T I C .  LID.  STI. 
Q1-)  What i s  your name? F i r s t  Last  
A l - )  Serdar  Liman 
4 2 - )  How long have you been working f o r  t h i s  company? 
A2-)  9 years  
Q3-)  What i s  your p o s i t i o n  a t  t h i s  company? 
A 3 - )  P res iden t  and owner 
Q4-)  What i s  your a u t h o r i t y ?  Span of a u t h o r i t y ?  
A 4 - )  Run bus iness ,  f i n d  new customers and make con t ac t  wi th  customers.  
Q 5 - )  How long have you been i n  t h i s  p o s i t i o n ?  
AS-) For 9 years  s i n c e  beginning of t h i s  company 
Q6-)  What k ind  of bus iness  does your company do? 
A 6 - )  We a r e  independent bus iness  company. W e buy s p a r e  p a r t s  from 
import companies i n  Turkey and s e l l  them t o  u se r  customers.  Our s p e c i f i c  
l i n e  i s  p a r t s  f o r  Komatsu, C a t e r p i l l a r ,  H i t ach i ,  Isuzu,  Kato, Kawasaki 
excavators  and l oade r s .  
4 7 - )  What i s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  of being independent d e a l e r ?  
A7-)  We can s e l l  p a r t s  f o r  many brands i n s t e a d  of being d e a l e r  f o r  j u s t  
one brand. 
Q 8 - )  How does being a independent d e a l e r  e f f e c t  your ope ra t i on  and 
bus iness?  
AS-) Since we a r e  n o t  d e a l e r  of any brand, it i s  sometimes hard t o  g e t  
good p r i c e s  f o r  some kind of brands l i k e  C a t e r p i l l a r .  Therefore ,  we 
c a n ' t  compete w i th  companies such a s  C a t e r p i l l a r  main d e a l e r  i n  Turkey. 
Q9-)  Why d o n ' t  you t r y  t o  buy s p a r e  p a r t s  from o the r  C a t e r p i l l a r  d e a l e r  
i n  o t h e r  coun t r i e s?  
A9-) We don't imports parts from other countries. We buy parts from 
couple of importers who buy parts abroad and give us very competitive 
prices. They told us that Caterpillar headquarters has very strict rules 
about not selling any products to any companies in other countries but 
in their regions. Therefore, companies that import, can't get good 
prices for Caterpillar excavators and loaders. 
Q10-) How does this effect your competition? 
A10-) Main distributor of Caterpillar created a monopoly on Caterpillar 
spare parts. They sell parts to customers only and don't sell to 
companies like us. If we try to import which is almost impossible, we 
get very high price so it is not easy to compete with Caterpillar 
dealer. 
Qll-) Why do you want to buy Caterpillar spare parts if you can't make 
any profits? 
All-) In some case we have to buy Caterpillar parts to meet our 
customers needs. In our company, we have some sales people that visit 
our customer to get orders. Some of our customers have Caterpillar 
excavators beside Komatsu, Kato, Kobelco. In this case we buy 
Caterpillar parts for our customers satisfaction. We want our customers 
to know that we can meet all demands and needs they want. Most of time 
we don't make any profits for selling Caterpillar parts but we make 
money from other parts to recover the losses. Our policy is to sell more 
parts in big quantities in small profits rate in Caterpillar parts. So 
we can still make some money in Caterpillar business which is rare for 
us. 
412-) Would you describe you have a very hostile relationship with 
Caterpillar Company? 
A12-) Since our best lines are Komatsu, Hitachi and Isuzu engines, I 
don't care about Caterpillar but I can say that we have very hostile 
relations with Caterpillar. 
413-) Would you say that there is a hostile environment between 
Caterpillar Company and independent dealers in Turkey? 
A13-) Since Caterpillar dealer don't do business with independent 
companies, we can say that most independent companies have the same 
problems with Caterpillar. 
Q14-) Do you have any problems with Komatsu comapny? 
A14-) We don't get competitive prices from Komatsu dealer in Turkey but 
we can buy parts from other Komatsu dealers in other countries in much 
cheaper prices. They give us more competitive prices in other Komatsu 
dealers in other countries. 
Q15-) What would you say about Caterpillar and Komatsu companies? 
A15-) In my opinion, Caterpillar don't do business with independent 
dealers just because they want to make all profits they can by meeting 
all of Caterpillar customers needs. But Komatsu Company don't make any 
monopoly and have very strict rules. They let their dealer sell parts 
and provide services to all foreign markets that make them sell more 
Komatsu excavators and loaders. 
Q16-) What would you say more about Caterpillar, Komatsu and the 
industry in Turkey? 
A16-) Because of good service and easy to get all kind of parts, more 
independent companies sell Komatsu parts and meets their customersf 
needs. Komatsu is going to be more popular machines in the future. Most 
of the excavators and loaders are Caterpillar so far but because of 
Caterpillar1 strict unpopular rules, many people have started buying 
more Komatsu parts; therefore, Komatsu will become major player i n  
Turkey and capture the big percentage of Turkish market i n  future. 
KENDALL TOYOTA 
Q1-) What is your name? First Last 
Al-) Ms. Melannie Brennan 
Q2-) How long have you been working for this corporation? 
A2-) 5 years for Toyota Corporation. More than 3 years for Kendall 
Toyota. 13 years total worked for Isuzu and Honda too. 
43-) What is your position at this company? 
A3-) Service director and legal affair. Take care of customer 
complaints. 
Q4-) How long have you been in your current position? 
A4-) Over 3 years. 
Q5-) What are your responsibilities? Span of authority? 
A5-) Responsible for service, parts department,customer relation and 
taking care of any customer complaining and dissatisfaction. 
46-) How would describe your corporation's headquarters authority? 
Centralize? Decentralize? 
A6-) Decentralize. Headquarters gives Kendall Toyota authority to run 
its own business, have own promotions and advertisement campaigns. 
However, Kendall Toyota has to meet the requirements of quality, 
quantity, company's image and good public relationships. As long as 
Kendall Toyota does these things, Kendall Toyota can run its own 
business with having great authority. 
Q 7 - )  Why would you think headquarters has this system? Centralize? 
Decentralize? 
A7-) Decentralize. It helps Kendall Toyota to become more competitive, 
more business authority and provide cheapest prices because Kendall 
Toyota can set up its own business rules, prices etc. Which make Kendall 
Toyota more flexible than its competitors. 
Q8-) Do you think having this kind of system help your company in your 
region to become more competitive and effective? 
A8-) Yes it does. 
09-) If the answer "YESu could you elaborate it more please? 
A9-) Because Kendall Toyota has authority to run its business and set 
up prices, it helps the company to become more flexible, business 
oriented, create customer satisfaction and have cheaper prices than its 
competitors. 
Q10-) How much power and authority do you think your corporationls 
headquarters should give your company and other branches in other 
countries to run their businesses according to their local markets 
conditions and needs? 
A10-) Headquarters Toyota gives Kendall Toyota enough authority to run 
its own business. Headquarters should also have control on Kendall 
Toyota because it will keep Kendall Toyota in discipline and order, 
according to Toyota Corporationls rules and will help Kendall Toyota to 
have better relationship with customers because when Kendall Toyota 
meets the headquarters1 requirements of quality, better service and 
customer relations, Kendall Toyota also can meets its customers1 needs 
and satisfy them. 
Qll-) What kind of relationship does main headquarters has with your 
company such as friendly relationship and understanding communication? 
All-) There is a very good relationship and communication between 
Kendall Toyota and headquarters. 
Q12-) What does main headquarters do to have and remain a good and 
effective relationship and communication with your company? 
A12-) They send representative to Kendall Toyota to check the company's 
business performance such as quality, services, customer relationship 
that headquarters requires. They also ask Kendall Toyota about new 
ideas, needs and desires to make Toyota Corporation even more 
competitive. 
013-) How do you think main headquarters should improve its image and 
communication with your company and other branches in other countries? 
A13-) Headquarters has already very good communication and relationships 
with Kendall Toyota; therefore, there isn't need to improve anything. 
414-) Do you think main headquarters puts enough inputs and ideas that 
gets from its branches abroad, in practices and actions? 
A14-) No, they don't get inputs and ideas abroad much. 
Q15-) If the answer "NO" how much inputs and ideas from abroad you think 
main headquarters put in practices and actions? 
A15-) No. It isn't necessary to get many inputs and ideas from abroad. 
Because there are so many Toyota operations in other countries, it is 
well beyond headquarters capacity and control to check and implement all 
these ideas. 
Q16-) Does your headquarters ever consult with its foreign branches such 
as your company before it makes any kind of business decisions that may 
effect your company? 
A16-) Because there is very good and effective communication network 
between headquarters and Kendall Toyota, we always keep touch and 
exchange information with headquarters. 
Q17-) Do you think close contacts by getting more inputs and ideas from 
abroad and putting these ideas in practices would help your company to 
improve its competitiveness? 
A17-) Because headquarters has already effective communication with its 
operations in other countries, headquarters gets enough information and 
ideas; therefore headquarters doesn't have to get any more ideas from 
abroad. 
Q18-) Has ever main headquarters changed or made some adjustment to 
existing products or rules to satisfy your regional customers1 needs 
that may be different than other customers in other countries? 
A18-) No. Toyota Company has a standard products and rules for every 
markets in other countries. Headquarters doesn't make any major changes 
on a product but sometimes allow foreign operation to make some minor 
changes in interior of the car but it has to be very small and limited 
changes. Moreover, even though company has standard rules, the company 
also become flexible in some occasions. For example, sometimes a parts 
can broke down after its warranty over. The company believes that it 
wasn't customer's fault and part had some defects, then the company has 
a uGoodwillu rules to refund of the customer or change the parts free. 
Q19-) What kind of problems and misunderstandings does main headquarters 
usually has with your company? 
A19-) Sometimes, when headquarters doesn't tell us about change of some 
policies and rules on time, this create confusion between Kendall Toyota 
and headquarters. 
Q20-) What kind of education and training programs does your company has 
for its managers to handle problems with main headquarters and 
customers? 
A 2 0 - )  Toyota Corporation has 4 parts college course which has a one week 
training program. Every manager has to go through one of this one 
programs in four different times in a year. 
4 2 1 - )  What are the some requirements and rules for your company to hire 
and promote a manger to higher levels? 
A 2 1 - )  Have to have management capabilities and financial background. 
Q 2 2 - )  What kind of advises does your company gives main headquarters to 
deal with your company and other branches in other countries? 
A 2 2 - )  Keep the effective communication and understanding. 
4 2 3 - )  What do you think main headquarters should do to improve its 
managers' experiences and knowledge about your comapny and other 
branches in other countries? 
A 2 3 - )  Main headquarters has a very good training program; therefore, 
they don't have to change anything. 
Q 2 4 - )  What are the requirements and rules for a company to become a 
distributor and branch? 
A 2 4 - )  No answer. 
Q 2 5 - )  What is main headquarters' process of adding new companies into 
its operations? 
A25-)  No answer. 
Q 2 6 - )  How strict is main headquarters to enforce its rules, goals and 
ethics on your company and other branches in other countries? 
A 2 6 - )  Not very strict. They believe having good communication with their 
operations in other countries. 
0 2 7 - )  How does main headquarters enforce its rules and check branches 
such as your company, in other countries? 
A27-) Send representatives to check if operations perform according to 
Toyota Corporations rules and ethics. 
428-) What does main headquarters do if there is a violation of its 
rules in your company or other branches in other countries? 
A28-) Try to solve the problem by helping its operation to improve 
itself. 
Q29-) How does main headquarters determines and decides what is ethical 
or not for your company even though it may be different in your market 
environment than the environment that main headquarters is located? 
A29-) No answer. 
030-) What kind of advises does main headquarters usually gives your 
company and other branches in other countries to do better business? 
A30-) They are very concern about keeping good customer relationship, 
good quality of products;therefore, they tells us to improve ourselves 
in customer relationships and product quality. 
Q31-) What do you think your company should do to become more effective 
and competitive in your market? 
A31-) In sales, service are very good and effective. Concern and keep 
competitiveness by having fair price and customer satisfaction. 
432-) What would you say more about main headquarters and your company's 
structures, operations. managements, competitiveness and business 
operations? 
A32-) Because Toyota Corporation is very well organized company, the 
company should keep have this system for ever. 
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Fact Sheet 
March 1995 
Headquartered in Peoria, Ill., Caterpillar Inc. is the world's largest manufacturer 
of earthmoving and construction equipment and a major global manufacturer of 
diesel and natural gas engines. It is a Fortune 50 company with $16 billion in 
assets and nearly 54,000 employees. 
Caterpillar is one of only a handful of U.S. companies that leads its industry 
Overview while competing globally from a principally domestic manufacturing base. 
While 75 percent of Caterpillar's assets are in the United States, half of its sales 
are to overseas customers. Exports from the U.S. were $4.5 1 billion in 1994, 
accounting for about 16,000 Caterpillar jobs and 32,000 supplier jobs in the U.S 
The company's positive contribution to the U.S. trade balance was $1.37 billion. 
Caterpillar has consistently supported the reduction and removal of trade bar- 
riers. In 1991. NAFTA contributed to the sale of $239 million worth of US.-  
produced C3t products to Mexico, an increase of 59 percent over 1993. GATT is 
U.S.-Based Global expected to generate an additional $350 million a year in Caterpillar sales in the 
Competitor year 2000. - 
Caterpillar's products range from track-type tractors to hydraulic excavators, 
backhoe loaders, motor graders, off-highway trucks, diesel and natural gas 
engines and gas turbines. They are used in the construction, road-building, 
mining, forestry and material-handling industries. 
Caterpillar has earned a reputation for rugged machines, typically setting 
Rugged, Durable industry standards for performance, durability, quality and value. The compa- 
Machines ny's goal is to remain the technological leader in its product lines. 
Superior 
Customer Service 
Caterpillar delivers superior customer service through its extensive network of 
independent dealers in 128 countries worldwide. This network is composed of 
65 dealers in the United States and 122 outside the country. Many of these deal- 
ers have relationships with their customers that have spanned at least two gener- 
ations. Caterpillar owes its reputation to customers who have remained loyal 
over the years and measures its success by repeat business. 
Caterpillar's commitment to customer service is demonstrated by the fastest 
parts delivery system in its industry. Caterpillar's customers can obtain replace- 
ment parts from their dealers usually upon request. If not, Caterpillar usually 
delivers them anywhere in the world within 48 hours, and in many cases, less 
than 24 hours. 
Because of its distribution expertise, the company formed Caterpillar 
Logistics Services to warehouse and distribute other companies' products. 
It currently distributes products ranging from running shoes to computer 
software and auto parts. 
Caterpillar products and components today are manufactured in 27 plants in 
the United statesand 18 plants in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, China, 
France, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia and the 
United Kingdom. 
The company's marketing headquarters are located in Peoria and 
Mossville, 111.; San Diego, Calif.; Geneva, Switzerland; Hong Kong; Tokyo; 
Singapore; Melbourne, Australia; and Piracicaba, Brazil. 
Caterpillar's parts distribution network features 11 distribution centers in 
'orldwide Facilities nine countries and 12 regional distribution centers in the United States. 
1925 C.L. ~ e s t  and Daniel Holt form Caterpillar 
1931 First diesel-powered tractor produced by the company 
1940s Company's products in demand during World War I1 and post war 
construction period 
1950 Company begins international expansion with establishment of 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. Ltd. in Great Britain 
1953 Company solidifies its commitment to engine market with 
creation of separate division for engine customers 
1963 Caterpillar, Mitsubishi form successful joint venture in Japan 
1970s Company introduces a broad range of new products that would 
become the forerunners of today's best-selling lines 
1987 $1.8 billion plant modernization program launched 
1990 Company reorganizes into profit centers and service centers to 
better focus on customer needs and the bottom line 
1993 Company increases future sales opportunities in key regions of the 
world by forming two joint ventures in Russia and reorganizing its 
marketing operations in the Far East to sharpen its focus on China 
1994 Company reports record sales and earnings, making 1994 the 
most successful year in the company's history, and forms two 
History additional joint ventures in Russia and two joint ventures in China 
TRACK-TYPE TRACTORS EXCAVATORS PAVING EQUIPMENT 
Move and rip rock. soil and Dip. lift. load, hammer Soil and asphalt compacting, and 
other material. and cut material. asphalt paving. reclaiming and stabilizing. 
ENGINES WHEEL LOADERS MOTOR GRADERS TRUCKS 
Power locomotives. Excavate rock, minerals, soil. Create and maintain road Haul rock, 
Major Product Line trucks. boats. Load and carry materials, surfaces, consrruction sires. minerals and soil. 
1994 1993 
Sales and Revenue $14,328 $11,615 
Profit $ 955 $ 345' 
Profit Per Share $ 4.70 $ 3.21': 
Employment 53,986 5 1,250 
Financial Data (I)ollars in millions except per share data) 'E.rclrcluding 1993 ~ ~ o r ~ r e r ~ r r r i ~ l g  m.r-relared iten~s nrld r.rtraordinnry loss. 
Contact Caterpillar Corporate Caterpillar Inc. 
Public Affairs at 100 N.E. Adams Street 
.For more information (309) 675-58 10 Peoria, Illinois 61629-1425 
F I R S T  Q U A R T E R  1 9 9 5  . R E P O R T  TO S T O C K H O L D E R S  
C A T E R P I L L A R  I N C . .  P E O R I A .  I L L I N O I S  
first-quarter results 
at a glance 
(Miilions ofdoiiars excepl per share dala) 
First Quarter 
1995 1994 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Sales and revenues $3,913 $3,286 
Profit per share of common stock . . . .  $ 1.50 S 9 4  1 
1 A Highest qliui,terly profit evei: 
1 Recoi-d fiist-qtlarrer sales - second I~igi~est eve]: 
A O~ltstandirz$ teal72 effoict - ei~zploj~ees, dealers, and suppliei-s. 
:2/fni7tlfacturiizg productivity coi~t i i~t led to iiizprove. 
Colztilzued Izigh prodtlct quality 
-1 Operating profit lzighest siizce 1981. 
A Dealel, invelztoi-ies set for spi-i~zg selling season. 
A 1995 outlook: t~nchanged fionz that reported January 19. 
(Additional details page 2.) 
DIVIDEND DECLARED 
On April 12, the Caterpillar 
Board of Directors declared a 
cash dividend of 25c per share, 
payable May 20 to stockholders of 
record at the close of business 
April 24. This maintains the divi- 
dend rate declared for the previ- 
ous quarter. 
Cat displayed 39 machines - 25 
of them new - at Bauma '95, the 
world's largest construction indus- 
try trade show held April 3-9 in 
Munich, Germany (photo belo~v). 
Together with its German dealer, 
Zeppelin, Cat was the largest 
exhibitor. Additional information 
and photos about the show, which 
drew more than 400,000 visitors, 
appear on page 4. 
(See related story and photos page 4.) 
.t Quarter 1995 
3 Our Stockholders 
Caterpillar achieved record profit in the first quarter, the fifrh consecutive quarter of  
word-breaking results. The credit for this strong pev fomnce  belongs to the combined 
florts, spirit, and teamwork of our world-class global team - employees, dealers, 
and suppliers. 
I'm proud of this organization and what we've accomplished. But we know we must not 
7ecome complacent and think it> OK to relax now. The global marketplace doesn't work that 
way. What was good enough in 1994 won't even cut the mustard in 1995, and certainly won't 
:any us through the decade. 
Donald V. Fites 
Chairman 
April 19, 1995 
-1 April 19, Caterpillar announced 
Fth consecutive quarter of record 
it. Profit totaled $300 million or 
10 per share, an improvement 
( $192 million or 9 4 ~  per share in 
irst quarter of 1994. Both profit 
profit per share were records 
excluding nonrecurring tax- 
ed items From third-quarter 
es and revenues of $3.91 billion 
a first-quarter record and were 
~d only to the fourth quarter of 
. A 15% improvement in physi- 
des volume was the biggest Eac- 
ontributing to the increase in 
-t From first-quarter 1994. 
:ales Inside and Outside the 
Jnited States 
ide the United States, sales were 
J billion, a $322 million or 19% 
:ase from the same quarter a 
ago. The improvement was pri- 
iy the result of stronger industry 
~ n d  for machines and engines. 
i also benefited From higher 
realization, a larger increase in 
:r inventories than in the first 
ter of 1994, and an increased 
: of industry sales. U.S. sales 
52% of total sales, the same as 
nt-quarter 1994. 
side the United States, sales 
$1.80 billion, a $270 million or 
ncrease from first-quarter 1994. 
nprovement was primarily due 
rger increase in dealer machine 
t o ~ y  than occurred in the First 
quarter of 1994. Improved price real- 
ization and higher machine sales to 
end-users also contributed to the 
improvement in company sales. 
Sales outside the United States repre- 
sented 48% of worldwide sales, the 
same as first quarter last year. 
including UAW members on strike, 
was 54,298, compared with 5 1,67 1 
one year ago. Hourly employment 
increased 2,531 to 32,331, while 
salaried and management employ- 
ment increased 96 to 21,967. 
(continued on page 6) 
A Dealer Inventories 
U.S. dealer new machine invento- 
ries were up significantly From the 
end of the fourth quarter as dealers 
prepared for the spring selling sea- 
son. Machine inventories at the end 
of the quarter remained slightly 
above normal relative to current sell- 
ing rates. 
Outside the United States, dealer 
new machine inventories were also 
up significantly From the end of the 
fourth quarter, but remained slightly 
below normal relative to current sell- 
ing rates. 
J Labor Update 
The strike by the United Auto 
Workers (UAW) union that began 
June 21, 1994, at eight of the compa- 
ny's U.S. facilities continued. These 
striking employees represent about 
16% of Caterpillar's total work Force. 
The ongoing strike had virtually no 
impact on the company's ability to 
meet the needs of its customers or on 
its financial results. 
A t  the end of the quarter, 
Catelpillar's world\\~icle mploymcnt, 
THE WEAKER DOLLAR 
During the quarter, the U.S. dol- 
lar reached historic lows against 
the Japanese yen and the German 
mark, as well as a few other 
European currencies. Conversely, 
the dollar appreciated to new 
highs against the Canadian dollar, 
Mexican peso, and other key trad- 
ing partner currencies. Overall, on 
a "trade-weighted basis, the dollar 
declined only slightly. 
The weak dollar results in a com- 
L.  petltive - '  advantage to - '  U.S. 
e'ypbrtEi;s-W7ien to EEo.m- 
petiton whose costs are primarily 
in Japanese yen andlor: strong 
European currencies. Many 
Caterpillar competitors fall into 
this category. 
Caterpillar is well positioned to 
compete because of strategically 
placed manufacturing plants 
worldwide. However, the majority 
of our manufacturing asset. are in 
tKe United States - and as a 
major net exporter from the 
United States - the weaker dollar 
should have a Favorable impact on 
Caterpillar's global competitive 
position. 
WORLD'S LARGEST AIRPLANE PICKS UP CAT~TRACTORS 
FOR DELIVERY TO RUSSIAN GOLD MINE 
The world's largest cargo plane recenlly landed at  Cat's world head- 
quarters city in Peoria, Illinois, to'pick up three Caterpillar D8N tractors 
For delivery to a gold mine in eaStern Russia. Once there, the machines 
were transported by rail For 250 miles (402 lulometers) and then driven 
to the mine. 
The Russian plane, the Antonov An-124, stands 72 Feet (21.9 meters) 
high, with a length of 228 feet (69.5 meters) and a wingspan of 240 Feet 
(73.2 meters). 
Caterpillar has more than 4,000 machines and engines in operation in 
the Common\vealth of Independent States. And demand For Cat equip- 
ment is on the rise, driven p~imarily by large mining, oil and gas devel- 
opment, and infr-ast~ucture projects. 
condensed consolidated 
results of operations 
(Millions of dollars except per share data) 
Three  Months  Ended  
March  31, March 31.  
1995 1994 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Sales and revenues $ 3,9 13 S 3,286 
Operating costs and orher expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3,481 3,025 
Profit before taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  432 26 1 
Provision for income taxes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  143 79 
Equity in profit of affiliates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11 10 
Profit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . .  Profit per share of common stock 
condensed consoIidated 
financial position 
(Millions of dollars) 
Assets 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Current assets 
Land, buildings, machinery and equipment - net . 
Other assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total assets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Liabilities and stockholders'equity . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Current liabilities 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Long-term debt 
Other liabilities, including postemployment benefits 
Total liabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Stockholders' equity . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Total liabilities and stockholders' equity . 
*Includes Financial Pmducrs 
S u p p l e m e n t a l  D a t a  
Consol idated* F inanc ia l  P r o d u c t s  
March31, Dec.31. March31, lYIarch31, Dec.31, March3 
: 1995 1994 1994 . 1995 1994 1994 
! . . 
I.. . . , . i .: 
. % 2,926 $ 7,409 $ 6,670 $ 1,586 $1,442 $1,165 
. 1: i:?. ' 3 , ~ 0 8 .  3,776 3,769 439 433 379 
. .; 5,114 5,065 4,758 2,912 2,862 2,387 
. ;$16,298 $16,250 $15,197 $ 4,932 $4,737 $3,931 
. 1, : ,.' 
..,. ",?. ., 
5 0  $ 5 , 4 9 8  $5,087 1$1,945 $1.842 $1,508 1 it, -; 
. 4 314 4,270 3,971 2,328 2,336 1,944 
. j . 3,553 3,571 3,786 11 11 12 
. 1 13,612 13,339 12,844 4,334 4,189 3,464 
. 1. '. 3,'181 2,911 2,353 603 548 467 
. pl6,298 $16,250 $15,197 ; $4,932, $4,737 $3,931 
- 
-. . .~ ~ - - - . - -. . - - ~ - -  - -- ~ -- - ~- 
Trade Show ..., ,iri,i,,il~.,iI,,,r,, ,,,rc(. / I  
NEW PRODUCTS ENHANCE COMPANY'S LEADERSHIP 
Cat products on display at Bauma, the world's largest con- 
struction industry wade show, included: 
The first Cat product designed using state-of-the-art, vir- 
tual reality technology, the Cat 914G wheel loader. Key fea- 
tures include a redesigned cab to improve operator comfort 
and visibility. 
Two new electronic engines which emit significantly fewer 
emissions, use less firel, and are quieter. 
The first in a new series of motorgraders. 
The first in a new series of track-type tractors 
A ne\v line of wheeled excavators 
A number of new machines which have been re-engi- 
neered to emit significantly lower sound levels [or European 
customers who must comply 1~1th laws regarding construc- 
tion site sound. The machines feature Germany's prestigious 
"Blue Angel" environmental certification. 
A new line of paving and compaction equipment designed 
especially For the European market. 
The exhibit also spotlighted the unmatched product sup- 
port and customer services of 187 Caterpillar dealers in 128 
countries. 
Caterpillar recently commemorated its 10th year in 
the backhoe loader business. 
In  a special ceremony a t  the company's Leicester, 
England, manufacturing facility, employees, dealers, and 
customers gathered to commemorate the anniversary 
and production of the company's 50,000th backhoe 
loader. Cat donated the 438B backhoe loader to PLAN 
International, a worldwide humanitarian oganization, 
which will use the machine to build schools and homes 
near Cairo, Egypt. 
Cat entered the backhoe loader business in 1985 and 
is today recognized as a leader in the industry. Backhoe 
loaders are often the "workhorse" of job sites because of 
their versatility in performing tasks such as digging and 
loading, their maneuverability in urban areas, and the 
resulting value thev provide customers. 
Worldwide, small construction machlnes like the back- 
hoe loader today account for about half of the market 
opportunity for all Cat construction machines. 
ClAL RESULTS ... (conrfnried [rorn page 2)  
995 Outlook 
e world economic outlook is 
tially unchanged from that 
4 in January. The outlook con- 
to call for moderate economic 
Ih in the United States, but bet- 
)wth in Europe, Japan, AFrica 
ce Middle East. Latin America 
: weaker than earlier expected. 
~ o w t h  is expected to continue 
ada and Australia with strong 
I forecast to continue in Asia. 
n America, the downward revi- 
s due to just two countries. 
: recession is now forecast for 
3 for the entire year in the after- 
of December's devaluation. 
mtina, the only other country to 
3ticeably impacted by the 
m crisis, will suffer much slow- 
wth due to the high interest 
; ~ n d  reduction in government 
ng. Strong growth is still fore- 
)r the other key countries of 
Chile, Colombia, and Peru. 
-recent strengthening OF the yen 
~eral  European currencies does 
ertain risks for the economic 
k. At this time, however, we 
: that the Japanese and 
.can governments will take 
xiate actions to offset the 
:r currencies, such as lowering 
t rates. In the United States, 
the Federal Reserve is not expected to 
raise rates simply to defend the cur- 
rency, although one more rate hike is 
still possible to slow the economy's 
momentum. 
In this generally improving global 
enyironment, industry demand is 
expected to increase moderately in all 
regions outside the United States and 
Latin America. A slowing U.S. econo- 
my is still forecast to keep the U.S. 
industry near 1994 levels. In Latin 
America, better than expected 
demand in several countries \vill par- 
tially offset lower sales in Mexico and 
Argentina to hold demand near 1994 
levels For the region as a whole. 
Moreover, demand appears to be 
somewhat stronger than expected in 
Europe, Africa and the Middle East. 
In total, industry demand is still 
expected to be moderately higher and 
in line with January's outlook. 
The 1995 outlook for company sales 
and profits is unchanged from that 
reported in January. 
C A T E R P I L L A R  I N C .  
profit* 
*Excludes the third-quarter 1993 nonrecurring 
income-tax-related gain and the fourth-quarter 
1993 extraordinary loss. 
-QUARTER PRODUCTION MILESTONES 
rpillar's world-class global team continues to achieve record production and shipment levels -while 
ltaining Caterpillar's traditional high product quality. Here are a few typical examples of accomplishments 
e first quarter compared with one year ago: 
a h i ,  Japan: although the plant near Kobe, 
>an, was damaged during the January earth- 
ake, critical repain were completed within a 
weeks and production was back to normal 
early February. First-quarter production was 
23% over year-earlier levels. 
vora, Illinois: 14% more machines were built. 
uano, Italy: production rose 25%. 
mtur, Illinois: off-highway truck production 
9 82%. 
zvev, Colorado Dktribution Center: produc- 
3 up 22%. 
Lafayette, Indiana: large engine production up 24%. 
Mapleton, 112inois: castings shipped up 22%. 
Melbourne, Australia: bucket production rose 89%. 
Minneapolis, Minnesota: shipments of paving products 
up 34%. 
Monterrey, Mexico: truck body production up 20%. 
Morton, ZZlinois: parts shipments set all-time record. 
Mossvitle, Illinois: truck engine production set new record, 
rising 8%. 
Piracicaba, Brazil: production rose 17%. 
- - 
Pontiac, ninois: fuel system production rose 70%. 
moble, France: machine production rose 58%. 
. . 
terpillar lnc 
q* Tlris rt.llo,-/ ~\,os pt-it?ted ntr ,cc?cled %2 prrlvr ic.irlr ~ ~ e ~ e / ~ r h l t . - b o . ~ ~ ~ O  irrk. CATERPILLAR" 
led lmnt to Beljlng - even l l lhey  
-1hrealen sanctions -was more ef. 
Mr: .Wall argued' that's whal 
dlssldenls wanted anyway. 
+e Forelgn Relatlons Chalrman 
;ram rose 3 . e  to. 
-jur monlhs: ,:, 

,:'< ;,;, -.,: !.;;,..~:,;,'..~x:: Todraw on  the brldQe loan. . . . +; 
P.O. charges inleresl on the , ; .:;:.:?>.'.,; ':::,,; ;,: 
loan of 12.5 to 14 percenl. 
., 
;-.:;,. ,;- .: ,-.,,,,,. :.,:;>-
-lular 
.h posted 
rth had 
m f t u  
While P Q stands Too much debt. _ Can't #ell Iha junk bonds. Proflta squaazad. 
lo make mllltons. II deal rnnkers gel mofe ~ggresslve If lnveslors [urn up lhelr noses a1 C"petlllOn lo 
br~dge loans are and saddle companies wllh loa junk bonds mtended lo replace a b r l d ~ e  loans 
- r~sky much debl. fenders c w l d  be lorced brtdge loan, lender could be banks and securllles 
lo reduce or even wa~ve lnterest saddled wlth a longer-lerm ltrms could drive down 
T ~ ~ ~ Y M ~ ~  payments lo prevent delaulls , .commllmenl lhan was anl~clpated fees 
On Air . Car . 
By ANDREW POLL 
TOKYO, Frlday, July 21 - 
Slatea and Japan aald loday 
-ched&aalcngrcemen 
dlapule over alr.cargo mute 
fualng another In a serles o 
conflicts between the world 
-cconomles,- 
Under the agmmcnt.-! 
Government wlll lmmedlal 
sc!lve iradlng. Fot 
.a sham to close at 
. . .  
traverse the moat at the GM headquancrs 
building. " I t  went from the bottom up but 
i t  never got to this point (top managenlenl) 
in the company," he says. As a result. Gbl 
continued to make what can only be clas- 
sified as major, damaging blunders. Some 
.The 1984 reorganization: "It changed a 
lot of boxes around, but it didn't change any 
fundamentals. Going on 2000  hindsight, i t  
sure as hell didn't do anything for us. 
* Transfer prices between GM di- 
isions: "We paid Chevrolet more 
for the Firebird (a 10% transfer 
mark-up) than they got From their 
dealers on Camaro. They lost 
money on Camaro, but they made 
it on Firebird." 
T h e  $7-billion W-car (GM-10) midsize 
car program in the late '80s: "Seven car lines, 
automation coming out of your a -. They'd 
just spent $800 million to modernize the 
Oshawa, (Ont.) plant, and afterward they 
were so proud of it they took the board up and 
showed them. They didn't realize it but they 
didn't gain anything with the $800 million - 
no better quality, no lower cost. So you've got 
to involve the people who know how to make 
it work." . 
New United Motor  Mfg. Inc. 
rd: Wort 
BY DAVID C. SMITH 
t's like training for the world heavy- 
weight championship: Slimming 
down while beefing up, developing 
agile footwork to elude the oppo- 
was, 'No, you can't do that; you figure out nents' punches, and perfecting a powerful 
how to solve that.' Then the next day you wallop of your own to keep them off guard. 
come up with some kind of spiff (incen- But this is not a training exercise. It's the 
tive) on the product to move it a little dauntingchallengefacingtheFordMotor Co. 
faster, and they'd say, 'Can't you sell these as it moves to mesh its two huge automotive 
cars a little bit faster without spiffs?' I'd operations, North America and Europe, into a 
say, 'Hey, wait a minute, it was just yester- single, global &wehuse  for the 21st century. 
day I asked you to take the schedules down Ford 2000, as it's called, grew from a 
and you wouldn't do that.' It was ugly." study team organized last summer to look 
Under GM's new management_stmaure - at globalizing Ford's powertrain opera- 
e ~ e ~ ~ v ~ 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a ~ ~ s u c h v i t a l  tions. Starting on Jan. 1, 1995, what were 
matters, he says. "It doesn't Pet sh_ov.ed two very distinct, individualistic, high-vol- 
,through the system, so when you-make a ume  organizations will become FordAuto- 
- .-.. -- decls1_4?nthere's a far greater buy-in to it motive Operations (FAO). Other areas of 
L-. - . 
.than when you have a top-down process. the world such as Asiflacific and Latin 
" ~ v e r ~ o n e  fe ls they're pan of the team; and South America, where Ford has a lesser 
ihat's what's differe$iqday's generation presence, will remain separate for at least as 
versus yesterday's generation;" he contin- long as it takes to digest the biggest bite. 
ues2:.~ou!ye got to,feel part of the team. The reorganization arguably marks the 
You've got to want to come to work. And most massive change ever in Ford's 91- 
you wantto feel what you're doing is mak- year history. It dismantles Ford of Europe, 
ing a difference." established in 1967 by the late Henry Ford 
Mr. Hoglund traces the seeds .. of .. GM's 11, and gives five car and truckvehicle Pro- 
cTnturatch8fi~e to theeady  1970s when gram Centers (VPCs) worldwide responsi- 
~ u a t ~ t ~ - o f - w o r k  life (QWL) p.rogrjims first bility for developing all Ford-badged ve- 
were tntttated in-its plants. The idea - hicles no matter where they're sold. 
workp'lace democracy - quickly spread That includes Mazda Motor Corp. ve- 
throughout GM empire, but failed to hicles sporting the Ford oval, although 
(NUMMI. the GM-Toyola Motor Gorp. 
C;iliforni;~ joint venture): "Obviously we 
did not learn anything from NUMMI when 
we did the W-car. But at Saturn we learned 
a ton from them, and my guess is Toyota 
learned something from Saturn." Even 
though then-Chairman Roger B. Smith 
pushed creation of Saturn Corp. in the mid- 
'80s to prove GM could change its ways, 
Mr. Hoglund says Saturn's customer-do'veo 
principles were "not particularly under- 
stood or desired or asked for" at GM's 
headquarters. . . . . . . . . - . . 
Then there's the late W. Edwa'ia's 
Deming, whose quality principles were 
adopted Japan in the 1940s when no one in 
the U.S. would listen. Mr. Hoglund was 
among the first Americans to embrace the 
Deming philosophy, but got nowhere when 
he suggested that GM invite Mr. Deming in 
to meet with top management. "What the 
hell can he teach us?" was the.arrogant re- 
ply, he says, not identifying'who said it. 
"So what's your response? It's toshut 
up and not come up with any other stupid 
ideas," he says. 
That son of thing simply would not hap- 
pen today, he maintains, which perhaps 
underscores most poignantly how GM has 
changed. Q 
h the Risks,; 
Mazda will continue to have its own dii- 
tinct nameplates. Ford owns a 24%hter&t 
in the Japanese automaker and h'as'mo$ed 
recently to take more management control. 
By eliminating redundancies and other- 
wise streamlining, Ford estimates annual 
savings of $2 billion to $3 billion by 1999, 
when the first products from the VPCs 
reach production. 
That's expected to come in part from re- 
ducing management layers, and overall 
employment by about 5%; savings on en- 
gineering and facilities investments; anc 
via economies of scale from its own anc 
supplier's factories. Ford currently ha: 
1,500 component and system suppliers, hu 
by 1996 that will contract to 1,200 as a piv. 
otal part of slashing overhead and improv. 
ing costs and quality. 
Perhaps most importantly, Ford is con 
vinced FA0  will be much faster afoot ir 
meeting quickly shifting customer de  
mands - and the competition. New-prod 
uct cycle times are targeted to be uniforml) 
under three years, and plant changeover: 
for new,"global" models produced at vari 
ous locations arouid the world are chartel 
to follow each other in weeks, not month: 
Ford's chief agent for change is Chair 
man Alexander I. Trotman, but the ma. 
charged with implementing FA0 is Edwar 
E. Hagenlocker, 54, who was named it 
first president in April. 
A physicist and engineer by training, M 
WARD'S Auto World 
Shii  Support Group and its Ic;~di~ig spokcs- .,- 
man. whcrc Ilis citsy-going style has ccrvcd 5 -3  
as a steadying inl'lucnce. I n  GM's lalcst 
management shuffle during June (seeAirro f People, p .14) ,  he took over as the 4 l.' 
lameduck head of North American sales, 
service and marketing. 
Among his tasks is to help find his per- 
manent replacement for what arguably is 
GM's hottest seat: directing its seven ve- 
hicle marketing divisions. 
Mr. Hoglund clearly will depan from GM 
sZiZfiid'that its culture and ways of doing-.' ..-, 
-business finally have truly changed for the i. '. 
-. better. In his mind it all comes down to dis- : 
mantling GM's historical top-down, au- , ' .- 
thoritarian leadership and adoptingthe , 
principles of participative management and 
empowerment within the ranks - in short, 
teamwork- which he long has championed. y 
"The real important thing about the or- 
2 ganization change is that the five members . 
of the President's Council (established by $ Jack Smith when he took charge) spent 
3 more time on it than I've spent on any 
mill Hoglund: GM's problems started on the 14th floor. 'change in the last five to seven years. 
Whatever was done was done with the full Managing for agreement of all five.And if we didn't like what wkgo(ng on we would've said, 'No, 
we don't agree with it."' That is a decid- 
CHANGE edly far cry from GM's traditional deci- sion-making process, he maintains. Over most of the last 20 years Mr. Hoglund held positions in GM's operating divisions. But during a seven-month period in 1984, he 
worked on its legendary 14th floor at Dctroit 
How the Big Three are restructuring for the future hadqu"'en as head Of corporate marketing - . .  
and central office operating staffs. 
General Motors Corg. has just reorganized, purring a new North American team in ~n an unusually candid commentary, Mr. 
.lace (see story p.14). Ford Motor Co. is going even further: It's combining ifs huge Hoglund recalls that experience: "It was 
'orth American and European operations into a single new entity, Ford Automotive bt-6f i l  I got on the 14tFflbbr that I real- - 
.)perations. And Chrysler Corp., riding the crest of a new-product and record-profir i@-whatbe main problem of t K e - ' d i n F  
onama under a new team structure initiated in (he early '90s, is stepping back to get - -  pany was: It was a-tdp-do.wn-pEce~6f~b"- 
/-.----.I ... - -  
t nagging qualiyproblems that have marred i u  success. How are the Big Three man- -- reaucracy.When I was on the management 
ging change? To find out, Ward's Auto World interviewed top executives at each committee, the only input I was allowed to 
utomaker The report starts with GM. -giveLwas from the piece of business for  
Y DAVID C. SMITH ness. Mr. Hoglund spent his early years at which I had responsibility. If they did ask GM in financial jobs. During the 1980s he . for your input, they'd go their own way. 
ill Hoglund turns 60  this moved into general management, taking__lBy,.contrast) in contemporary manage- 
month, and soon he'll retire over as Pontiac Motor Div. general man- ment, thetop people geftogether to m e  
from General Motors Corp., ager and rising to head Saturn Corp. and- busitiess, not just their section of it." 
capping a 36-year career. the now-defunct BOC Group that emerged-- Under GM's old structure, managers 
No one remaining in GM's from GM's 1983 reorganization. I down the line could make decisions within j ' 
increasingly younger higher During the 1992 turmoil that forced early their own groups, he says, but those with ! 
chelons has seen and experienced more retirements of President Lloyd E. Reuss real impact on their success or failure were 
' $' 
trenching change at the world's largest and Chairman Robert B. Stempel, GM's made at headquarters. "Scheduling (pro- 
. $ 
utomaker than has Mr. Hoglund. suddenly fiesty hoard of directors - fright- duction) and pricing pretty much were dic- ! , 
From his vantage point he's convinced ened as the world's largest corporation tated," he maintains. "It's down here (head- j 9 
?M1s longstanding dictalorial managemen, plunged toward disaster - selected John F. quarters) where you've got to integrate the i 9 
mtyle i\ientually;beCame its undoing. and - (Jack) Smith Jr. as president and named one various components of the company to) 
--7---- ---- 
-,at 11s recent change toteamwoik and de- of its own. fomier Procter & Gamble chair- make it  great. You couldn't do that." 
ision-sharing at the top will assure i[s re- man John G. Srnale. as chairman. The "classic example," Mr. Hoglund re- 
i';gT Znifu t  u i -S ' i c~e~s .  - " . 
~ . 
Mr. Hoglund emerged from that shakeup calls, "is this: Let's say you had a little ex- 
A candid,'b;Gtspken i f d  congenial ex- second in command lo Mr. Smith as execu- tra inventory out in the field, so you wanted 
cutive schooled in economics and busi- ti\.< vice president-Corporate Affairs and to reduce your inventory. So.the decision 
Q WARD'S Auto World August 1994 
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TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION 
I .  Company Summary 
1. General Status 
Establ~skd 1 August 28. 1937 
1 
Head Office : 1 Tovota-cho, Toyota Clty. Aichi Prefecture 471. Japan 
Tokyo Head Office 1 4-18. Koraku 1-chome. Bunkyo-ku. Tokyo 112. Japan 
. Manufacture and sale of automobiles, industrial vehicles. 
sh~ps. aircraft, other transportation machinery. aerospace 
mach~nery. parts. and components. 
lvlanufacture and sale of prefabricated housing unit and 
home-related equipment 
Net Sales "' ! X8.154. 750 million ( $76. 931. 603 thousand"" ) 
Net Income ": : Y110. 734 m~llion ( $1. 044. 660 thousand '" ) i 
Capital : Y261. 799 million ( $2. 469. 801 thousand ) 
Employees 1 70. 000 ( as of Jan. 1995 ) 
%July 1993 - June 1994 
Z X A t  the rate of Y106=USS1 ( on the Tokyo Fore~gn Exchange Market on June 30.1994 ) 
2.-... . -,: .,. 3.- ,u;zc* 
$@&y-:2:;+>:?c7> 
2. Statistical Highlights of  1994 
Total 
3.508.456 
2,040,570 
1. 504. 472 
Production 
Passenger cars 
2, 769, 359 
Trucks and Buses 
739, 097 
614. 185 
467. 917 
Domestic Sales / 1, 426. 385 ( Reg~stration )
Exports 
( Shipment) 1. 036. 555 
Brief History 
1933 
7-'44 
-5-.54 
(Sep '33) Automobile Department established in Toyoda Automatic Loom Works. Ltd. 
(Aug. '37) Toyota Motor Co.. Ltd. established 
(Nov. '38) Honsha Plant started operation 
(May '47) 100.000th Toyota automobile produced 
(Aor. '50) Toyota Motor Sales Co.. Ltd, established 
6-'59 
, .,.
(Apr. '56) Toyopet dealerships established 
ioct .  '57) Toyota Motor Sates. u S A.. Inc. establtshed 
(Aug. '59) Motomachi Plant started operatton 
(Jun. '61) Toyota Publica dealerships (present Corolla dealerships) establlshed 
(Sea '61) Haruhl Center comoleted 
-,- 0- 
'65 
"' 
'67 
'68 
1Feb.) 30.000.000th Toyota automobile reg~stered In Japan 
'87 / 1Apr.i Kasugat Hous~ng Works completed 
(JU" '62) 1.000.000th Toyota automobile produced 
(May '64) Toyota Nagoya Wharf Center completed 
(Nov Kamigo Plant started operation 
(Sep.) Takaoka Plant started operation 
(No".) Hlgashi-Fuji Technical Center completed 
IOct.) Toyola Auto dealersh~ps established 
(JuI.) Miyoshi Plant started operatlon 
'69 
'70 
'72 
'73 
'75 
'76 
'78 
'79 
'80 
'81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
.86 
(Mav) Toyota Motor Manulactur~ng. U S.A. InC S!arted production 
lSep 1 6O.OOO.OOO1h Toyota automob~le produced 
(Nov.) Toyola Motor Manufacturina Canada Inc slarted oroduction 
(Mar.) Toyota Corolla dealerships (former Publfca dealerships) establcshed 
(Sep ) Toyola exports exceeded cumulative total o f  1.000000 automobcles 
(Dec.) Tsutsumi Plant started operation 
(Jan ) 10.000.000th Toyota automobile produced 
IJun.) Myochi Plant started operation 
(0ct . l  10.000.000th Toyota automobile reglstered in Japan 
(Mar.) Shlmoyama Plant started operation 
1Jul.i 20.000.0001h Toyola automobtle produced 
IAug.) K~nu-ura Plant started operation <>>-i&~~+y;&<;L~~j:~q*+,y+.?~>;<* 
(Jan ) Tahara Plant started operatson 
(May1 Toyota exports exceeded cumulative total o f  10.000.000 automobltes 
(Jan I 30.000.000th Toyota automob~le produced 
(Apr.! Toyota Vista dealerships established 
(Nov.) 20.000.000th Toyota automob~le regcstered In Japan 
(Apr.1 Toyota Technological Institute opened 
iJuI.1 Toyota Motor Co.. Ltd and Toyota Motor Sales C o .  Lld ciarqes ! i t s  Toyota Motor 
. Corporatton 
(Ma: 1 40.000.0001h Toyota automobtle produced 
(Oct 1 Shibetsu Proving Ground (the primarv constructlonl completed 
tDec.1 Toyota-GM loin1 venture (New Unlted bloior Manulaciurtng. Inc In U S  A. started 
producl~on 
1Jun.i Tob~shlma Center completed 
(Jan.! 50.000.000th Toyota automobile produced 
(Febl Telho Plant started ooeration 
(Mar I H~rose Plant started operation 
IApr 1 Toyota Automob~le Museum completed 
IAua ) Tochloi Hous~no Works comoleted 
I - - 
80 I (Sep) Toyota Autosalon Amlux Tokyo opened 
I lFeb.1 70.000.000th Toyota automobile produced 
tSep 1 80 000 000th Toyota automobile produced 
,-+mmemoratlve Muse~lm of  lndustrv and Technology opm7=2 
61 
42 
7 
/ loci 1 Toyola-Sabanc~ Aulonrot~vr Industry 8 Trade Iric stiirtcd "roecictic!.. 
- 2 -  
(JuI ) 40000000th Toyota automobile regcstered ~n Japan 
IOct ) Yamanash1 Houslng Works completed 
(Mar ) DUO dealersh~ps (for Volkswagen and Audc cars) started sales 
LDec 1 Toyota Motor Manufacturing (U K ) Ltd started productton 
(Jul I Toyota Autosalon Amlux Osaka opened 
4. Offices, Plants and Others 
Head Office ! Toyola-cho. Toyola C l t y  A lc l l~  P8eleclura 171. Jaoan Telephone  
Tokyo Head Office 4-18, Koraku 1-chome. Bunkyo-ku. Tokyo 112. Japan Telephone  
Nagoya Office 23-22 lzuml 1-chome. Hlgashl-ku Nagoya. Alchl Preleclure JG1 Japan 
A Telephone.  
%As of the end of June. 1994 
%%Plants: As of the end of Dec. 1994 
Other centers: As of the end of June 1994 
. Production 
Since its establishment. Toyota's principle has been to strive constantly to build 'better products 
;ser costs." To this end. Toyota has developed its own unique production method. This system 
~sed upon the idea "just in time" (i.e.. producing only the necessary amount of parts just at its 
ed time), the idea of Toyota Founder Kiichiro Toyoda. This system also seeks to thoroughly 
late all sorts of waste in order to reduce prime costs. Toyota also places a maximum value on 
wman element, allowing an individual worker to employ his capabilities to the fullest through 
cipation in the productive management, and improvement of his given job and its environment. 
the motto of "Good Thinking. Good Products." each individual worker is making his best effort 
;sure Toyota's customers the highest quality product, with an understanding that it is in his work 
:ess that quality is built in. 
Oassenger Cars 
Century. LS400(Celsior). Crown. GSJOO(Aristoj. ES3OO(Windom). SC400/300(Soarer), Supra. 
Cressida(MarklI1 1 Chaser ! Cresta. Scepter. Vista / Carnry. Caldina. CarinaE(Corona). 
Carina. Celica. Curren 1 CarinaED - i  Corona EXiV. MR2. Corolii. Sprinter. Corolla 4WD 
Wagon(Sprinter Carib). Tercel 1 Corsa i Corollan. Paseo(Cycos). Starlet. Sera. RAV4 ~ , + ~ ~ $ ~ < ~ ~ - ~ ~ ~ h ~ ~ ~ $ + ~ ~ ~  
-rucks and Buses 
Dyna. Toyo Ace. Hi Ace. Previa (Estima). Estiina Lucida / Emina. L~te Ace / Town Ace. Deliboy. 
Stout. Hi-Lux. Toyota Truck. Land Cruiser. Coaster. Quick Delivery. T.U.V. 
'oyota Home series 
"Foret". "Oak-. Aspen". 'Larch'. "Elm-. "Ceder". 'Meleze". .Espasio 5L'. Espasio 3". "Ma~son 
Lecc~a'. Offlce & Shop" 
Production Record 
Passenger 
Cars 
5 
j 
' 
1 
1 
1 
Trucks and 
Buses 
2. 569.284 
2, 684. 024 
2. 708.069 
2.982.922 
3. 055. 101 
3.345.885 
3. 180. 054 
3.171.311 
2, 882.698 
2. 769.359 
Toyota 
Total Industry ~~~~t~ vehicle production Total 
1. 096. 338 
976. 143 
930. 210 
985. 775 
920. 801 
866, 488 
905. 027 
760.030 
679. 052 
. 739. 097 
3. 665, 622 
3. 660. 167 
3. 638. 279 
3. 968. 697 
3. 975.902 
4. 212. 373 
4,  085. 081 
3.931.341 
3. 561. 750 
3. 508. 456 
12. 271.095 
(Un~t. thou. vehicles! 
12. 259, 817 
4.000 
12. 249. 174 
3.000 
12. 699. 803 
13. 025. 741 2,000 
13. 486. 796 
13. 245, 432 ', OoO 
12.499.284 
0 
11, 227. 545 
10. 554. 119 
m. Domestic Sales and Service 
Toyota boasts a finely detailed sales and service network stretching throughout Japan. This includes 
a total of 310 automobile dealers who operate approximately 5.500 sales and service outlets. 
We a l Q  make efficient use of an impressive online computer network, guaranteeing prompt and 
accurate delivery of any part or component. 
(1) Domestic Sales and Service Network 
'Toyota" Dealers (50) 
4 ..Toyopet" Dealers (52) 1 
4 . .~orol la"  Dealers (76) 1 
"Auto" Dealers (66) 
Parts Distr~butors (33) 
* ( ) =number of dealers 
(2) Domestic Sales Record (Registrations) 
Toyota Total Industry Total Toyota Share 1%) 
1985 1. 683. 494 5. 556. 897 30. 3 
1986 1. 753. 984 5. 708. 131 ' 30. 7 2.000 
. Overseas Operations 
Today. Toyota vehicles are used by people in about 160 countries, and are proving their reliability 
nd the world. For Toyota, the most important consideration in its relations with these countries 
always been "Competition and Cooperation" and -Co-existence and Mutual prosperity'. 
Based on these considerations. Toyota has sought to create and supply vehicles that respond 
to the needs of the world's different markets. At the same time, the Corporation has been 
+meriting the production in 24 regions, with the aim of co-operating in the growth of local 
~omies. 
As another step based on this principle of "Competition and Cooperation" and "Co-ex~stence 
Mutual prosperity with the nations of the world. Toyota is now promoting the procurement of 
seas parts. This is not simply the import of automotive parts from abroad. We also promote 
parts purchases by our overseas production companies distributors. and sales outlets all over 
vorld. 
lrseas ~ c t i v i t i e i  Organization 
(Sales) 
Toyofa Importers. Sales 
Motor Oislr~butors Oullels Customers 
Corporat~on (160) (7.214I 
3verseas Production 
Overseas 
Compantes 
i34) 
Toyota's overseas production operations not only contribute directly to local economtes. but 
'oster local development through technical guidance and assistance. 
Toyota intends to continue overseas production operations which meet the particular local 
tions and requirements. 
Overseas 
parts makers 
'seas Production Companies 
24 Regions, 34 Companies 
No. of regions No. of companies 
- ~- 
Asia and Oceania 
Latin America 7 7 
Africa 2 2 
Euro~e 2 2 
M~ddle East 4 4 
North America 2 6 
Total 24 34 
3. Overseas Sales 
The princ~pal oblect~ve of Toyota In 11s ovelseas sales actlvlties IS to ma~ntaln a stable long-term 
supply o! products and parts wh~ch meet the demands of the respective markets around the world 
Toyota veh~cles today enloy a reputation throughout the world for the~r h ~ g h  quallty and fuel economy 
as well as for the comprehensive servtce network Toyota has developed over many years 
Whlle cond~t~ons In overseas markets have been rather dlfflcult In recent years due to such factors 
as the ~nstabll~ty of the worlds currency sltuat~on and greater compet~tlon wlth overseas automakers 
In the small car fleld Toyota Intends to contlnue 11s efforts to produce and supply automob~les to 
serve people of the world 
(1) Export Record (Shipments) 
(Un~l=veh~cle! 
Toyota Industry Total 
1985 1.979. 955 ', 202,020 ) 6, 730. 472 ( 1. 002, 560 ) 
Note: The statistics exclude non-countable "KD sets." whlch are expressed in the parentheses. 
(2) Toyota Vehicle Export 
(Unit: thou. vehicles) 
-or-Management Relations 
ike labor unions in the United States and European countries. Japanese labor unions are 
-based. In other words, a union consists only of the workers of the company. The philosophy 
n labor-management relations in Japan is that the healthy growth of a company is essential 
,ing the living conditions of its employees. Those conditions of well-being, on the other hand. 
,der essential in achieving higher productivity with higher morale among our workers. 
>or-management relations of Toyota are based on a "firm relationship of mutual trust" 
!d over many years of close consultations between management and labor representatives. 
~ a l  goal is to create a stable, fruitful balance between improving worker lifestyles and continuing 
e development compatibly. 
orking Conditions 
i general, working conditions in Japan have made considerable improvements in recent years. Q ~&~~:s:+~+i~w%.;y2 %&$:. % ,  
.Y..?X. . .:-. .+ ,-h %$y 
ion to better wages and shorter working hours, the terms of employment for many Japanese . . 
tions include such additional benefits as lunch subsidy, commuting allowances, housing 
rce, as well as a chance for further education and training programed systematically by the 
'Y. 
oyota has sought to insure a stable and long-lasting full livelihood for its employees through 
y of measures to improve the health and welfare of workers. standards of living. as well as 
te better conditions in terms of both wages and working hours. 
(1) Number of Employees 
(2) Average Wage: X4.080 per hour 
(3) Working Hours: 8-hour day. 40-hour week 
(4) Days Off: 2 days each week 
Spring vacation for about 10 days summer vacation lor about 10 days 
and winter (New Year) vacat~on for about 10 days 
In addltion to the above. each employee is ent~tled to rake pa~d  hol~days 
for up to 20 days per year 
Total 
70. 000 
Office. Techn~cal Staff 
26. 000 
( 5 )  Welfare Facilities 
Shop Workers, etc 
44,000 
1 )  Recreational facilities 
In addition to the Toyota Sports Center, a 610. 000-square-meter complex of permanen! 
facilit~es for many sports activities, there are also recreational facilities located in and around 
each of the Toyota plants. Also available for use are resort houses at var!ous scenic spots 
in Japan. 
2) Housing 
Dormitories, apartments and houses are available through the company for all who require 
them. There is also a house purchasing assistance program for employees who wish to 
buy their own houses. 
3) Toyota Memorial Hospital 
This fully-equipped general hospital is open to local residents as well as to Toyota employees 
and their families. 
4) Co-op Association 
Toyota Co-op Association provides various lines of daily necessities for Toyota employees 
and their families at discount rates. 
5) Toyota Family Fund 
Toyota joins together with its labor union and employees to finance a variety of activities 
enhancing the welfare of Toyota workers. These activities include financing for 
congratulations and condolences for various occasions; providing education for orphans 
of deceased employees; contributing to utilization of resorts: and other efforts dedicated to 
human health and welfare. 
Development of Personal Capabilities 
> 
ln'the belief that the greatest asset of a business enterprise is its manpower, Toyota Motor 
oration offers a wide variety of educational and training programs to help employees 
op their own capabilities. These include on-the-job-training as well as formal and informal 
-ational programs. 
The main aims of these programs are development of 1) creativity, 2) positive attitude, and 
?rise of responsibility. Through these, workers can improve their respective skills and 
lop a sense of fulfillment as members of society. 
In the spirit of the company slogan "Good Thinking. Good Products," each worker ,can 
~nstrate his capabilities in reduction of cost and in improvement of quality through the 
aestion System and about 6.800 QC (Quality Control) circles. 
'oyota's Three-Fold Education System 
Capabilities 
/ Formal 1 on-the-lob 1 Inbrma~ \ 
Education Training Education 
Suggestions Submitted by Employees (1993) 
Suggest~ons Submitted 
Percentage Adopted 
Suggestions per Employee 
m. Research and Development 
Toyota believes that 11s prlmary iask 1s to produce vehicles that will please customers all over 
the world by responding promptly and aptly to such social requirements as safety. pollution control. 
and energy and resource conservation, as well as to user demands concerning driving conditions 
and preferences. - 
Toward this oblective. Toyota has adopted a concept of "total balance" in its ongoing effort to 
develop vehicles highly dependable from every possible standpoint. 
A wtde range of research and development activities. from long-term, basic studies to f~nal 
product development, are deployed tn joint efforts 01 the Head Office Technical Center and the 
Proauct~on Eng~neering Development Department and other research and development facilities In 
vartous places. 
System of research and development a t  Toyota 
( 1 )  System of research and development of product 
1. Eng~neering departments at Head Office 
2. H~gashl-Fuj~ Technical Center 
3. Sh~be!su pmving Ground 
4. Tokyo Design Center 
5. Toyota Technical Center. U. S. A.. Inc. 
6. Calty Design Research. Inc. 
7. TMME (Technical Center. Design Center) 
(5. 6-U. S. subsidiaries of TMC. 7-Europe subsidia of TMC. ) 
(2) System of research and development of production engineering 
1. Production Engineering Development Department 
2. Production Engineering Departments 
(3) System of joint research and development by companies in Toyota Group 
1. Toyota Central Research & Development Laboratories. Inc. 
2. Nippon Soken. Inc. 
(Both 1 and 2 established through joint participation of TMC and Toyota Group 
companies) 
~ocial Activities 
ile. working to produce motor vehicles that will serve the automotive needs of the world. 
jetermined to help create a more affluent international community, is engaged in 
s of direct benefit to all of us: programs to improve the transportation and traffic 
lent, donations toward the construction of public cultural facilities, and grants to aid 
research institutions both in Japan and overseas. One of these activities is the Toyota 
ion, which now has a total endowment of Y11.400 million. The Foundation extends grants 
ich and other types of projects, which will contribute to social progress from a truly 
~erspective. 
nother is the Toyota Technological Institute, which opened in April 1981, with the aim 
r i bu t i n~  to the development of personal capabilities. 
syota Foundation 
dblished: October 1974 
ation: Shinjuku Mitsui Building 37F 
2-1-1. Nishi-Shinjuku. Shinjuku-ku. 
Tokyo 163, Japan 
eirman: Eiji Toyoda 
sident: Soichi lijima 
dowment: Y11. 400 miillon 
To promote the future development of social \.:eifare in Japan and other 
countries, mainly developing countries, by providing a~d for research and other 
social projects involving traff~c safety, natural and social environments, social 
welfare, education and culture. 
yota Foundation Aid: 
j of Mar. 16. 1993 curnulat~ve a ~ d  totaled) 
Number of Aid Amount of Money Awarded 
3. 210 Y8. 311 mill~on 
m. Toyota Group and Suppliers 
A u l o m o b ~ l e  m a n u f a c t u r e  IS an In teg ra ted  I n d u s t r y  comb~n~ng a w l d e  range of t e c h n o l o g ~ c a l  f ie lds 
In t h e  case ol T o y o t a  m a n y  k l n d s  of p a r t s  and c o m p o n e n t s  a r e  s u p p l t e d  b y  T o y o t a  Group companies 
and by d o m e s t l c  and overseas s u p p l ~ e r s  
W h e t h e r  a T o y o t a  Group member or a n o t h e r  suppl~er each m a n u f a c t u r e r  m u s t  malnta ln the 
v e r y  t o p  levels of technological skill and equipment applicable In ~ t s  f le ld  B e s l d e s  automotive p a r t s  
T o y o t a  Group produces p r o d u c t  l l nes  I n  several o t h e r  f te lds  lncludtng steel  p r e c l s l o n  machinery 
automatic looms textl les h o u s e h o l d  wares off~ce and h o u s l n g  u n i t s  and other products 
Al l  T o y o t a  Group f l rms  and o t h e ~  suppliers e n j o y  a w o r k l n g  r e l a t l o n s h t p  of equa l l i y  s l d  trust 
n u r t u r e d  over m a n y  years  o f  c o - o p e r a t l o p  
(1) Toyota Group 
Toyoda Automat ic  Loom 
works, Ltd. 
A ich i  Steel Workr, Ltd. 
Company 
Toyoda Machine Workr, Ltd. 
*Capital 
(in millions) 
Toyota Au to  Body Co., Ltd. 
* 
Employe~s Established 
Toyota Trusho Corporation 
Main Productr /Act iv i t ies 
Ais in  Seiki Co., Ltd. 
Nippondenso Co., Ltd. 
Toyoda Boshoku Corporation 
Tawa Real Estate Co.. Ltd. 
Toyota Central Research & 
Development bboratorier. Inc. 
Kanto Au to  Works. Ltd. 
Toyoda Gosei Co., Ltd. 
Hino Motors, Ltd. 
Daihatsu Motor  Co., Ltd. 
Nov. 1926 
Mar 1540 
lvlay 1941 
Aug. 1945 
Jul, 1948 
Jun 1949 
Dec. 1949 
May 1950 
Aug. 1953 
':anulac!u,2 ar.5 sale at solnnilg Erin weav:ng 
vacn;nes inl~Slr,il vehicles and 2-;lmoDlles 
hlanulacture and sale 01 soec.aimty %eel and 
forged steel products 
Manufacture and sale 01 rnacb~le lools and 
auto parts 
Manulaclure of auto and specla1 vehlcle 
bodles a ld  parts 
lmporl erpor: and tradlng of raw materials 
and prooucts 
Manufaclure and sale of auto Darts. 
hOuSehold appl~ances. and die-cast parts 
Manufacture and sale of electr~c auto 
components and housahold appliances 
Manufaclure and sale of cotton thread. COltOn 
cloth auto parts and household appliances 
Real estate development. management, and 
rental 
Mar. 1907 1 Manufacture and sale of automobiles 1 Y28.192 
1960 
Apr- 1946 
Jun. 1949 
May 1942 
* A s  o f  the end o f  fiscal year for  each company 
(2) Suppliers' Organization 
Fundamental technical rzsearch for the 
Toyota Group 
Manufacture of auto bodies and parts and 
equipment for housing construction 
Manufacture and sale of synthetic resin. 
rubber, and corkproducts 
Manufacture and sale of large trucks and 
buses 
Note: As  o f  Apr. 1994 
Y 3. 000 
6, 850 
Y18.038 
Y26.412 
Assoc ia t ion  
K y o h o k a i  
Eihokai 
Desc r ip t i on  
Manu fac tu re rs  o f  a u t o  pa r ts  and 
c o m p o n e n t s  
Manu fac tu re rs  of molds, gauges. jigs. 
etc. and c o n t r a c t o r s  f o r  plant facilities 
Establ ishment 
Dec. 1943 
Apr. 1983 
No. of Companies 
245 
78 
release a wave of redesigned V-8s as the engine once again finds 
favor with Americans. 
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%stract : Although Toyota has sold cars in Western Europe for many 
years, it was relatively late to manufacture there, getting started 
only in 1992. As part of its heightened emphasis on Europe, Toyota 
opened a parts center in Belgium in 1993. Toyota is still primarily 
a marketing operation in Europe. 
9ccess NO: 
Citle: 
quthors : 
Journal : 
2ompani.e~ :
Subjects: 
3eo Places: 
:odes : 
01049867 ProQuest ABI/INFORM (R) Global 
Roadblocks, roadblocks everywhere 
Updike, Edith 
Business Week [BWE] ISSN: 0739-8395 
Iss: 3429 (Industrial/Technology Edition) 
Date: Jun 19, 1995 p: 58 
Contact UMI for article reprint (order no. 36.00). 
Restrictions may apply. 
Ford Motor Co DUNS: 00-134-4746 Ticker: F 
Automobile industry; Market penetration; Distribution 
channels; Objectives 
Japan; US 
8680  ransp sport at ion equipment industry) ; 1300 
(International trade & foreign investment); 9179 (Asia & 
the Pacific) ; 9190 (United States) 
Qstract : US automakers face considerable challenges in penetrating 
the Japanese market. Most dealers are under intense pressure from 
Japanese auto makers to keep American cars out. It took Motoh 
Katsumata 2 years of negotiations to get Fords into the showroom. 
Once Katsumata started importing Fords, he had the daunting task of 
assembling a sales team from scratch, since Toyota Motor Corp. would 
not allow salespeople to hawk its cars and Fords at the same time. 
The market for Fords while still a niche is still growing. 
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2bstract : Last week, US trade representative Mickey Kantor formally 
gave notice that the US will soon seek tariff sanctions against 
Japanese auto makers in a last-ditch effort to cut the swelling 
US-Japan trade gap. It was enough to send fresh jitters through 
already-hurting Japanese auto makers, pushing the stock prices and 
ADRs of Toyota, Honda, Isuzu, Nissan, Mitsubishi Motor and Mazda down 
by almost 10% on the week. American and British analysts in Japan 
are not especially upbeat on the auto stocks' prospects for getting 
better. This past week, 2 of the big 3 Japanese makers of game 
systems, Sega Enterprises and Sony, traded opening salvos in what 
will be a fierce struggle for the critically important $5 billion US 
video-game market. Last week Unilever reported a nearly 20% drop in 
first-quarter profit margins and first-quarter net, and the stock 
slipped sharply in London on the news. 
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Article Text: 
When Gary Arnholt began working at Cummins Engine Co. in the summer of 
1944, the world was at war and most of the heavy-duty diesel engines the 
company turned out wound up in places like Iwo Jima and Normandy. 
Today, Arnholt, 66, an assembly line worker, is still in the plant, 
building engines for trucks, buses and industrial machinery. 
But that's about the only thing that's remained the same at Cummins' 
oldest factory over the last 50 years. 
"There have been big changes around here," said Arnholt, standing 
alongside the engine block assembly line. "When I started here, we 
turned out 24 engine blocks a day. Now we turn out 165 a day with fewer 
people. 
"And the quality is way, way better." 
Arnholt could also have mentioned the new automated manufacturing 
processes, the concept of work teams and the just-in-time inventory 
system that have dramatically improved quality and productivity. 
It's a good thing that productivity and quality are up at Cumins 
because for the first time since the late 1970s demand for the com~any's 
engines is exceeding production-despite the fact that the 70-~ear-;ld; 
2.3-million-square-foot Columbus, Ind., plant is running three full 
shifts to turn out 35,000 heavy duty, 250- to 500-horsepower engines 
every year. 
But Arnholt isn't complaining. And neither is Cummins' new chief 
executive, Jim Henderson. 
In fact, Henderson, a tall, affable man who has spent-his entire 
working life at Cummins, couldn't be happier. 
Henderson, who had been president of the company, took over as chief 
executive officer last August in a remarkable transfer of power that saw 
former CEO Henry B. Schacht voluntarily step aside. It was an unusual 
move because both men are age 59 and both have been with the company 30 
years. 
Although some might conclude that Schacht, now board chairman, was 
bumped up to make way for Henderson, insiders and analysts who know 
Cummins say nothing could be further from the truth. Instead, they say, 
it was a display of enlightened leadership. 
Both men, they say, wanted to preclude a situation in which the 
company's two top executives retired in the same year. At the same time, 
;chacht sayshe wanted to gi.ve Henderson the opportunity to imprint his 
?ersonal vision on the company. 
It's not that Henderson's vision is dramatically different from 
jchacht's. For 15 years, Schacht as CEO and Henderson as president acted 
in tandem to steer Cummins through some of the roughest waters in its 
76-year history. 
When you look at Cummins today, you wouldn't know that. The company 
?osted record fourth-quarter sales of $1.3 billion-a jump of 18 percent 
+rom the year-earlier qusrter. Earnings were even more impressive. They 
vere up 49 percent, from $47.1 million in the third quarter of 1993 to 
j70.2 million in 1994. 
As analysts predicted, 1994 has turned out to be the best year ever 
for Cummins. Net earnings for the year were $252.9 million, or $6.11 per 
;hare, on sales of $4.7 billion. Net earnings for 1993 were $177.1 
-nillion, or $4.79 per share, on sales of $4.2 billion. 
But things were a lot different a few years ago. Between 1986 and 
L992, the company lost money almost every year. The exception was 1987, 
#hen it cleared $5.8 million. 
The 1980s found Cummins scrambling to keep up with big changes in the 
global marketplace. And although Schacht and Henderson saw the writing 
3n the wall as far back as the early '80s and moved to diversify 
3utunins' product line with several new medium-size engines, the company 
seemed helpless to stop the erosion of its bread-and-butter 
susiness-heavy-duty diesel truck engines. 
The problems began in the late 1970s, when Cummins controlled about 
50 percent of the North American heavy-duty truck engine market. 
"We sold every engine we made," Henderson said. "We added capacity to 
keep up. The market kept exceeding our expectations." 
It's possible Cummins grew complacent, perhaps even overconfident, 
say analysts. Then, in the mid-80s-despite putting millions of dollars 
into new technologies, expanding new markets and implementing quality 
initiatives and training programs-the bottom fell out. 
A new line of heavy-duty engines was introduced that was riddled with 
lefects and flaws. That allowed Cummins' biggest U.S. rival, Detroit 
liesel Corp., to eat into its biggest market. By the time the 
semorrhaging stopped, Detroit Diesel and other competitors had grabbed 
15 percent of the heavy-duty diesel engine market from Cummins. 
Then, to make matters worse, Cummins found itself competing with an 
old customer and partner-Japan' s monolithic. Kornatsu Ltd. , the worldl,s .. 
second-largest manufacturer of heavy-duty construction equipment after 
. 
.(l5te*illar Inc . of 'peoria:?--- . .. . . _ _ 
- 
- 1 ~ ' ' ~ s  abouttliis'time that corporate raiders began circling Columbus 
like vultures. Schacht and Henderson decided to sell 20 percent of the 
company to three customers-Ford Motor Co., Tenneco Corp. and Japan's 
Kubota Corp.-so it would have the capital it needed to continue 
investing in new technologies. 
Schacht drove down costs almost 23 percent by instituting 
corporate-wide cuts-including a 15 percent cut in his salary. 
To keep Komatsu and other competitors at bay, Schacht cut prices on 
engines 30 percent. Although the move battered the bottom line and 
resulted in that red ink bath, it kept Komatsu and other rivals from 
eating further into Cummins' market share. 
That was not the scenario Cummins had in mind when, in the early 
1960s, it licensed Komatsu to build its heavy-duty diesel engines. 
Indeed, at the time it was like adding a fat cash cow to Cummins stable 
of truck, bus, industrial, military and marine engines. 
''Komatsu wanted to compete with Caterpillar and they wanted to export 
.machinery," Henderson said. It was a marriage made in heaven. Cummins 
-was able to deal a heavy blow to one of its biggest 
competitors-Caterpillar, while using Kornatsu to gain a foothold in Japan 
3nd As la. 
There was just one problem, Henderson said. 
"When Japan went through its energy crisis in the early 1970s, we 
deren't close enough to Komatsu to see what it needed," Henderson said. 
"We weren't as responsive as we should have been, and we didn't design 
the engines to perform like Komatsu wanted them to." 
With Cummins unable or unwilling to redesign its heavy-duty diesels 
:o conform to Komatsu's Cew fuel and emission requirements, the Japanese 
Zompany decided to start producing engines on its own. 
"Overnight, Komatsu became a competitor instead of a customer," 
lenderson said. 
I Cummins engineers bristled. Some felt betrayed. The engines Komatsu 
ras turning out in the 1980s looked a lot like the engines Cummins 
lade-except for the Komatsu logo on the block. 
It would have been easy to bang their fists on the boardroom table 
~ n d  sever the Komatsu relationship with costly patent infringement suits 
dnd complaints to the U.S. Commerce Department. 
"We decided not to do that," Henderson said. "We worked hard to keep 
:he relationship going. What happened to us in the 1980s was our own 
iault. We took Komatsu for granted. We didn't understand their culture. 
Ve brought Komatsu engineers here in the '60s and '70s, and they spent 
fears in our technical center learning about our engines. We, in turn, 
Learned little from them." 
Cummins has come a long way since its early years in Japan-especially 
in getting closer to its customers and in understanding what they need 
ind want. 
The company has also developed new electronic technology and married 
.t to its expanded line of diesel engi'nes. It is technology that neither 
:ustomers nor competitors can easily duplicate. 
It includes a high-tech on-board computer system that monitors engine 
)erformance and maintenance, provides to a fleet manager detailed 
usiness trip information, such as pinpoint satellite-monitored 
,ositioning and fuel consumption. It even delivers different levels of 
,ewer and torque depending on road and driving conditions. 
By going forward with new technology instead of squabbling over past 
.ethnology, Henderson and Schacht set a fresh tone'for Cumins. 
In addition to attracting new customers with its lineup of improved 
leavy-duty MI1 and N14 engines and its smaller B and C series 
-1edium-duty diesel engines that are now found in Ford Motor Co. and 
lhrysler Corp. trucks, it regained an old customer-Komatsu. 
In 1993, 30 years after their original linkup, Cummins and Komatsu 
~ntered into a new joint venture to produce the company's B Series 
tngines in Oyama, Japan, and Komatsu's 30-liter engines in Seymour, Ind. 
"1 don't think Komatsu would have the incentive today to do what it 
Bid back in the early 1 9 8 0 ~ , ~ ~  Henderson said. "We are well-positioned 
iith our technology. We are close to our customers and we are 
-esponsive . " 
But Cumins isn't resting on its technological laurels. It has 
intered into new joint ventures with several foreign companies to 
develop new engines and new markets. 
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stract : Donald Fites, Financial World's choice for CEO of the 
Year, runs his company, Caterpillar, like he drives his earthmoving 
truck: with gusto and a steady, tight hand on the wheel. His 
attitude has enabled the $14.3 billion-in-revenues company to 
announce a year of record profits in 1994, despite a long and bitter 
strike by the United Auto Workers and fierce competition from the 
likes of Komatsu, Hitachi, and Kawasaki. Fites, a career marketer, 
had worked for Caterpillar on 6 conyinents and had written a 
master's thesis at MIT in 1971 on whether US manufacturers could 
compete with Japan. Drawing on his nearly 5 years in Japan, he 
concluded that US companies had the vigor to compete successfully as 
long as certain US industries abandoned protectionism. Under Fites, 
-Caterpillar would be reorganized into 13 functionally independent 
areas and 4 service divisions, each with its own budget and return on 
assets target. CEO of the Year Silver Award Winners and Bronze Award 
-Winners are also listed. 
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-stract : IBM is reaching out to electronics manufacturers to 
@rovi.de an outlet for its Workplace microkernel, even as the company 
continues to promote the 2-year-old technology as a PC operating 
-system. IBM recently announced a cross-licensing agreement with 
IKomatsu Ltd. of Japan to use the IBM microkernel as a factory 
ziutomation platform. 
temporary workers, who now number about 5 , 7 0 0 ,  company officials '~l., 
d. 
Since the strike began, the company has probably seen some payroll 
ings because it does not have to pay union wages to the retirees and 
lporary workers, said Frank Manfredi, an independent industry analyst 
suburban Buffalo Grove. 
But these savings are probably balanced out, he added, by the added 
ts of importing equipmeht from its facilities in Belgium and Japan. 
,Most industry observers say Caterpillar will likely be in the 
ver's seat in its dispute with the UAW because of its robust 
ancial condition. 
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irticle Text: 
'he United Auto Workers and Caterpillar Inc. have quietly renewed 
iegotiations in their 13-month-old dispute, the nation's largest labor 
:on£ rontation . 
In the second of two recent gatherings, UAW and Caterpillar officials 
 ill meet at an undisclosed location in the first week of August, UAW 
~fficials said Wednesday. 
'hree top officials from each side previously met July 5 in Chicago, 
inion sources disclosed. 
Neither side would discuss the meetings, and word of the coming 
.leeting got out after the UAW mentioned it in its telephone hotline 
iervice for the Caterpillar workers. 
The meetings mark an expected drive by Steve Yokich, the UAW's 
-ecently elected president, to find a way out of the nearly 4-year-old 
itruggle that has hung heavily on the UAW1s shoulders. 
"We still have the same old problems, the way I see it, but the 
~arties,have a real feeling for wanting to get this behind them," said 
'ed ~ohnson, chairman of the UAW local in Decatur, Ill. 
More than 9,000 UAW members have been on strike since June 1994, 
bile another 4,000 have crossed the picket lines. 
--Sincethe UAW walked out, Caterpillar has made a point of saying the 
:trike has not hurt the company. 1ts latest financial figures, reported 
rednesday, bolster the Peoria-based companyls assertion. 
The second quarter was the best three-month period in terms of 
rrof its .and sales -in- Caterpillar1 s 70-year history, Douglas Oberhelman, 
he companyls chief financial officer.;.said. 
Caterpillarls net income-increased - 3 5 ,  percent, to $323 million, or y - 62-.a. sh 
, .  
,.-_-,-... are from.$240 million, or $1.18 a share, in the year-earlier 
marter. 
Revenues, which grew by 17 percent for the quarter, reached $4.21 
 illi ion, the first time Caterpillar's sales topped $4 billion in a 
warter. A year earlier, Caterpillar had $3.61 billion in sales. 
Caterpillar,..the:.leading manufacturerof heavy equipment in the 
llni-tZs-.-and abroad, said .domesf ic sales were up 13 percent, to 
2.05 billiofi, and 20 percent in overseas markets, to $2.01 billion, 
'rom the year-earlier period. 
As for the situation within its plants, Caterpillar officials said ] 
he number of white-collar workers assigned to blue-collar jobs due to 
he strike has fallen to about 500. 
At one time, Caterpillar had shifted as many as 6,000 white-col.lar 
lorkers to its strike-bound.facilities. -It has also relied on retirees. 
Japanese still players in North American markets. 
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Abstract: Major Japanese corporations are establishing their market 
niche in the North Ame~ican region, particularly in the construction and 
industrial equipment industries. The problem of keeping the Japanese yen 
competitive against the US dollar has been managed by moving production 
p-?a-cCesses to the US and by establishing joint ventures with American 
firms, enabling Japanese access to distribution and manufacturing 
facilities. Among the prominent firms in the US are Komatsu and Kobelco. 
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--e are more than 15 major Japanese companies producing and marketing 
gtruction and industrial equipment in North America. Many of us think 
:kly of the larger companies such as Komatsu, Hitachi and Kubota, but 
.-e are many companies selling their products here, doing what they can to 
with the problems of a strong yen against the dollar. 
2 Japanese manufacturers are overcoming the exchange problem by moving 
luction to the U.S. and/or have been setting up joint ventures with 
rican companies to gain distribution and manufacturing capabilities. 
a are some of the players and'how they are doing in the market-place: 
dtsu, the Caterpillar of Japan, now owns 81 percent of the Komatsu Dresser 
joint venture in North America. The company has construction machinery 
rluction facilities in Canada; Galion, Ohio; Peoria, 111.; and Chattanooga, 
.I. It would not be surprising,to see the company expand its North American 
luction to another plant during the next few years. 
ttsu also sells industrial lift trucks in North America and has a small 
embly operation for gas-powered lift trucks in the Los Angeles area. 
elco produces and sells its line of hydraulic excavators in North America 
has a production facility located in Calhoun, Ga.' Kobelcols 
.-excavators and wheel loaders are manufactured in Japan and exported 
? .  
!lco accounts for about 9 percent of the North American excavator market 
has recently signed an agreement with Fermec Holdings of England in which 
Till take delivery of three Fermec backhoe/loaders for the North American 
:et. 
.chi has been selling excavators in North America for over a decade. The 
)any has a joint venture arrangement with Deere located in Kernersville, 
, where final assembly for some Deere and Hitachi excavators is handled. 
- 
stract : The top 3 new'minivan models are the Dodge Grand Caravan 
S E ,  Ford Windstar, and Honda Odyssey. Unlike traditional 3-door 
ninivans, the Dodge and Honda both have rear doors on both sides. 
The Windstar is only available with the usual 3-door layout. Because 
each is slightly different in styling and features, choosing the best 
-ninivan is largely a matter of personal taste. 
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;tract: The batch-of-one theory from Toyota is well known, but the 
?ractices that have made Honda supremely successful have not been so 
 ell documented. Andrew Mair of Birkbeck College believes that 
Iondais strength has been its ability to maintain an internationally 
flexible manufacturing policy that caters to the ups and downs of 
zustomer demand. Honda's key factor is not that particular employees 
lave certain machine skills, but that they had been schooled in the 
londa way. Honda's concept of a flexifactory is based on the 
flexibility of its components: 1. flexible machinery, 2. flexible 
?eople often rotating jobs on a 2-hourly basis and a willingness to 
>e retrained, and 3. flexible organization from the vehicle 
lssembler to the parts suppliers. The resilience that comes from 
ilexibility has helped Honda survive the recession, and will allow it 
;o return to full output faster than many of its competitors. 
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;tract: The heritage of engine management systems (EMS) is focused 
3n by examining the evolution of the fuel delivery systems of the 
londa-MacLaren Formula 1 race cars and the Chevrolet Corvette and' 
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- L. .> $ar, Gas ~ o w e r i u l  and tough 
W s  THIS CXCKET? iL American Pnough to ~ 5 e  the strong doilzl to. 
$! mmufactuier and a lapanesc ioi-... hold- down ?fires: grabbing back 
&&together-but not  illst to gsc worldwide market ;hart irofi~ Ko- 
somc ncw tcchr,o!ogy or to beat thc 
currency game. They tenm to fight 
another hrnerican company. "The t n -  
emy of my enemy is my friend." 
Th:1:'5 just t t ~ c  point oi:hc nstound- 
ing but I;:tlc appreciated joint venture 
[effective Scpt. 1) that puts Drcsscr 
Industries' construction cquipmcnt 
business togethes with the U.S. busi- 
ness of Komatsu Ltd. of japan. Ko- 
lnatsu Dresser Co. starts lifc as 3 $1- 
billion-p!us entcprise  but a relatively 
small player in the world market of 
nearly Sl5 billion in  sa!cs. 
What makes this joint vcnturc dii- 
ferent i r o n  so many others is the divi- 
sion of labor: The  Japanese will run 
th.: manuiacturing and furnish rrtosi 
of the product teclinology. T h e  Amer- 
icans will provide thc plants and thc 
marketing. Though it is a 50-50 OWE- 
ership, the j3pmcse arc clcarly thc 
senior partners. 
It is a marriage of desperation. Drcs- 
ser's construction equipmcnt plants 
are running a t  half capacity, and,Ko- 
matsu haslo.s~threedaurrh%af1t~ 
'-?r@-ks to thc strong ycn ...T hc- 
big winner to date has-becn Cat$-rpil- 
-?a<-"Cft't's s t rcn i t6  drovc~this.dcal,"-- 
says James Mezcra, a vice prcsidcnt of 
thc new - joint  -venture. - Catcrpillar, 
matsu. Drcsscr, as a distnnt competi- 
toi to Caterpillar, was'caught in the 
middle, !osing S!S million last year 
on construction equipmcnt. 
Drcsscr, howcvcr, did not wan: to 
quic on thc buaincss, which accoufit- 
cd for morc than 3 fifth of its $3 bil- 
lion in salcs last year. "This is not 
throwing in  thc sponge," says Ralph 
Vttcrberg, thc ncw Komntsu Drccscr 
chairman and chicf cxccutivc. Hc fig- 
urcs that Iiomatsu Dresser has thc 
potential of taking 20% or more of the 
market, cnough to stand up to Cat in 
production scanomice. hToreover, Ko- 
matsu spends S24G million a year on 
R&D, tcn times .Drcsscrls RWD 
spending O i t  thc dirt =.,?cis; t : ~  flew 
venturc will havc thc advsntngc of all 
this t c c h n o l o , ~ .  
Joint vcnturcs hnvc bccr~ growing 
dramatically in thc manufa:turing 
scctor, but nonc appears so compictc. 
ly aimcd at  a local compctitor as this 
onc. Irl thc auto industry, for cxamplc, 
tbc Gcpcral h:otors-Toyota joint 
plant in California and the C h q s l c r  
..Mitsubishi comhinc in Nornlnl, I!(. 
build Japancsc-typc cars to sugplc- 
mcnt thc lincs of U.S. cars hirilt by 
GM and Chryslcr and colnpctc 
against othcr imports. 
-- 
Bet tlic Koniatsu Drcsscr "enemy B. o! i;,y cri~iiiy" sciaTcg); x 2 y  hccrmc 
the trcnd. T h c  Iatcst auto industry @ 
joint vcnturc, fnr c s a l i i ~ l c ,  a Ford- @$ 
Nissan minivan :o 'cc buil: qutsidc 
Clcvcland, is aimcd ajiaicst Chrys- 
lcr's successful m i n i v . ~ .  
"Thc ratc of joint vcnturcs in  rhc 
U.S. is incrcasin~, rapidly," says Kath- 
v n  Hanigan, a profcsor  a t  &c Co- 
lumbia University busincss school. 
"In 1975 thcy rcprcscntcd 1.75; ol  all 
ccononiic activity in thc U.S. By is85 
thc :arc incrcascd to 7.6%." Shc d s o  
cstiniatcs that thc formation rstc tor 
joint vcnturcs this ).car is r u n n i q  
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turri izar:~;lnctt!;-i?g ori:r io :!I: :.!;;::. 
;lese! (3! murr-e, '.7rcsscr necdet ::I: 
Xxnacsu lilie :o fiil its plznts, \r.i;i:? 
Kcmnt:;a nccded rhc iaciiities i: the 
U.S. Sccnuse of thc yen's apprccia- 
ticn. Uu:: it also was an hones:. iccog- 
nition that kmcrica!?.n.s stiil ha-c 
much to !cam kos.  :kc: foreip-crs. 
And nor just in earth movix:lg. Lri aiatc- 
~ o b i l c s ,  says Ford C h ~ m z n  Donzid 
Pctersen, ?'oyo:als home F!XICS a i i  
30% more clficient thzn F~ord's U.S. 
pIxts, but, he adds: "I: used to 5: 
100Y~." Fetcrsc:: says that with thc 
ct:capcr dollar :my remainin2 iap;. 
nesr cost ~dva r~ tngc  is offset by ship- 
ping costs, thus mnkizg 5.S. p!az:s 
ccmpetitivc. But tlle produc:ivi:y a<- 
vantlgc stiii remains with the japa- 
ncsc pl-nts. 
J-farchiko Umcda, 3 Konla:su direc- 
tor, is ~ h c  joint v c n t ~ i c ' s  prrsiden: 
22d chic-! occrating officcr in iibcrty- 
villc. Whcn hc t o u r ~ d  rhc Libcr tp i l~c  
plznt, a union n12n askcd him what hc 
thought of rhe plant. 
"I told him 1 thou$: I wzs in a 
Kometsu p l a t  ia :;pan 20 years ago. 
He sxid, 'How comc?' 
"On, plcasc, look a t  thesc ma- 
chiiies, 20 people working, very haid, 
moving very quickly." timcda re- 
plied. "in Japnn thcrc arc only onc or 
two opcratora, operating thc s jmc 
numbcr of mschincs, and they d ~ n ' t  
havc to movc so  quickly and musclc 
work isn't nc-ccssary." Umeda &e;d!: 
has a tcnm of 30 Iapenesc cngincers 
fnnxing out  in thc ioinf. factory look- 
ing foi morc of what he ca:ls "the 
badncss" in operations. 
Komarsu h3d a troubling cxpcri- 
cnce with an earlicr plant it opened on 
its own in Chattanooga, Tcnn. Thc 
piant had ncw managcmcnt, a nc\c 
work forcc, nclv t w l s  and tcch- 
niquc+roboa and flcxible manufac- 
turing ccntcrs. Thc plan \\,as :3 3s- 
Komanu Drmrr C l ~ i n t n n  Ra(ob Y ~ r b r n ~  and Prmid~v i~ 1inniI~;ko U?,icdrc scmblc a widc vancry cf products in a 
C o m m a  emngtk d m =  deal. snlall location. "Wc intcndcd to pro- 
duct products cxaccly the way KO- 
30% ahead of 1987. draulic excavators--with prices rang- m t s u  I;a:.nnl was do iq , "  Umcdj 
T h  Ku,-2rsl? Drcscr  dell is head- irrp from $50,000 to $1.5 million. "For says. "Evcr).body wcn: crzzy." Thc 
quartcrcd at Libcrtyvilie, Ill., 40 rnilcs the first timc customers will have a Chattanooga plant, which is no:u pan 
olrtside Chicago and thc site of a ma- viablcaltcmativc to Catcrp;llar," says of thc joint vcnturc, ,nay i,c cqandcd jor Komatsu Drcsscr plant. Thc ncw Komatsu Drcsscr's Mczcr:~. "Wc and some of its c -~r rcn t  products 
company will havc total asscts worth won't hc 3 nichc playcr." fsrrncd out to othcr Komatsi~ Ercssci 
more than $1 billion, 3.5 million Somcwhet surprisingly, Komatsu plants. 
squarc fcct of factory spacc, including Drcsscr wi!! no: r;l:lrkct a unified linc tlmcda docsn't intcnd to rcpca: ihc 
four U.S. plants (mostly uliionizcd], cf products. Drcsscr and Komatsu, samc mistakes, but hc will ioilo~\. rhc 
two in Canada and two in Brazil, and which mnkc similar lincs of cquip- hasic Jnpnncsc manufacturins a p  
5,000 cmployccs. Somc $200 million mcnt, will kccp thcir dcalcrs and pronch. Hc also must movc ro 
is to be invcstcd in thc plants quickly. product lincs scparatc-likc Buick add thc Ko~nntsu linc to LIIC 2roduc- 
Komatsu Drcsscr vrill bc n full-linc and Oldsn~ohilc. lndccd, that's thc tion in Drcsscr's plants, bur adlnirs kc 
company, making just about cvcry kcy to aiming at a 20% rnnrkct sharc. must movc ~ a d u a l l y  in n ~ d i f > i n s  
kind of machinc that can movc dirt- But i f  marketing will bc kcpt scpnratc, the lapancsc mcthods to fit ~ h c  Amcr  
crawler tmctors, vihccl londcrs, hy- mznufactrlring will not. In this, thc ican sccnc. Esactly how? That rc- 
-eats of a recession jog P.E.'s memory to the recession of the early 
10s when the capital goods market came up flat. Company's like 
:Allister practiced deep discounting to keep business going. "You're 
.ng anything just to get [inventory] out," he said. 
same discounting caused many of the company's competitors to fall by 
wayside, leaving MacAlIister to reign as one of the largest heavy 
struction and mining equipment dealers in the state. 
lysts largely credit survival stories like MacAllister's to the 
ler's relationship with CAT. 
e CAT theory is that the dealer is going to be an integral part of 
vicing the equipment," said Gary F. McManus, a capital goods analyst 
J.P. Morgan in New York. CAT almost always involves the dealer in 
es; even if the customer comes directly to the corporate office, he 
d. 
competition, Japan-based Komatsu for instance, is not as well-known 
its after-market service, McManus said, although Komatsu's product 
considered high-quality. 
ypical CAT dealership is privately held by a family and has at least 
years' experience in the business, McManus said. All the U.S. dealers 
e profitable last year, he said. 
takes great pains to maintain good relationships with its 65 U.S. 
lers because they perform most of the marketing for the company's 
ducts, said CAT spokeswoman Marsha Hausser. "They are the direct link 
the customer," she said. 
trong customer base has also been built around the CAT name and the 
tinctive yellow hue of its machinery. Those who bought CAT machines 
the past are attached to them. They will probably buy them in the 
ure, said Merrill Lynch's McAnn. 
you cut [CAT owners], I think they'll bleed yell~w,'~ he said. 
astounded analysts and industry experts alike by posting its own 
3rd earnings and meeting its production schedules, despite its labor 
olems. While some workers ended up crossing picket lines, management 
3 trained for work on the factory floor. 
2y were very much prepared for a strike,I1 said Chris MacAllister. 
?ytve proven that in spades. They built more on strike than they did 
.I they werent t . " 
C year, CAT posted net income of $955 million on sales of $14.3 
lion - record-setting statistics. Another record was set when the 
>any reported 1995 first-quarter profit of $300 million on $3.9 
:lion in sales. CAT is predicting higher year-end figures than last 
c ,  Hausser said. 
far, threats of an impending recession have not stopped worldwide 
3nd for CAT products. U.S. dealers might benefit from the dollar's 
against certain foreign currencies. It might make domestic capital 
jects and equipment more attractive, McManus said. 
rright (c.1 1995 Business Journal 
company is also aggressively pursuing agricultural machinery markets 
well as used machinery resale and rebuilding, Chris MacAllister said. 
. . 
,ending on the'machine, a piece of CAT equipment could run from 
,000 to well over $1 million. Generally, the used or rebuilt parts 
ch about half of what new equipment would cost, Chris MacAllister 
d. a 
ut 45 percent of MacAllister's business is rooted in southern Indiana 
1 mining where CAT machinery is the norm. Despite the fact that the 
1 mining industry is flat now, MacAllister continues to get a steady 
eam of business, MacAllister said. 
company gambled last year when it invested in a new building to 
lace its Washington, Ind., operations. So far, the gamble seems to be 
ing off. 
built a [new] building down there assuming there would be at least 
years of coal mining activity. There are enough Indiana plants that 
-e geared their business to burning Indiana coal that we don't think 
le demand will1 disappear," said Chris MacAllister. 
ze analysts are bullish about the coal market's future. As big 
iiness increases its electricity consumption, the demand for 
:ctricity produced by burning coal will also increase, said James R. 
an, a Merrill Lynch capital goods analyst in New York. 
es and service provided to the construction industry represents 
~ther 25 percent of MacAllisterts business, while 20 percent is 
oted to aggregate business. The remaining business is a mixture of 
,era1 industries. 
:Allister Machinery is wholly owned by P.E and Chris MacAllister. They 
L about 47  percent and 53 percent, respectively. 
:. ~ac~llister, who took over the company in 1953 after his father, 
r .  MacAllister, suffered a stroke, is probably best known in 
iianapolis as a founder of the Indianapolis Opera Company. He also 
ped found the Indiana Opera Theatre and MacAllister Awards for opera 
cgers . 
addition to his musical interests, he hosts five local television 
,ws on cable, ranging from talk shows to feature programs on rural 
liana . 
. MacAllister spent most of his life building MacAllister Machinery 
.o one of the SO largest private companies in Indiana. The company has 
:rations in Indianapolis, Fort Wayne, South Bend, Lafayette and 
chington. 
the last six years, P.E. and Chris, who took over in 1990, have faced 
! music and made necessary personnel changes to keep the company on 
: cutting edge. Most of the top managers have been replaced with 
inger ones who possess equal technical and management skills. 
se things have been hard for P.E. to get used to. 
m a Depression child. I don't like,debt very well. ~hese guys don't 
.nch at debt, he said. 
I 
. . 
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Length: 1 1 5 8  words 
:hor: By A.J. SCHNEIDE* IBJ REPORTER 
)EX TERMS 
Irustry/Company/~ocation: 
lstruction equipment industry/ MacAllister Machinery Co. Inc./ 
Yianapolis, Indiana 
-1struction equipment industry/ Caterpillar Inc./ Peoria, Illinois 
)ject: company profiles 
rsonal Name: MacAllister, Chris 
MacAllister, P.E. 
:icle Text: 
Ity-year Caterpillar dealer prospers in spite of strike, anticipates 
:ession 
.ting all its eggs in one basket hasn't hurt MacAllister Machinery Co. 
spite of a contentious strike at its sole supplier, MacAllister 
ted 1994 income of about $10 million before taxes, on record sales of 
5 million. 
Allisterls fortunes are tied to its status as a dealer of 
th-moving and construction machinery made by Peoria, 111.-based 
erpillar Inc., a company whose union workers have been on strike for 
ear. MacAllister is the exclusive CAT dealer for most of Indiana. 
Allister executives say their company's success is built on its 
year partnership with CAT, a company that seems to have overcome 
sssible odds in the face of labor unrest. 
next hurdle for MacAllister is overcoming what analysts predict will 
3 downturn in the capital goods industry over the next-two years. 
don't ._ look for - ... 1 9 9 6  _ to be so good," said Chris MacAllister, company 
Tldent. "We - eqect _ a . l b ~ g h ~ e ~ _ p i c . t : u r F ~ ~ ~ ~ - o f  1 9 9 7 .  It 
- . . ____ 
~ l d  be pretty decent in 1998.11) -----.____ - -  
.  - -- - , -. - , - . . . . . .  . 
I 
... 
short-term outlook worried MacAllister and his father,-.P.E. 
illister, company chairman. So the two decided to take pre-emptive 
wres to boost profits. 
free enterprise, you make it on your own ingenuity," P.E. 
allister said. So MacAllister started a new company, Angus Industries 
, to supplement its dealership and service operations. 
.ead of selling new CAT machinery, Angus' mission is to repair and 
heavy equipment parts and hydraulics. Revenue from the new 
ness, started a year ago, is already bolstering MacAllister's bottom 

We are delighred and proud ro 
report uprurning consolidated sales 
and profits of Komacsu Ltd. for 
fiscal 1995. Net sales were up 8.6 
percent to Y 9  18.9 billion 
(US$10,562 million at US$I/Y87). 
Net income rebounded to Y10.2 
billion ( U S 1  18 million), recording 
a dramatic 684.7 percent growth. 
The reason is char we have 
become better prepared to tackle the 
posr-bubble recessionary economy 
and the stronger yen. The 
restructuring of our domestic 
production of construction 
equipment and industrial 
machinery operations was near 
completion by fiscal year-end. We 
also accelerated the pace of 
globalization and strengthened our 
electronics and other non- 
conscrucdon equipment operations. 
MovingAbead with ConJidence 
Coupled with enhanced production 
efficiency in Japan, Komatsu is 
improving the global competitiveness 
of its construction equipment by 
expanding offshore production of 
market-driven models in each 
region of the world. Komatsu has 
also shifted production of some 
models to overseas subsidiaries to 
generate the scale of economy. 
S5o Paulo-based Komatsu do Brasil 
S.A. (KDB), for example, is now 
engaged in the exclusive production 
of the D4 1 medium-sized bulldozer 
as a supply base for other Komatsu 
companies worldwide. 
Our business diversification 
through strategic alliance has been 
very rewarding. Applied Komatsu 
Technology, Inc. (AKT), a joint 
venture established in 1993 with 
Applied Materials, Inc. of the 
United States, has grown to be a 
major player in the Japanese LCD 
manufacturing systems market. 
Coping with the H'er-  
Appreciation of Japanese Yen 
The recent hyper-appreciation of 
the Japanese yen underlies our most 
urgent management concern to 
make us more flexible against 
currency fluctuations. Not only 
coping with the volatile currency 
trends, we are also working to take 
advantage of them. 
While expanding offshore 
production and imports, Komacsu 
has also embarked on the full-sde 
procurement of completed 
raw materials by networking irs 
international production centers 
Asia, the Americas and Europe i 
the Forms of cross- and multi- 
sourcing. 
At the same time, we are 
continuing to step up our effort: 
expand domestic sales of 
construction equipment and 
promote company-wide cost 
reduction in the areas of purcha: 
and corporate overhead. 
Looking at Fircall996 
For our construction equipment 
the domestic demand is projectc 
grow due to replacement needs : 
well as extraordinary demand frc 
reconstruction projects in the 
earthquake-destroyed Kobe area- 
Overseas, the demand is likely t 
remain at a high level especially 
Asia, while Komatsu Dresser 
Company (KDC) is expected tc 
continue its business improvem 
in North America. Our busine: 
other regions is expected to be : 
the fiscal 1995 level. 
In our electronics business, 
Komatsu Electronic Metals Co. 
Ltd., a leading manufacturer of 
silicon wafers, and AKT are 
expected to further expand sale. 
the semiconductor manufactur 
and devices industries in Asia. 
products, components, parts and 
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The value of a dollar 
Cullen, David 
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us 
9190 (United States) ; 8350 (Transportation industry) ; 
6100 (Human resource planning); 6400 (Employee benefits & 
compensat ion) 
ract : Toyota Motor Corp. achieved its impressive 1994 cost 
vings by trimming its cost structure with traditional kaizen 
rkplace-improvement practices, and with such completely new 
asures as boosting white-collar productivity. A goodly share of 
ything saved must be returned to the fleet owner or stockholders. 
metimes money saved must be given back to customers as lower prices 
r goods or services rendered. Managers must reinvest savings to 
sure security and enhance growth for the operation. Truck drivers 
e the main concern of fleets right now, but mechanics are also 
arting to become harder to find. Monies saved from effective cost 
-nagement strategies that can be returned to the worker on the line 
some fashion or another does more than boost consumer buying 
wer. It can demonstrate management's belief that labor is crucial 
a business' success in language everyone can understand. 
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8680 (Transportation equipment industry) ; 9179 (Asia & 
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investment in the US) 
stract : It has become crucial for Japanese automakers to boost 
their North American operations as the Big Three - General Motors 
Corp., Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler Corp. - increase their 
competitiveness. Honda Motor Co. is taking the lead to strengthen 
its operations. Honda announced a new strategy for the Americas in 
July 1994 aimed at expanding North American operations. The company 
plans to increase its annual car production capacity in the US and 
Canada from 110,000 units to 720,000 units by 1997. Japanese 
automakers are gradually increasing local production to avert the 
negative impacts of the yen's appreciation, which is expected to 
-become more effective if they increase local procurement of 
zomponents. 
Kornauu Ltd. and Consolidated Subsidiaries 
Yars ended March 31, 1995, 1994, and 1993 
.. Ycn in milliom md U.S. dallm in cham&, accpt pcr share amounct 
1995 1994 1993 1995 
Net Sales: Y918,910 Y845,853 Y869,928 $10,562,184 
Domestic market 608,187 586,048 604,133 6,990,655 
Overseas market 310,723 259,805 265,795 3,571,529 
Net Incorn& 10,225 1,303 3,037 117,529 
Earnings per Share Y 10.19 Y1.3 Y3.0 11.710 
Cash Dividends Paid per Share 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.20 
Capital Expenditures Y 41,492 Y30,032 Y 47,156 $476,920 
Research and Development Expenses 36,266 32,594 32,337 416,851 
Number of Employees 28,040 28,446 26,313 - 
The United Scaru dollar amounu repruenr ranslations of Japanue yen mounts at the race of Y8741 
See Nore 1 to consolidated financial statemenu. 
Sales by Division 
Yen in millions md U.S. doll= in rhowands 
1995 1994 1993 1995 
Construction Equipment Y619,113 Y536,294 Y549,198 $ 7,116,242 
Civil Engineering & Construction 104,123 101,266 100,076 1,196,816 
Electronics 62,080 53,598 50,165 713,563 
Industrial Machinery 28,494 50,299 64,710 327,517 -' , 
Other Operations 105,100 104,396 105,779 1,208,046 - 
Net Sales Y918,910 V845,853 Y869,928 $10,562,184 
Sales by Region 
Yen in milliom md U.S. dollas in rho'-& 
Americas 149,573 77,379 57,023 1,719,230 
Europe 72,741 83,364 101,625 , 836,104 - 
. . . . .  
Middle East and Africa . . 11,986' 27;632 ' 33,820 137,770 
Asia (excluding Japan) and Oceania 76,423 ' 71,430 73,327 878,425 1 
Net Sales Y918,910 Y845,853 Y869,928 $10,562,184 
Tetruya f i t ah  (right). 
Cbainnan of the Board 
Together with Partners 
Our management principle is to 
build upon [he trusr relacionships 
with our shareholders, customers 
j ,.:* and Satoru Anulki, 
? w <  President I 
and business partners. That's the 
only natural way to envision our 
future growth in the coming age of 
Iglobal 'mega' competition. 
To our shareholders, we are 
making a resolute commicmenr to 
further improve earnings for a 
higher return on equity. To our 
customers, we are working to 
provide total quality based on 
reliability. Toward this goal, 
Komatsu will be working in closer 
proximity to customers to ensure 
faster service and products which 
stand for value to their users. 
While focusing on the 
construction equipment operations 
as our mainstay business, we will 
parrnersllips to capiralize on new 
business opportunities around the 
world. We also remain committed 
to our pledges to make our 
operations friendly to the 
environment and host communicies 
through all these endeavors. 
June 1995 
Teuuya Karada 
Chairman of the Board 
Management Change 
At the board meeting held on June 
29, 1995, Ryoichi Kawai, ajer 
serving as chairman of the Boardfor 
13 years, resigned to take the 
position of director and counselor. 
Tesuya Katuda, formerly president, 
was appointed as new chairman and 
Satoru Anzaki, firmerly executive 
managing director, as new president 
ofKomutsu Ltd Under the new 
management, Komatsu is determined 
to tackk new cbafknges boldly and 
share the brightjitture of the next 
century with its partners. 
pursue strategic alliance 
Customers come First 
The profitability and long-term 
prosperity of our customers around 
the world come first for us at *: Cross- and multi-sourcing of finished 
. 
Komatsu. Our continued growth is products, components and parts; 
ensured only by their success in -:* International division of product 
business and their trust in us. It is development among our plants; 
our mission to provide each and 6 Ofihore production with the goal of 
every customer with the best attaining over 80% local content; 
possible products and services which To be the world's number one maker 
incorporate the latest technology. of hydraulic excavators in terms of 
quality, cost and delivery; and 
Construction Equipment Going O Reduction of total costs including 
Global in High Gear global logistics. 
Komatsu has come a long way since 
the company launched Japan's first Localizing Offshore - 
offshore production of construction 
equipment in Brazil in 1975, 
followed by Indonesia in 1983, and 
the United States and the United 
Kingdom in 1986. With 15 plants 
in 10 countries outside Japan as of 
June 1995, our globalization drive is 
entering a new stage to better serve 
our customers. 
Networking for Global 
Competitiveness 
By networking core bases for 
development, ~roduction, sales and 
service roles, Komatsu is becoming 
more competitive in the global 
marketplace. Specific programs 
under way include: 
Operations for 
Global Success 
With the ultimate goal 
of localized management, 
Komatsu is earnestly working to 
make its overseas subsidiaries into 
full-fledged local companies serving 
their local customers. 
In the U.S., under the leadership 
of Arlie G. Tucker, Chairman and 
CEO, Kornatsu Dresser Company 
(KDC) has grown as a ~ ro f i t  center, 
concentrating on its large-sized 
earthmoving equipment for the - 
North American market. KDC$ 
equipment will also be sourced by 
Komatsu companies in other 
regions of the world. Recent 
development of the world's largest 
mining truck (capaciry: 310 tons) 
041 bulkiour 
I by the Haulp& division underlines I KDC's commitment to local needs. 
In Europe, Komatsu UK Ltd. 
(KUK), managed by Keith Tipping, 
celebrared the roll-out of their 
10,000rh machine in September 
1994. They eight models 
of medium-sized hydraulic 
excavators, including cwo KUK- 
designed wheeled versions. 
KUK is rapidly growing 
. into an 
':"'Y internarional 
supply base of the 
@< Komatsu group for 
. > 
9 ;A medium- and large-sized 
hydraulic excavators. 
Forging Firm Footings in Asia 
By capitalizing on our 40-year 
business record in China, we have 
recently established two joint 
ventures, Komatsu Ghanglin 
Construction ~ ' i c h i n e r y  
Corporation, to produce wheel 
I loaders under our license, and I Komatsu Shantui Construction I New dunner M O O  Machinery Co., Ltd. for hydraulic 
headquarters in South Asia-I'aci[ic, 
established Komarsu Saigon Co,, 
Ltd., a joint venture to initially 
provide an entire range of product 
support, then to manufacture 
bucket assemblies and hydraulic 
excavators in the Future. 
Thailand is another country 
where we have also heightened our 
presence by esrablishing Bangkok 
Komatsu Co., Ltd., a joint-venture 
manufacturing company with our 
35-year Thai disrributor. This joint 
venture will build medium-sized 
hydraulic excavators with over GO% 
non-Japanese conrent procured in 
our global production network. 
"Techno Renaissance" Renewing 
Success in the Japanese Construction 
Equipment Market 
As part of the ongoing "Techno 
Renaissance" commitment initiated 
in 1992, Komatsu introduced 40 
new models to the Japanese market 
during the year. Coupled with their 
successful market performance, 
fiscal 1995 domestic sales improved 
6.9% over the previous year. 
Our challenge in new frontiers 
has also remained focused on new 
types of construction machines. 
hydraulic cxcavaror excavator manufacturing. 
In April, 1995, Komatsu 
Singapore Pte., Ltd., our regional 
O U R  S T R A T E G Y  
XThile we have continued to enjoy 
mrgeoning sales of our mobile 
liebris crusherlrecycler series, in 
-iscal.1995 we introduced another 
~ew-concept equipment, the LT300 
each tower crane, designed to offer 
mproved work efficiency and safety 
jn crowded urban sites. 
:?estru-tured to Be More Cost 
- 
,ompetitiue 
We have consolidated production 
ines for our mainstay construction 
quipment from 13 to 10. 
lperating efficiency of the 
ssembly lines has consequently 
nproved from 80% to virtually 
00% for medium-sized hydraulic 
xcavators. 
Lead-time for product 
evelopment has also been 
lortened to about two thirds for 
ur major models by means of the 
multaneous development 
rogram. Concurrently, our 
evelopment center in Japan 
lcorporates the regional market 
eeds of the world from the 
lanning stage of product 
evelopmen[. 
As a result, the Y 15 billion 
JS$172 million) investment 
required for this restructuring is 
expected to save us about ~7 billion 6 
(US$82 million) annually. A v 
Driving N m  Business Growth 
through 
Business Diverszj&ation and 
)1 - -  
Strategic Alliance A 
For not only its market potenti 
but also our group-wide 
technological portfolio, we 
have positioned our 
electronics 
operation as the 
second most 1 
important business next ,. 1 
to construcdon equipment. 
We expect over 10% annual Y 
growth for the semiconductor- 
related markets. 
Strategic alliance has provided us 
with the venues to new businesses. 
Most recently, in January 1995, 
Komatsu and IBM Cotp. entered a 
technology cross-licensing 
agreement in which Komatsu will 
participate in IBM's Microkernel 
technology development for use in 
facrory automation. Also in 
January, Komatsu joined hands with 
ZF Friedrichshafen A.G. ofGermany, 
Over 28,000 Komarsu 
peoph arc working 
nrozrnd rhrglobe ro 
le,zrn morr aborir 
c ~ i ~ r u r t ~ r r ~ ' ~ e e A  a n d  
rxpecrurior~s. 
- 
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:tract : A flexifactory is a factory capable of changing the 
xoduct it makes with relative ease, at low cost, and with great 
-apidity; whether changing production volumes, changing models, or 
:hanging the nature of the products made. Flexifactories are 
.ogically operated as networks, constituting a bridge between the 
licro flexibility of people and machines and overall corporate 
'lexibility, resulting in improved mass production. Honda is a 
.eader and master at developing and utilizing the flexifactory. 
:xamining Honda flexifactories worldwide reveals how models are 
!hanged over, the model mix altered, and whole factories switched to 
take new types of products. The flexifactory has numerous 
.dvantages, among them coping with demand shifts and realizing 
.conomies of scale in practice. 
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Tovoto. I itsrtl lo t l~ i r~k  
rllat droppir~g scra\vs or1 
rlze floor occasioilally was 
a natural part ofptctring 
a car together. You just 
picked rllern tip. Now, I 
think dropping a screw 
is abnoriilal. 
"Tlze Toyora Prodtiction 
Systenz teaches us to seek 
tile root causes ofprob- 
1el.n~. So, ~ O L I  slztct the line 
down and find orit why 
you dropped the screw. 
Maybe your glove is a little 
too cumbersor7ze. Maybe 
the wrong kind of screw is 
in there. Ifeach operator 
lost one screw per day, 
that would cost us hun- 
dreds of thousands of 
dollars a year." 
Mike DaPrile 
Wce President, Manufacturing 
Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing. U.S.A.. Inc. 
You ain't seen nuthin' yet! 
For many years, we adapted to 
evolutionary change in the mar- 
ket environment.with incremental 
change in our organization. Now, 
we are responding to dramatic 
change in the global marketplace 
with dramatic change at Toyota. 
Our employment, for example, 
has shrunk in Japan even as our 
global workforce has grown. The 
number of full-time employees at 
our parent company in Japan 
has declined 5,518 over the past 
three years, to 69,748 at March 
31,1995. Combined with sharper 
have become just as adept in the 
Toyota Production System as our 
people in Japan are. Everyone 
becomes an expert in identifying 
waste and in discovering ways to 
eliminate it. Waste, by our defini- 
tion, is any expenditure of time, 
energy, or material that does 
not add perceptible value for 
the customer. Eliminating waste 
means continuously raising qual- 
ity as well as productivity, since 
squandering resources on less- 
than-perfect products is the 
worst waste of all. 
.. . 
Everyone becomes a 
waste..and in discovering 
that w ~ t e :  . . 
cuts in part-time and seasonal 
- 
employme'nt, thafhas produced 
a double-digit decline in employ- 
ment at the parent company. 
Over the same three years, 
employment at our consolidated 
subsidiaries outside Japan has 
grown some 11,000, to 27,567. 
Similar growth has occurred at 
affiliates-including some of our 
production ventures in Asian 
nations-whose figures do not 
appear in our consolidated total. 
Happily, employees in all 26 
nations where we make vehicles 
Everyone at a Toyota plant also 
masters a wide range of skills. 
Multiskilled employees help us 
respond flexibly to fluctuations in 
demand.Training is at the experi- 
enced hands of the employees 
who lead our workplace teams. 
Those leaders provide personal 
guidance to each of their team 
members (below, at a casting 
plant). Together, team members 
and leaders achieve continuing 
improvements in quality, pmduc- 
tivity, and working conditions at 
their job sites. 

Years Ended December 31 
(Dollars in millions except per share data) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Sales and revenues 
Profit before extraordinary loss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Profit'" 
. . . . . . . . . . .  Profit per share of common stock before extraordinary loss 
Profit per share of common stock"' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Dividends declared per share of common stock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Capital expenditures . excluding equipment leased to others . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Research and engineering expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Year-end employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Average shares of common stock outstanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Change 
(adjusted for a stock split on a two-for-one basis in September). 
We increased our  dividend twice in 1994, doubling i t  and 
then increasing i t  another 67 percent. A stronger U.S. econ- 
omy boosted sales inside.the Uniled States to $7.01 billion, 
Our Mission 
0 Provide ctlstomers worldwide with differentiated products 
and services of recognized superior val~le.  
0 Pursue businesses b7 which nle can be a leader based on one 
or more of our strengths. 
0 Create and maintain a prodrtctivc uwrk et~viron~nent it7 
which cmnlovee satisfaction is attained 
D e m a n d  in our industry continued to grow in 1994, anti our 
global strategies. helped us reap the benefits - serving both 
our customers and our owners well. We earned a profit of 
and Operating Principles:' 
0 Achieve growth and provide above-average returns for 
stockholders resulting from both management of ongoittg 
businesses and a studied awareness and development of 
new opportunities. 
$955 million on sales and revenues of $14.33 billion, both I I 
record numbers for Caterpillar. In each quarter, we posted a representing 5 1 percent of our total sales. The increase in U.S. 
record profit (after excluding nonrecurring tax-related items dealer sales volume came on the s t r e n ~ t h  of relatively low 
from third quarter 1993). ,-: Compared to 1993, sales and rev- interest rates, s t rong growth in cash flow, favorable eco-  
enues were up 23 percent; profit increased 46 percent. Our nornic prospects and better growth in [he activilies that use 
stock price continued to grow 3s well, up l'ro~n 44%. to 55% our machincs ant1 c~igincs. Sales ou~sitlc ~ h c  United States 
increased significantly i n  1994 to $6.85 billion, up more 
than $1.32 billion from 1993. Sales were up significantly in 
all regions except the Middle East and China, where sales 
declined. 3 The increase in non-U.S. sales resulted from higher 
industry demand for our products, an increased share of industry 
sales, and higher price realization. Machine sales also bene- 
fited from significant growth in dealer inventories. ; Signi- 
ficantly, in 1994, Caterpillar's participation in tlie worldwide 
market continued to strengthen - building on record levels for 
the third consecutive year. For example, off-highway trucks 
were up six percentage points worldwide, and excavators four 
percentage points worldwide. We continued our strong perfor- 
mance in the sale of heavy-duty diesel truck engines in North 
America, where more than a quarter of heavy-duty trucks on tlie 
road are Cat powered. o u r  percentage of sales in the industrial 
gas turbine business in our size range approached 50 pcrcent 
worldwide. And we continued to build on our lead in tlie large 
engine business worldwide. " Though industry demand is 
likely to level off in the United States, we expect to see industry 
growth in all o ther  areas,  including Asia,  Europe,  Lat in 
America, Japan, Africa, the Middle East, Canada and Australia. 
'Ions, With  noder rate incrcnses in t lc~n;~nt l  in 311 those r c ~ '  
we expect higher company sales in 1995 (see Outlook For 
tlet;~ils). Caterpillar's ;~hility to c;rpi\nli-/.e on industry dcmantl 
- 10 increase physical salcs volumc, ~untl then to maximize profit 
on those sales - is no accident. It's tlie result of years of plan- 
ning, investing and sacrificing as we fol-met1 and implemented 
our global strategies. With increased cleniand, that hard work 
and patience has now begun to pay handsome rewards. But. 
even when the business cycle eventually hits bottom again, 
those strategies slioultl help us remain profitable. 
Factory modernization: Our $1.8 billion invest- 
ment in tlie future, begun in 1987 and completed just a year 
ago, has strcnmlined k~ctory operntions. Wc'vc hccn able to cut 
the time i t  takes to process a part Tram start to finish by 75 per- 
cent ... to reduce our in-process inventories by 60 percent ... ant1 
to enjoy a return on incremental investment of Inore than 20 per- 
cent. By motlcrnizing our ccli~ipmcnt ;uicl psoccsscs, wc Iiavc 
become much more flexible, efficient and productive. 
New Corporate Organization: We moved 
from a function-oriented structure to a decentralized, customer- 
oriented organization in 1990. And we've continued to fine- 
lune lhe new struclurc lo ineel the changing dcm;~ntls ol' the 
marketplace. For ex;umplc, we h;~ve cxptuntlecl oul- cxccu~ivc 
office - with [our group presidents each overseeing a cornbina- 
[ion of geographic and product responsibilities. We've also 
continued to develop our divisional organization. Because our 
engine business is approaching $4 billion a year, we added a 
1994 in Review 
0 Profit in 1994 was a record $955 million or $4.70per share. 
0 Sales and revenues were a record $14.33 billion, a 23 per- 
cent increase over 1993. The in~proven~ent i  sales was the 
primary reason for the higherprofif. 
0 Inside the United States, sales totaled a record $7.01 billion, 
a 23 percent increase over sales of $5.71 billion in 1993. 
Sales inside the United States represented 51 percent of 
total sales. 
0 Outside the United States, sales were a record $6.85 billion, 
a 24 percent increase over sales of$5.53 billion in 1993. 
Sales outside the United States represented 49 percent of 
total sales. The only regions not recording sales increases 
were Cltina and the Middle East. 
vice president to the division. Also, with the resurgence of husi- 
ness in Latin Amcrica ilnd cxpantletl business clevelopment in 
China and India, we reorganized two geographic units, moving 
Latin America from the Asia/Pacific/Latin America Division 
into its ow11 division with Cat Brasil (Latin America Division), 
and also creating a new Asia/Pacific Division. We also created a 
new business unit, the Logistics and Product Services Division, 
encompassing a series of new, potentially. high-growth busi- 
nesses that have evolved from mainstream Cat operations in 
reccnt years. Antl thcrc's o new service division, Corporate 
Auditing and Compliance. 
N e w  Produc t  Deve lopment:  We revamped 
this process several years ago, dramatically shortening the inter- 
vals between product updates and putting multidisciplinary 
teams in charge of everything fro111 design to ~narketing. As a 
result, we've been able to conlinuously improve our products, 
regularly ~ ~ p d a t i n g  the product line to respond to everchanging 
customer requirements. In 1994 alone, we introduced 53 new or 
imlxovcd protlucts. 
FOCUS on Growth Markets: Nearly 23 percent 
of our total sales in 1994 were in regions with enormous needs 
for conslruction equipment - Asia, Latin America, Africa and 
the Middle East, iuid Central Europe. As part of our strategy, we 
continue to ally ourselves with some of the most prominent 
companies in new areas of opportunity. In 1994, w e  signed 
two joint venture agreements in Russia, with AMO-ZiL and 
with Kirovsky Zavod; and in China, with Shanghai Diesel and 
with Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group. We established 
new denlersliips - in Vietnam and in tlie Shanghai region of 
Cliin:~. We anticipate significant growth in  tlcvcloping areas, 
particularly in infrastructure development and power genera- 
tion. In 1994 alone, we sold $60 million worth of our largest 
electr ic  power generator  sets ,  installetl on  barges, . . to the 
Philippines. We expect similar p~~rc l iases  in'the fi~ture in other 
areas hungry for electrical power. 
F r e e  T r a d e :  ' r h ~  ;lclvantagcs of ~'rcc t~-;~tlc h c:lmc cvi- 
dcnt in 1994. In the first full year of thc North Anlcric:ui Frcc 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), we sold $239 million worth of 
US.-produced Cat products to Mexico, an increase in exports of 
59 percent over 1993. But tlie big prize was tlie General 
Agreement on Tarirfs and Trade (GATT) - an agreement that 
will create a tariff-free marketplace for C:iterpill:u- that is I4 
times tlie size of that cre:~ted hy NAFTA. Fol- Cat cuslomers in 
Europe, Japan, Australia and many developing countries, GATT 
will eliminate the tariff-related premium they've had to pay for 
American protlucts. Tariffs currently cost Cat customers about 
$100 million annually. The elimination of those trade barriers is 
expected to generate an additional $350 million a year in Cat 
sales in the year 2000. 
L a b o r :  Thc company was ch:~llenged by UAW strikes ;I[ 
several O F  our Midwestern facilities tluring 1994. Our employees 
rose to the occasion, clemonstrating a diversity of skills and a 
motivation to help Caterpillar maintain its competitive posi- 
tion. Though tlic long strike began in June ant1 continued 
Toyota sales in Japan and overseas ('lb~llion) 
Fiscal 1995 was a 9-month period. The dotted lines represent 12-month conversions. W Sales in Japan Z Sales outside Japan H Total 
M1995 FYI995 
Y billion FYI986 FYl987 FY1988 FYI989 PH990 FYI991 FYI992 FYI993 FYI994 lg months) (12 monlhs) 
Total 6,646.2 6,675.4 7,215.8 8.021.0 9.192.8 9,855.1 10.163.4 10.210.7 9.362.7 8.121.0 10,828.0 
Sales in Japan 3,603.5 3,780.7 4,449.6 4,907.1 5,400.1 5.714.7 5.880.1 5,653.2 5,295.8 4,812.5 6.416.7 
SalesautsideJaoan 3.042.7 2.894.7 2.766.2 3.113.9 3.792.7 4.140.4 4.283.3 4,557.5 4,066.9 3,308.5 4.411.3 
Vehicle sales worldwide* (lhousandsolvehicles) Units (% 01 total) (9 FYI995 months) (12 MI995 monlhs) p(19g4 Annuaalued %change 
Tatai' 3,260,670(100.0) 4,347,560 4.130,846(100.0) 15.2 
5,000 Passenger cars 2,581,546 (79.2) 3,442.061 3,293,550 (79.7) 4 . 5  
Trucks and buses 679,124 (20.8) 905,499 837.296 (20.3) +8.1 
4,000 
\ 'The figures for unit sales do not include vehicles assembled outside Japan by unconsolidated campanies fram knockdown sets of parts. 
3,000 , 
2.000 
1.000 
n 
M 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
*Passenger cars -Trucks and buses Total 
Fiscal 1995 was a 9-month period. The dotted lines represent 12-month conversions. 
FYI995 FYI995 FY19g4 Annualized Vehicle sales O V ~ ~ S F ! ~ S *  (thousandsafvehicles) Unils (% olglobal tolal) (9 months) (12 months) %change 
Total' 1,699,700 (52.1) 2,266,267 2,120,716(51.3) 4 . 9  
2.500 Passengercars 1,247,528(38.2) 1,663,371 1,563,W6(37.8) +6.4 
Trucks and buses 452~72(13.9) 602,896 557.710 (13.5) 4 . 1  
Unit sales by region (% oloverseas total) 
, , Narth America 911,578(53.6) 1,215,438 1.105.447(52.1) t9.9 
, a Europe 288.065 (16.9) 384,087 384,249 (18.1) 0.0 
East and SE Asia 224,401 (13.2) 299,201 270.936(12.8) t10.4 
Middle East 90,870 (5.3) 121,160 144,162 (6.81 -16.0 
 atin in ~merica '76,528 (4.5) 102.037 90.101 (4.3) +13.2 
---- Oceania 72.549 (4.3) 96,732 91,532 (4.3) +5.7 
500 Africa . 31,516 (1.9) 42.021 29.275 (1.4) 43.5 
Other regions . 4,193 (0.3) 5.591 5.014 (0.2) t11.5 
0 1993 1994 FY 1491 1992 1995 
il Passenger cars 7 Trucks and buses Total 
. . .  . . ,  . 
. .  . Fiscal 1995 was a 9-month perlad. The dotted llnes represent 12-month conversions. ' :' ' '. ' "  .:" ,,-: ".. ..", . . 
, . . . . ,  . . .  
The Japanese market showed signs of recovery during the past fiscal period, 
but the stubbornly strong yen clouds the outlook. 
New-vehicle registrations in Japan during the nine months of our past 
fiscal term increased 7.5% over the same nine months of the previous 
year, reversing three consecutive years of decline. 
We made the most of firming demand and maintained our share of more 
than 40% of the Japanese market. 
Globalizing our purchasing and production reinforced our competitiveness 
in the Japanese market. 
4 One way ro stimulate 
demand for motor vehicles is 
to demonstrare new possibili- 
ties in motoring lifestyles. 
That> the purpose of Sanage 
Adventure ~ie ld;  a commer- 
cial off-road course that 
opened in 1994 on a wooded 
hillside near our headquar- 
ters in Toyora City. Toyota 
and a Toyota subsidiary char 
assembles Land Cruisers 
were the prime movers in 
building the Sanage course. 
The course lets drivers tackle 
off-road challenges without 
damaging the environment. 
It has become a popular 
recreational spot where 
friends and family can enjoy 
outdoor barbecues, as well 
as off-road motoring. 
1 ofour main planrs in hours o f  [he morning. The 
pan srvirched ro a conrir~u- conrinztotis shifrs ref7ecr 
ts rwo-shifr workday ir~ gains in prodricriviry, ~vhich 
)95. The lare shifi begirls at have enabled 11s to [rim 
Ijp.nt., only art hour nfier workitrg hours, especially 
e scheduled end o f  the day ovenime, in recenr years. 
if?. Thar frees enrplo>ezs They enable employees ro 
11n [he inconvenience o f  enjoy more rime rvirh rheir 
3rkiiig urzv 11110 the mrh [umilies. b 
Market share in Japan (not including minicars) 4 Toyoras contintre to Moror Co., Lrd., which 
account for more rhan 40% is a leading mantrfacturer 
o f  new-vehicle regisrrations ofnrinicars in Japan.) We 
in Japan, not incltrding mini- expect to increase our markel 
cars, a segment in which we share in Japan significanl1~ 
rln nor cortrpete. (We own bv rlre end ofrlre decade. 
(1 16.6% stoke it? Dnilrnuit 
Toyota sales ~n Japan totaied the ~mpact of the strong yen on those models at our Kentucky 
1,560,970 veh~cles in the nlne- our bus~ness ~n other nations To plant Importing those cars from 
month fiscal period to March 
1995. That implies an annualized 
increase of 3.5% over the previ- 
ous year. 
Japan is our leading source of 
sales by far, and we maintain the 
largest share of the Japanese 
automobile market. Our solid 
cash flow in Japan helps offset 
maximize that cash flow, we con- 
tinue working to raise efficiency 
in our Japanese operat~ons. 
imports of parts and vehicles 
are an important way of raising 
efficiency. The United States is 
the biggest market, for example, 
for the Camry and the Avalon. 
So, we concentrate production of 
Vehicle sales in Japan (lhousandsalveh~des) 
the United States is less expen- 
sive than gearing up production 
lines to make them in Japan. 
We market made-in-U.S.A. 
Carnrys through 1,971 sales out- 
lets in Japan and the Avalon 
through 1,085. Similarly, we are 
preparing to begin marketing a 
version of the Chevrolet Cavalier 
that General Motors will produce 
for us to sell in Japan. We will 
market that car as the Toyota 
Cavalier through 1,089 outlets. 
We also continue to import a 
huge volume of parts and mate- 
rials from affiliated and unaffiliat- 
ed manufacturers around the 
world. Also in the name of raising 
efficiency, we are expanding our 
activity in sharing parts and 
commercial vehicles with two 
Japanese automakers: Daihatsu 
Motor and Hino Motors, Ltd. We 
North American customers continue to welcome the quality and value of 
Toyota and Lexus vehicles. We have responded by providing them with locally 
made products. 
Our Kentucky plant will start handling the machining locally for the V-6 
engines it produces for Camrys and Avalons. 
When we finish expanding our Canadian plant in 1997, plants in North 
America will produce all the Corolla sedans we sell there. 
Our California joint venture with General Motors produces all the light 
pickup trucks we sell in North America, as well as a lot of the Corollas. 
We have begun studying the possibility of building an additional plant in 
the United States. 
The Kentucky plant where tve 
make Camrys and Avalons 
is the best plant in North 
America in productivity and 
quality. The industrial survey 
firm Harbour and Associates 
has ranked rhe Kentttcky 
dant first or second in 
productivity among all North 
American plants in each of 
the past sir years. During the 
&me period, the plant has 
ranked first three rimes in 
an annual quality survey 
by the marker research f rm 
J. D. Power and Associates. F 
4 Ortr vehicle plant in 
Ontario, Canada, began 
prod~ccing Corollas in 1988. 
It since has won numerous 
awards, iilclttdirzg the 1995 
J.D. Power Gold Plant 
Quality Award. That award 
goes to the North American 
vehicle plant that turns out 
the fitvest prodttct defects. 
The Ontario plant started 
with a capacity for 50,000 
cars a year and notv cart 
make 80,000. We will open 
a12 engine line at the plant in 
October 1995. And we broke 
grorlnd in spring 1995 for 
a prodricrion line that will 
raise [he plant> capacity to 
200,000 cars a year in 1997. 
'orth American prodtlcrion those nations. And that per- Local production: Now more than 112 of local sales ilhousanosolvehicissl 
"Toyora cars artd trucks cenrage confinues ro rise. By 1,200 
>nrinries to grow Ji~ster than 1996, we plan to be manrt- Norlh American sales 
.ir North American sales, facturirtg 790,000 vehicles 900 
tir ulnitts in the Uizited arzn~iallv in North Aiiterica. b 
0 
FY 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
F~scal 1995 was ;I I - ~ n o ~ r l h  period. The dotltt l  IIIIDS represent 12-IIIIIII~~ CO~IV~~SIIIIIS. 
Operations continued to generate a strong cash flow. Net cash pro- 
vided by operating activities totaled Y424.2 billion ($4,767 million). The 
12-month conversion of that volume is Y565.6 billion. 
Our liquid assets totaled Y2.543.8 billion ($28.582 million) at the end 
of the fiscal period, compared with Y2,365.9 billion at the previous year- 
end. Interest-bearing debt-net of liabilities at our finance sub- 
sidiaries-increased 12.6%, to Y1,136.7 billion ($12,771 million). 
Additions to property, plant and equipment-not including invest- 
ment in leased vehicles-totaled Y282.6 billion ($3,175 million).The 12- 
month conversion of that investment. at Y379.8 billion, suggests an 
increase of 151% over the previous year. The chief targets of capital 
Shareholders' equity (Y billion, iefl scale) 
and equity ratio (%I  
Shareholders' equity 4.577.9 4,718.9 4.762.5 4,829.8 5.020.8 (Y billion) 
Equity ratio 50.9 49.2 50.6 50.0 48.3 1%) 
Total assets (Y billion) 
12.000 
spending were facilities and equipment for developing new technolo- 
gies and products. equipment renewals and automated systems at pro- 
duction facilities, and housing and other facilities for employee welfare. 
Cash flow' 
and capital investment (Yb~lllon) 
FY 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
B Capital investment'. 804.2 768.3 555.9 330.0 282.6 
Cash flow 811.4 677.7 621.3 526.2 462.3 
N e t  income 431.5 237.8 176.5 125.8 132.0 
5: Depreciationx' 379.9 439.9 444.8 400.4 330.3 
'Cash flow ic the narrow sense of net income plus depreciation 
"Not including vehicles for leasing 
Fiscal 1995 was a 9-month period. The doned lines represent 12-month conversions 
Investment and Funding Plans 
We will continue to allocate ample resources to necessary investment 
in facilities for developing new technologies and products and in equip- 
ment renewals and automation. Our plans call for funding all our capi- 
tal spending with cash flow from operations. 
Meanwhile, financing for customers and for dealers is an increas- 
ingly important aspect of our business.To help fund that financing, we 
will continue to supplement our cash flow from operations through 
fund-raising in the world's capital markets. Our strategy provides for 
continuing to upgrade our capabilities in raising funds locally in princi- 
gal markets around the world. 
Consolidated Financial Statements 
Consolidated Balance Sheets 
Toyola Molor Corporalion and Consolidaled Subsidiaries 
March 31. 1995. and June 30, 1994 
Thousands 01 U.S. 
Millions of yen dollars (Nole 1) 
ASSETS 199s 1994 199s 
Current Assets: . .. 
Cash and cash equivalents Y 1,450,588 Y 944,879 $ 16,298,743 
Short-term investments 261,031 762,181 2,932,936 
Trade notes and accounts receivable (Note 6) 
Inventories (Note 3) 
Other 
Less: allowance for doubtful receivables (5l9M7) (45,654) (573,562) 
Total current assets 5,019,961 4,697,879 56,404,055 
Investments and Other Assets: 
Investments in securities 1,087,712 917,512 12,221,487 
Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries and affiliates 861,281 922,269 9,677,311 
Long-term loans 255,211 362,293 2,867,535 
Other 
Less: allowance for doubtful receivables 
. .  . 
Total investments and other assets 2,261,759 2,238,467 25,413,027 
Property, Plant and Equipment: 
Land 
Buildings and structures 
Machinery and equipment (Note 4) 4,899,339 4,282,436 55,048,748 
Construction in progress 56,006 59,329 629,284 
Less: accumulated depreciation 
- 
(3,986,496) (3,477,347) (44,792,093) 
Net property, plant and equi~ment 2.990.659 2.632.988 33.602.908 
Translation Adjustments 123.437 88.304 1.386.936 
Total Assets Y10,395,816 Y9,657,638 $116,806,926 
See accompanying notes to consolidaled linancial stalemenls. 
Tliausands 01 U S 
M~llhofls 01 yen dollars (Note I) 
LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY 1995 1994 1995 
Current Liabilities: 
Short-term debt 
Trade notes and accounts payable (Note 6) 
Accrued expenses 633,387 594,881 7,116,703 
Accrued income taxes (Note 8) 106,150 70,238 1,192,695 
Deposits received 74,560 60,953 837,749 
Other 301,764 256,826 3,390,609 
Total current liabilities 
-- 
3,075,440 2,822,522 34,555,505 
Long-term Liabilities: 
Long-term debt (Note 5) 1,900,120 1,675,704 21,349,661 
Retirement and severance benefits 334,171 301,014 3,754,733 
Other 408 61 0 4,586 
-. - 
Total long-term liabilities 2,234,699 1,977,328 25,108,980 
Minority Interests in Consolidated Subsidiaries 64,835 28,033 728,484 
Contingencies (Note 7) 
Shareholders' Equity (Note 9): 
Common stock, par value Y50: 
Authorized-10,000,000,000 shares 
Issued-3,738,134,961 shares in 1995 275,198 - 3,092,116 
3,723,405,831 shares in 1994 - 261,800 - 
Capital surplus 291,556 278,179 3,275,915 
Legal reserve 65,450 65,212 735,393 
Retained earnings 4,388,638 4,224,578 49,310,538 
Less: treasury common stock (0) (14) (5) 
Total shareholders' equity 5,020,842 4,829,755 56,413,957 
Total Liabilities and Shareholders' Equity Y10,395,816 Y9,657,638 $116,806,926 
sol idated Statements of lncome 
I Motor Corporat~on and Consolidated Subs;diar;es 
ended March 31. 1995, and June 30. 1994 and 1993 
Thousands ol ll S 
~~ ~ 
Millions 01 yen dollars (Note 1) 
1995 (9 months) 1994 1993 1995 (9 months) 
Net Sales Y8,120,975 Y9,362,732 Y10,210,749 $91,246,916 
Cost of Sales 6,876,796 8,151,905 8,946,263 77,267.373 
. . 
Gross profit 1,244,179 1,210,827 1,264,486 13,979,543 
Selling, General and Administrative 
Expenses (Note 8) 988,459 1,074,600 1,082.589 11,106,286 
Operating income 255,720 136,227 181,897 2,873,257 
Other lncome (Expenses): 
Interest and dividend income 82,513 130,748 154,371 927,117 
Interest expense (39,311) (46,357) (53,389) (441,698) 
Other, net (24,109) 15,913 39,330 . (270,888) 
Income before income taxes 274,813 236,531 322,209 3,087,788 
lncome Taxes (Note 8): 
Current 
Tax effect of timing differences 
Minority Interests in lncome of 
Consolidated Subsidiaries 4,210 2,101 2,737 47,304 
Amortization of Consolidation Difference 21 106 89 239 
Equity in Earnings of Affiliates 20,118 15,105 18,341 226,040 
Net income Y 131,953 Y 125,807 Y 176,465 $ 1,482,619 
US, dollars 
Yen (Note 1) 
Amounts per Share: 
Net income Y34.40 Y32.95 Y46.04 $0.387 
Dividends 
-. 
14.50 19.00 19.00 0.163 
See accompanying noles lo consolidated linancial slalemenls. 
ANNUAL REPORT 1995 
YEAR ENDED MARCH 3 1 .  1995 
-INAI'ICIAI_ H I G H L I G H T S  
I( )XI>;\ ,\I()TOK (:O.,  1.1'1) .\NU 5~J l~S l l l l ~ \R lC~  
wrs et~cl?cl jbt~rcl~ J l  Yen U.S. dollars 
(millions except (thousands except 
per share amounts) per share amounts) 
1994 1995 1995 
Set sales and other operating revenue ...................................................... Y3,862,71 6 Y3,966,164 
. . 
$44,389,077 
-1perattng Income ..................................................................................... 78,328 107,916 1,207,790 
icome before income taxes and equity in income of affiliates ................. 46,890 94,287 1,055,255 
let income ............................................................................................... 23,699 61,525 688,584 
............................................................................... Fer common share 24.28 63.00 0.71 
.............................................................................. Per American share 48.56 126.00 1.41 
ash dividends paid during the period ................................................... 13,631 13,635 152,602 
Per common share ................................................................................. 14 
Per American share .............................................................................. 2 8 
.ockholdersf equity .................................................................................. 967,345 
Per common share 993.47 
Per American share ................................................................................ 1,986.94 
~ t a l  assets ............................................................................................... 2,921,084 
, . 
eprec~at~on ............................................................................................. 143,229 
3pital expenditures ................................................................................ Y 12 1,838 
Xes: 1. One American share represents two (2) shares of Honda common stock. 
2 .  Net income per common (or American) share is based on the weighted average numbel. o i  shares o i  common stock outsranding during each 
fiscal year and the number o i  shares issuable upon conversion of common stock equivalents. 
3. Eiiective April 1, 1994, the Company adopted Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 11 5, "Accounting for Certain Investments in 
Debt and Equity Securities." Net unrealized gains on marketable equity securities, less related income taxes, are presented as a separate compo- 
nent of stockholders' equity, and net income for the fiscal year ended March 31. 1995 was not aifecred by adoption of this statement. 
irs ended March 31 
it Sales Breakdown (thousands1 
Motorcycles Automobiles Power Products 
1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995 
~- - - -- - - - 
)an ....................................................... 671 649 566 ' 577 92 137 
krth America ......................................... 114 110 828 860 607 722 
rope ..................................................... 292 319 156 176 425 442 
hers ................................................... 3,092 3,737 203 181 590 703 
.al ......................................................... 4,l 69 4,815 1,753 1,794 1,714 2,004 
Motorcycle Automobile 
Business Business Others 
Sales Breakdown (millions o i  yen) 1994 1995 1994 1995 1994 1995 
an ...................................................... Y154,075 Y149,500 Y1,034,216 Y1,081,509 Y 94,480 Y 95,478 
rth America ......................................... 59,399 57,873 1,465,383 1,462,490 126,300 139,510 .. 
ope ..................................................... 107,059 96,961 297,568 355,276 33,909 35,823 
lers ..................................................... 226,692 248,342 235,803 210,193 27,832 33,209 
....................................................... al Y547,225 $552,676 Y3,032,970 Y3,109,468 Y282,521 Y304,020 
~ g h o u t  this report, the United States dollar amounts have been trans- 
irom Japanese yen solely ior the convenience of the reader at the rate 
39.35=US$l, the mean o i  the telegraphic transfer selling exchange 
and the telegraphic transier buying exchange rate prevailing on the 
10 ioreign exchange market on March 31 ,  1995. 
niormation regarding business segments has been prepared in  accor- 
:e with a Ministerial Ordinance under the Securities and Exchange 
o i  lapan, which requires certain information to be disclosed includ- 
liisiness segment information. Business segment categorization is 
based on the similarity of the principal products included within each 
segment as well as the relevant markets for such products: the motorcycle 
business segment consists pr~ncipally of motorcycles and relevant parts; 
the automobile business segment consists principally of automobiles and 
relevant parts; and the others segment consists of financial services and 
other businesses, including power products and relevant parts and trading 
subsidiaries. 
The geographical breakdown is based on the location of affiliated and 
unaffiliated customers. 
1 
R E S I D E N T ' S  M E S S A G E  
lririg fiscal 1995, encled March 3 1, 
95, the Unitecl States ancl Europe con- 
uecl to enjoy robust dernancl ior 'iuto- 
)biles. LVe are hdppy to say that lapan 
o iinally saw ,111 il l j turn in ~u tomol ) i l e  
es for the yex.  tlo~vever, lapan's auto 
lustry is curren~lv undergoing co~isicler- 
e change, the strain5 irorii which ,ire 
rentlv being euacerh,~tetl !by the rapid 
~reci,irion o i  the yeri ancl tratle tli\putes 
h the Unitetl St,~tes. 
N A N C I A L  R E V I E W  
sl~ i tc  z i~c l i  c l i r i i i . t~l l~c\,  \ i i ~ ~ r ~ l :  ,111111 \.IIu' 
\Ill1111 i\ l l l l ' l II 1 1  ,1111l 1:11ro~)1~ 11t~11,,,1l 1111\11 
l l i l < l ' 5  < l l l l ~ l ~ l l , l , l l l ~ , l  111,t \Lllc,\ Ill1 2 :');, 
1 1  IIII, I I IWI I I I I , .  \ ~ , , I I .  I,, \; I.'rr,i, I l~11111111 
(544,389 rn i l l ion~.  The steady growth in 
revenue from our motorcycle bi~siness, 
ancl continuecl successes in ,Asian markets 
outsicie Japan, was another important iac- 
lor in this year', satisivirlg results. 
We cicloptecl several iniportant rarion.11- 
iration nle,isures durinp tile ypar to rnaxi- 
mize the beneiits irom our .;,iles restilts, 
inclucling cost-cutl~nq in:ti,itives that 
eiiectively counteretl the inip,ict o i  the 
yen's strenqth c l t ~ r i r i ~  the year. As a result, 
operatlrig income rose to Y 11)7.C) hi l l ion 
15 l,.!O?j ~ i i i l l i o ~ i ~ ,  17.>j" ,8  111l:Iit:r tliciri LI 
v~,,ir r.~,iilicr. ,X~!I II~I.~IIIIL, tor tlit, vf!,lr 
\IJ~II ' IY~ I 5 ' I . I ~ " ~ ~ .  to \OI l ) i l l i i t ~ ~  1 ' 5 0 t i O  
l l l l ! l l l ~ l ~ l  I(,lll,, l l l l ~ , ~  ~ Ill . l l l l l l l l ,~ l~ \I> l~ll, O l l l -  
1 : l I l  l l l l l l l  l l l .  I ,,Ill, I l l l l ( ~  <.Ill1 
from the termination o i  Honcla's equity 
relationship with Rover Group Limited. 
O P E R A T I O N A L  R E V I E W  
I WOLIICI like to look in more cietail at our 
operatioris in each o i  Honcla's i o i ~ r  major 
business regions. 
In a buoyant North :\rnerican auto mar- 
ket, Honc1~'s auto~nobile sales continued 
to be robust, with iavorable sales o i  the 
mainstay Accorcl series ancl a very promis- 
 rig reception ior the Ociyssey, our new- 
c011ccpt m i~ i i van  introducetl l a ~ e  last year 
in t!1r U ~ i ~ t c ~ d  jtdte5. Thrs i\l)ril SJ\V  lhe 
1,1~111(.11 01 i l ~ i ~ ~ ~ l i ( ~ r  I C \ I V  ~iior/(:I. ~l l t :  r\curil 
2:) 1.1 III\LI~V \1~1l<111, ~ v l l l l  i l  i Y 1 '  l l l l ~ l ~ ,  
\ \( I1 l l l ~ l l ~  , ~ ~ l , l l l l l ~ l l  :\1 iI1,l .I\ 1 1 1 4 ,  l , ~ . l i l l l l ~  
lsiness Segment Information 
ars ended March 31 
e t  sales and other operating revenue: 
Motorcycle Business 
....................................................................................................... Sales to unaffiliated customers 
Automobile Busines 
. . 
....................................................................................................... Sales to unaff~llated customers 
Financial Services 
. . 
....................................................................................................... Sales to unaffll~ated customers 
lntersegment sale 
Total .......................................................................................................................................... 
Other Businesses 
....................................................................................................... Sales to unaffiliated customers 
......................................................................................................................... lntersegment sales 
. 
. 
................................................................................... Total ............. .......................................... 223, 040 244. 742 
..................................................................... ................................... Adjustments and eliminations .... 
rnsolidated ....................................................................................................................................... 
-1erating income: 
......................................................................................................................... 'dotorcycle Business 
.................................................. ..................................................................... 4utomobile Business ; 
- . 
-1nancial Services ............................................................................................................................. 
3ther Businesses ................................................................................................ ; ............................. 
Yen 
:ographical Segment Information (millions) 
~ r s  ended March 31 1994 1995 
ct sales and other operating revenue: 
apan 
Sales to unaffiliated customers ....................................................................................................... Y1.646. 594 
Transfer between geographical segments ........................................................................................ 1.229. 021 
Total ........................................................................................................................................... 2.875. 61 5 
lutside Japan 
Sales to unaffiliated customers ....................................................................................................... 2.216. 122 
Transfer between geographical segments ....................................................................................... 79, 361 
Total ........................................................................................................................................... 2,295, 483 
Adjustments and eliminations ........................................................................................................... (1,308, 382) 
nsolidated ....................................................................................................................................... Y3.862. 71 6 
~erating income: 
apan ........................................................................................................................................................................ 
lutside Japan ........................................................................................................................................................... 
Total ................................................................................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................................................................. tdjustments and eliminations 
nsolidated ................................................................................................................................................................. 
ONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS 
3NDA MOTOR CO, LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES 
arch 31, 1994 and 1995 U.S. dollars ' 
Yen (thousands) 
(millions) (note 2) 
isets 1994 1995 1995 
I 
~ r r e n t  assets: 
Cash and cash equivalents ....... : .................................................................... Y 186,763 Y 202,993 $ 2,271,886 
Trade accounts and notes receivable, net of allowance 
fo i  doubtful accounts of ~ 8 , 5 7 6  million in 1994 and 
................................................ Y8,064 million ($90,252 thousand) in 1995 275,243 282,638 3,163,268 ' 
................................................ Finance subsidiaries-receivables, net (note 3) 21 2,139 21 4,966 2,405,887 i 
Inventories (note 4) ....................................................................................... 586,969 512,312 5,733,766 
............................. Prepaid expenses and other current assets (notes 7 and 9) 158,975 154,468 1,728,797 
Total current assets ..................................................................................... 1,420,089 1,367,377 15,303,604 ; 
.nance subsidiaries-receivables, net (note 3) .................................................. 328,861 369,217 4,132,255 
i 
vestments and advances: 
.......................................... Investments in and advances to affiliates (note 5) 87,158 
Other, including marketable equity securities (note 6) ................................... 121,066 
Total investments and advances ................................................................. 208,224 
,operty, plant and equipment, at cost (note 7): 
Land ............................................................................................................. 255,296 
Buildings ...................................................................................................... 596,951 
Machinery and equipment ............................................................................ 1,377,325 
Construction in progress ............................................................................... 27,074 
2,256,646 
. . Less accumulated deprec~at~on ..................................................................... 1,337,036 
Net property, plant and equipment ............................................................ 919,610 
lther assets (notes 7 and 9) ............................................................................ 44,300 48,619 544,141 
Y2,921,084 Y3,014,410 $33,737,101 
accompanying notes to consolidated financial statements. 
IONDA MOTOR CO., LTD. AND SUBSIDIARIES 
ears ended March 31, 1993. 1994 and 1995 U.S. dollars 
Yen (thousands) 
(millions) (note 21 
1993 1994 1995 1995 
4et sales and other operating revenue (note 3) ....................... Y4,132,435 Y3,862,716 Y3,966,164 $44,389,077 
Iperating costs and expenses: 
Cost of sales (note 3) ......................................................... 2,987,547 2,820,423 2,886,108 32,301,153 
....................................... Selling, general and administrative 836,899 775,150 769,136 8,608,125 
Research and development ................................................... 199,233 188,815 203,004 2,272,009 
4,'023,679 3,784,388 3,858,248 43,181,287 
Operating income .............................................................. 108,756 78,328 107,916 1,207,790 
=)ther income: 
Interest ................................................................................. 11,050 7,758 9,347 104,611 
Gain on sale of Rover Group Limited shares (note 5) ............ - - .14,654 164,007 
Other .................................................................................... 21,381 2,940 3,123 34,952 
32,431 10,698 27,124 303,570 
tther expenses: 
Interest ................................................................................. 43,426 35,379 34,382 384,801 
Other .................................................................................... 9,197 6,757 6,371 71,304 
52,623 42,136 40,753 456,105 
Income before income taxes and equity in income 
of affiliates ........................................................................ 88,564 46,890 94,287 1,055,255 
come taxes (note 9): 
Current ................................................................................. 46,021 21,742 45,400 508,114 
Deferred ............................................................................... 7,187 11,977 (496) (5,551) 
53,208 33,719 44,904 502,563 
Income before equity in income of affiliates ....................... 35,356 13,171 49,383 552,692 
quity in  income of affiliates (note 5) ...................................... 1,801 10,528 12,142 135,892 
Netincome ....................................................................... Y 37,157 Y 23,699 Y 61,525 $ 688,584 
U.S. dollars 
Yen (note 21 
1993 1994 1995 1995 
-- - -- 
et income per common share (note l(j)) ............................... Y 37.94 Y 24.28 . 63.00 $ 0.71 
? accompanying notes ro consolidi~ted f inanci~l srarements. 
TO OUR SHAREHOLDERS AND FRIENDS 
e made a lot of changes at Ford Motor Company 
in 1994. 
Over the course of the year, we brought many 
new ~roducts  to market and simificantly 
- 
strengthened our balance sheet. At the same time, we began a 
realignment of our automotive business that will give us more 
products and lower costs in the years to come. 
We merged our North American Automotive Operations and 
our European Automotive Operations into a single 
organization, Ford Automotive Operations, which began doing 
business on January 1,1995. We plan to fold our Asia-Rcific, 
South American and African operations into the same 
organization very soon - probably this year. 
We're determined to become leaner, faster and more 
competitive so that we can provide the greatest value to our 
customers and shareholders. This new alignment will enable 
us to reduce duplication, increase efficiency, spread best 
practices and improve economy of scale. 
We made this change because we foresee a fiercely 
competitive environment that will demand higher standards of 
performance in the future. We can't allow human and financial 
resources to be wasted duplicating vehicle platforms, 
powertrains and other basic components that serve nearly 
identical customer needs in different markets. 
For example, in ihe  future we'll have one small-engine family 
in Europe and North America, instead of two separate families 
that power the same kind of car for the same kind of customer 
I 
-yet are completely different and used duplicate resources in  
their development. 
This doesn't mean we're going to ignore regional differences 
or local customer preferences. Even with under-the-skin 
components that may be identical, the design and feel of our 
vehicles can be made very different to suit local tastes. And 
t 
we'll still have regional vehicles like the Lincoln Town Car in 
North America and the Ford Transit van in Europe. 
But instead of organizing ourselves by geography with 
i 
regional profit centers, we're organizing our global automotive ; 
business by product line. To do that, we created five vehicle j 
centers within Ford Automotive Operations, each with 
responsibility for worldwide development of the cars or trucks i 
assigned to them. I 
I 
NEW WAYS OF DOING BUSINESS 
I The c h a n p g  organization results from the change in the I 
Gcesse s  by which we run our business. We're using less top- ( 
down management and more cross-functional teamwork; less 
bureaucracy and more employee empowerment; fewer 
multiple approvals and more efficient decision-making. 
A single organization doesn't mean we've centralized power 
-just the opposite. We're pushing authority and 
accountability down into the organization as far as it will go, to, 
keep us fast and innovative and in touch with our customers. 
We're on our way-to-being-a . more . . . efficient, . . . agile organization 
'with fewer layers of management. We want our employees to 
keep learning. and to be.empowered to make dec5oris i t  the 
. . . . .. . . . 
i 
level closest to the action. r 
i 
I've told the entire Ford team that I want to reduce our 
coefficient of bureaucratic drag so that our business is as 
streamlined as our cars and tmcks. 
We also want to intensify our focus on the needs.and 
wants of our customers, giving them not only what they 
ask for, but also things they never dreamed they could 
have, all at outstanding value. 
In addition to changing the way we run our business, 
we're also changing the way we look at our business. 
Conventional wisdom says the automobile industry is 
mature. The reality is that there are exciting growth 
prospects around the world, particularly in emerging 
markets, and especially in Asia. 
Our strategy is one of profitable growth in these 
markets. In keeping with that strategy we launched a 
variety of new initiatives in emerging markets in 1994, 
including three new joint venture component operations 
in China, manufacturing feasibility studies in India and 
Thailand, the start of a sales and marketing presence in 
Vietnam and re-entry into the South Afncan market. As 
part of our efforts to strengthen our presence in Brazil and 
Argentina, we also announced our intention to dissolve 
our Autolatina joint venture withvolkswagen. 
1994 FINANCIAL RESULTS 
Although we made sweeping changes in 1994 to prepare 
for the future, we didn't forget to run the business in the 
present. As a result, we had our best year ever. 
We earned $5.3 billion, or $4.97 per share of Common 
and Class B stock in 1994, a record for any year and more 
than double the earnings of last year. 
Our net income from worldwide automotive operations 
was $3.8 billion, an improvement of $2.9 billion from 
1993. The after-taw return on sales was 3.6 percent, up 2.5 
percentage points. In the United States, it was 4.2 
percent. 
In the United States, we swept the market with five of 
the eight best-sellingvehicles, including both the best- 
selling car and truck, Ford T a w s  and Ford F-Series. We 
also were the leading exporter of vehicles from the United 
States and Canada, with a record 120,133 units, up almost 
70 percent from 1993. 
In Europe, our combined market share of 12.1 percent 
was Ford's highest in 10 years. Three of the eight best- 
selling cars in Europe were kom Ford - Fiesta, Escort and 
Mondeo. In Britain, Ford held market leadership for the 
18th year in a row and had the three best-selling cars. 
We also maintained car sales leadership in Australia for 
the 13th year in a row. 
Our other core business, Financial Services Group, 
earned $1.5 bilhon in 1994, down $105 million from 1993. 
This included a $440 million charge related to the sale of 
First Nationwide Bank. Excluding the charge, profits were 
$1.9 billion, up more than $300 million from 1993's record 
earnings, and included record earnings at Ford Credit,The 
Associates and USL Capital. 
Our balance sheet is strong, and becoming stronger. We 
finished 1994 with automotive cash and marketable 
securities of $12.1 billion, a record year-end level. 
Stockholder equity was increased by more than 
$6 billion during the year. 
BUILDING ON STRENGTH. 
W~th these outstanding results, some might question the 
need for change. One reason we're changing is because 
we're still not satisfied and we know we can do better. We 
want to lower our costs, improve our return on sales and 
have a higher level of net cash so that we"waterproof"our 
balance sheet to withstand future economic downturns. 
Even if we were satisfied with our results, we couldn't 
afford to stand still. The world is changing, and we have 
to change with it. 
One major change is the movement toward freer trade 
around the world, what has been called the"border1ess 
wor1d"by some, and the"end of geographynby others. 
The competitive playing field is larger and more open 
than it's ever been before. That means Ford is going to 
have to compete increasingly with the best companies in 
the world, wherever they are located and wherever they 
operate. 
Some people are calling the intense, fast-paced, high- 
stakes battle that will result from this new global market 
"hypercompetition." I call it a real doghght. Whatever it's 
called, it's going to be tougher competition than anything 
we've experienced in the past. 
We also know that ours is a cyclical industry. And we 
believe strongly that there is no better time to prepare for 
tougher competition and cyclical downturns than when 
the overall outlook for the automotive business is good. 
The global market isn't the only thing that's changing. 
Competition, new technologies and government 
regulation are causing the evolution of the automobile to 
advance at an unprecedented pace. New technologies 
such as advanced electronics, ultra-light materials, 
computer-aided design and a host of others could change 
cars and trucks more radically in the next 10-20 years than 
in the last 100. At the same time these technologies will 
The 1996 Mercury Sable station wagon, on sale in fall 1995. 
incorporates advanced new thinking in design and engineering. 
rround: New 1995 
.ers at Ford's St. Louis 
ibly Plant. 
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F O R D  M O T O R  C O ' M P A N Y  A N D  S U B S I D I A R I E S  . .  . . 
F O R 0  M O T O R  C O M P A N Y  A N 0  S U B S I D I A R I E S  
PERATING HIGHLIGHTS 
1994 1993 1992 
-1orldwide factory sales of cars 
and trucks (in thousands) 
Jnited States 
3utside United States 2,363 2.141 2,403 
Total 6.639 5.965 5.764 
- ~~ 
a les and revenues (in millions) 
brutomotive $107,137 $ 91,568 $ 84.407 
-inancia1 Services 21,302 16,953 15.725 
Total $1 28.439 $108.521 $100.132 
come/(loss) before cumulative effects of 
changes in accounting principles (in millions) 
-c\utomotive 
=inancia1 Services 1,484* 1,589 1,032 
Total $ 5,308 $ 2.529 $ (502) 
-et income/(loss) (in millions) 
4utomotive 
-inancia1 Services 1,484* 1,589 1,243 
Total $ 5.308 $ 2.529 S (7.385) 
-apital expenditures (in millions) 
4;tomoti;e $ 8,310 $ 6,714 $ 5.697 
-inancia1 Services 236 100 93 
Total $ 8,546 $ 6,814 $ 5,790 
.ockholders' equity at  December 31 
rota1 (in millions) 
-After-tax return on Common and 
Class B stockholders' equity 
~tomotive cash, cash equivalents, 
snd  marketable securities at 
IDecember 31 (in millions) 
  to motive debt at December 31 (in millions) 
  to motive after-tax returns on sales 
iares of Common and Class B Stock (in millions) 
Average number outstanding 
dumber outstanding at December 31 
YlOUNTS PER SHARE OF COMMON AND CLASS B 
IrOCK AFTER PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDENDS 
:ome/(loss) before cumulative effects of 
:hanges in accounting principles 
Automotive 
:inancia1 Services 1.47 1.61 1.06 
otal $ 4.97 $ 2.27 $ (.73) 
:ome/(loss) 
iutomotive $ 3.50 $ 0.66 $ (9.08) 
'inancial Services 1.47 1.61 1.27 
otal $ 4.97 $ 2.27 $ (7.81) 
:ome/(loss) assuming full dilution $ 4.44 $ 2.10 $ (7.81) 
rsh dividends per share of Common 
end Class B Stock $ 0.91 $ 0.80 $ 0.80 
- - - 
includes a loss of $440 million related to the disposition of Granite Savings Bank (formerly First Nationwide Bank). 
Results in this period were a loss. 
are data have been restated to reflect the 2.for-1 stock split that became effective June 6, 1994. 
